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Social unrest and armed violence rewind development achievements in the fight
against poverty. This thesis examines various factors contributing to social unrest
and armed violence in different parts of a country. A common method of this thesis
is the empirical regression analysis of geo-spatial data to explain social unrest and
armed violence. I find four results. First, social unrest occurs more likely in areas
where droughts coincide with existing ethnic grievances. Second, to identify these
grievances, we develop a novel spatial inequality measure between and within ethnic
groups. Validation of the inequality measure against perceived differences in identity
groups’ economic conditions shows that individuals feel ethnic grievances. Third,
competition between armed groups causally increases the level of violence. Finally,
there is no evidence that development aid increases civil wars, but Chinese aid seems
to increase state repressions and a higher tolerance for autocratic rule. This thesis
shows that spatial characteristics can help understand and explain social unrest and
armed violence within countries.
Keywords: Political economy, social unrest, economic development, political
violence, ethnic inequality
Acknowledgements
Little did I know that starting my Ph.D. in Hannover would permanently accelerate
my eating pace in an attempt to keep up with the team’s daily speed eating
competition during lunch. However, I did anticipate that I would learn a lot about
research, and I am greatly thankful for that.
First of all, I thank Martin Gassebner for supervising me, maximizing research
time, providing me an environment where I could learn, train, network, improve,
and perform. I feel exceptionally blessed to have Martin as a supervisor. He gave
me professional feedback, resources, and advice that put my career at the center and
other things as a secondary priority. Talking and joking during conference dinners
and chair celebrations made the working environment fun and constructive at the
same time. His open-door policy invited me to ask stupid questions or call him for
a coffee hangout at the chair’s “living room,” also called Paul and Richard’s office
in 2015. I also like to thank Andreas Fuchs as my Co-supervisor. He also invited
me to his geo-spatial workshop on natural disasters that shaped my research early
on.
A special thanks goes to my co-workers who never saved their hilarious criticism
against each other. Without their input, my dissertation would not have been
possible. Richard was the driving person who guided me in learning about geo-
spatial analysis. Richard is an academic tech-geek. It means that we shrugged
our shoulders when we lacked a screwdriver to dismount a hard drive from the
computer chassis. He brought a crappy one the next day, barely big enough for
any serious maintenance job. However, he knows everything on how to set up a
personal computer cluster analyze data in an elegant and econometric correct way.
He always has some code snippets flying around that get the job done fast and
helped me improve my own technical skills and research methods.
Arevik Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan’s signature comment is to criticize first before
coming to the time-consuming polite phrases during internal presentations. I like
to thank her for the weekly preparation meeting for our course. We sat together
and patiently solved a problem set just to find out that the solution is boring and
not worth teaching it to the students. She genuinely cares for the students’ learning
outcomes, and learning from her helped me improve my teaching.
Paul Schaudt always held my spirit high when I was demotivated by setbacks.
I marvel about his effectiveness in getting things done. He is just as quick learning
new methods as finishing his meal and going for an immediate cigarette. At the
same time, the rest still sits and eats for the next 10 minutes. He quit smoking long
ago but did not stop being effective in his research, as I witness as co-author. I miss
our morning coffee that shaped much of my understanding of armed conflict.
I thank Martin Hoffstadt for our time as office-mates and guitar sessions at night.
Hinnerk Gnutzmann taught me about the spite effect. The informal agreement was
that the first person to arrive in the office makes coffee, which I often did not. He
responded by brewing unbearable strong coffee to motivate me, making drinkable
coffee for us all. Today, I drink strong coffee. Martin, Tobias Korn, Andrea Cinque,
and Julian Wichert all offered me to stay at their place multiple times, supported me
by taking various responsibilities at the chair after my son’s arrival, and helped me to
handle the logistics of this dissertations in Hannover during my time in Washington,
DC.
I am indebted to the supervisory board and fellow Ph.D. candidates of the
Research Training Group1723: Globalization and Development. The travel grants
enabled me to attend various conference attendance. Still, more importantly, the
regular workshops’ attention and bright ideas tremendously improved my research
and helped me think critically. I also like to thank Kai Gehring and Lennart Kaplan,
with whom I invested lots of time and discussions on aid distribution for our joint
research project. I am thankful for Paul Raschky and Ashani Amarasinghe. They
hosted me at Monash University for a joint project unrelated to this dissertation.
Finally, I thank my family for their never-ending support. My parents are my
role models in taking up new challenges with considerable uncertainty when they
migrated from Hong Kong to Germany without language proficiency. My family-
in-law was always ready to take care of Jeremia to buy me some additional time
to work. My wife, Janina, deserves special attention. Thank you so much for your
support and never-ending patience with me and my work.
Contents
List of Tables i
List of Figures iv
1 Introduction 1
2 Triggering social unrest 4
2-1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2-2 Measuring local inequality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2-3 Data and empirical strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2-4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2-4.1 Extensions and mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2-4.2 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2-5 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2-6 Data appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2-A1 Additional summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2-B2 Additional figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2-7 Analytical appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3 Local inequality 29
3-1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3-2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3-3 Empirical strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3-4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3-4.1 Unconditional results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3-4.2 Salience of ethnicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3-4.3 Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3-5 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3-6 Data appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3-7 Analytical Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3-B1 Sensitivity of main results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3-B2 Sensitivity test of interaction results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4 Armed groups in conflict 49
4-1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4-2 Background: Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4-3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4-3.1 Dependent variable: Organized political violence . . . . . . . . 54
4-3.2 Independent variable: Number of armed groups . . . . . . . . 56
4-4 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
CONTENTS CONTENTS
4-4.1 Estimation Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4-4.2 Identifying Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4-5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4-5.1 Baseline results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4-5.2 Threats to identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4-6 Extensions and alternative channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4-6.1 Targets of armed groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4-6.2 Government response: Counter-insurgency . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4-6.3 Capacity effect and strategy changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4-6.4 Semi-elasticity of armed groups on political violence . . . . . . 72
4-7 Robustness tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4-8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4-9 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4-A1 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4-A2 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4-10 Counting incidents and fatalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4-B1 Counting all forms of organized political violence . . . . . . . 89
4-B2 Double counting organized political violence . . . . . . . . . . 90
4-11 Counting independent groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4-C1 Active armed groups & potential active armed groups . . . . . 98
4-C2 Active armed groups: One-hit wonders . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4-12 Ethnopolitical representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4-13 Matching groups between GTD and GED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4-14 Splits & mergers of armed groups within Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5 Development Aid and Conflict 112
5-1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5-2 Theoretical considerations and related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5-3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5-3.1 Aid Data: World Bank and China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5-3.2 Stability Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5-3.3 Control Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5-4 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5-5 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5-5.1 Fixed effects, time trends and control variables . . . . . . . . . 125
5-5.2 Instrumental Variable approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5-6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5-6.1 Outright conflict – OLS, fixed effects and time trends . . . . . 129
5-6.2 Outright conflict – Instrumental Variables . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5-6.3 Results - Types of Conflict and Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5-6.4 Results - Protest and government repression . . . . . . . . . . 136
5-6.5 Results - Attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5-6.6 Sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5-7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5-8 Data Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5-A1 Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5-A2 Independent Variables (Development Aid) . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5-A3 Dependent Variables (Conflict data) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5-A4 World Bank Aid in the Financial Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5-A5 Afrobarometer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5-9 Analytical Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5-B1 Instrumental Variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5-B2 Alternative Outcome Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
5-B3 Channels - Aid Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
5-B4 Channels - Ethnic groups and governing coalition . . . . . . . 190
5-B5 Regime Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
5-B6 Spatial Dimension (Spill Overs and Aggregation Levels) . . . . 195
5-B7 Mechanisms - Afrobarometer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
5-B8 Estimations - Miscellaneous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
6 Conclusion 216
List of Tables
2-1 Summary statistics of selected variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2-2 Local ethnic inequality and protests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2-3 Within-group vs. between-group inequality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2-4 Regional inequalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2-5 Initial and average inequality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2-6 Different drought measures, 100 km neighborhood size . . . . . . . 20
2-A1 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2-C1 Conflict type, 50 km neighborhood size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2-C2 SCAD protest with different precision codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2-C3 Between-group inequality based on GREG (Atlas Narodov Mira) . 27
2-C4 Uniform weighting in distance function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2-C5 Climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3-1 Descriptive statistics of ordered variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3-2 Ethnic inequality and perceived relative living conditions (OLS) . . 35
3-3 Ethnic inequality and perceived relative living conditions (Ordered
probit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3-4 Ordered probit marginal effects for between-group Theil indices . . 36
3-5 Ethnic identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3-6 Ethnic identification with GADM1 regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3-7 Drought impact on group salience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3-A1 Overview of Afrobarometer questions by questionnaire rounds . . . 41
3-A2 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3-B1 Main with dummy dependent variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3-B2 Main with tribe control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3-B3 Ordered probit with tribe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3-B4 Ordered probit marginal effects with tribe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3-B5 Main table with GREG regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3-B6 Main results with uniform distance weigthing . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3-B7 Main with split sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3-B8 Drought impact on group salience with full control set . . . . . . . 47
3-B9 Drought impact on group salience (SPEIgdm) . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3-B10 Drought impact on group salience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4-1 Baseline results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4-2 Controlling for other groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4-3 UBA faction vs. UBA group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4-4 Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4-5 Government response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4-6 DiD: Within Baloch separatist groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
i
ii List of Tables
4-7 DiD: Government action against BLA/UBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4-8 2SLS evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4-9 2SLS evidence: Heterogeneous treatment effects? . . . . . . . . . . 74
4-A1 Treated groups (mergers and splits) and location of incidents and
fatalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4-A2 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4-A3 Definition of the dependent variables in (1)eq. (1)Table 4-4 . . . . 84
4-A4 Baseline results: Alternative standard errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4-A5 Baseline results: PPML . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4-A6 Baseline results: Negative Binomial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4-A7 Log DV intensive margin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4-A8 Baseline results: Additional fixed effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4-A9 Baseline results: no controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4-A10 Baseline results: severe and fatal incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4-A11 DiD: Within Baloch separatist groups (BLA & UBA) . . . . . . . 87
4-A12 DiD: Within Non-Baloch separatist groups (BLA & UBA) . . . . . 87
4-A13 Nonlinear instrumental variable results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4-B1 All incidents and fatalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4-B2 All events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4-C1 Controlling for potential other groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4-C2 Controlling for potential other groups area of operation (convex hull)101
4-C3 Controlling for other groups: Counting one-hit wonders . . . . . . 101
4-D1 Ethnopolitical representation across districts . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4-D2 Ethnopolitical representation across provinces . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4-F1 Observed groups splits and reasons to split . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4-F2 Observed groups mergers and reasons to merge . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5-1 Donor Comparison: WB vs. China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5-2 Descriptive statistics - ADM1 Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5-3 OLS results - Aid and conflict likelihood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5-4 IV results - Aid and conflict likelihood at the ADM1 level . . . . . 133
5-5 Aid and conflict types by actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5-6 Protests and non-lethal government repression [SCAD] . . . . . . . 137
5-A1 Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5-A3 Aid Allocation Formula Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5-A4 Descriptive statistics - ADM1 Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5-A5 World Bank Aid in the Financial Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5-A6 Afrobarometer - Labels, questions and sources . . . . . . . . . . . 154
5-A7 Afrobarometer - Questionnaire rounds and countries . . . . . . . . 156
5-B1 ADM1 - Absence of Pre-Trends with IV. Regression with
Instrumented Lead of Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5-B2 ADM1 - Leads and further Lags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5-B3 ADM1 IV (First Stage - Extensive Margin (Likelihood of at least
one active project)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5-B4 ADM1 IV (First Stage - Intensive Margin) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
5-B5 ADM1 IV (First Stage with probability constituent term) . . . . . 161
5-B6 ADM1 Reduced Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
5-B7 ADM1 IV (IDA-Positiont−1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
List of Tables iii
5-B8 Test for (Trend) Stationarity - Hadri type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
5-B9 ADM1 IV (First Difference WB & Chinese aid) . . . . . . . . . . . 166
5-B10 ADM1 IV (Without first year ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
5-B11 ADM1 IV (Initial Probability) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
5-B12 ADM1 IV (Without high leverage region) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
5-B13 ADM1 IV (WB - Global Time Series) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
5-B14 ADM1 IV (China - Global Time Series) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
5-B15 ADM1 OLS results (Intensity 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
5-B16 IV (Intensity 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
5-B17 OLS results (Battle-related Deaths) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
5-B18 IV (Battle-Related Deaths) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
5-B19 OLS results (Demonstrations) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
5-B20 OLS results (Riots) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
5-B21 OLS results (Strikes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
5-B22 IV (Riots, Demonstrations & Strikes [SCAD]) . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
5-B23 ADM1 IV (Repression (non-lethal) - Regions with UCDP violence
against civilians coded as zero) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
5-B24 Non-lethal Repression [SCAD] - Continuous measure . . . . . . . . 184
5-B25 Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
5-B26 OLS results (Protests: Riots, Demonstrations & Strikes [SCAD]) . 186
5-B27 OLS results (Non-lethal Government Repression) . . . . . . . . . . 187
5-B28 Aid sectors and conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
5-B29 ADM1 results (Power status - Member of Coalition Group) . . . . 192
5-B30 Sample-split: Median Fractionalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
5-B31 IV results - Aid and conflict across regime types . . . . . . . . . . 194
5-B32 IV results - Aid and repression across regime types . . . . . . . . . 195
5-B33 ADM2 level OLS results (Intensity 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
5-B34 ADM2-level IV (Intensity 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
5-B35 Country level aggregation with OLS and IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
5-B36 Country level aggregation with inclusion of non-geocoded projects 200
5-B37 Mechanisms - Afrobarometer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
5-B38 PPML . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
5-B39 Negative Binomial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
5-B40 OLS results: Lagged dependent variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
5-B41 ADM1 OLS results (Clustering at regional level) . . . . . . . . . . 206
5-B42 ADM1 IV (Clustering at Regional Level) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
5-B43 ADM1 IV (WB Aid - Time Split) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
5-B44 ADM1 - Aid Subtypes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
5-B45 OLS results: Population Weighted Aid Allocation . . . . . . . . . . 210
5-B46 ADM1 IV: Population Weighted Aid Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . 211
5-B47 OLS results - Both Donors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
5-B48 ADM1 IV - Both Donors (Intensity 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
5-B49 OLS results: (WB Aid - Same Years as Chinese Aid) . . . . . . . . 214
5-B50 ADM1 IV (WB Aid - Same Years as Chinese Aid) . . . . . . . . . 215
List of Figures
2-1 Theil distribution with 100km distance cutoff . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2-2 Ethnic inequality and droughts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2-3 Locations with years of protests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2-4 Linguistic homelands of the Congo, DRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2-5 Coefficient plots of interaction terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2-B1 Illustration of linear distance weighting for local Theil measure . . 24
2-B2 Linguistic tree of Congo (DRC) up to l = 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4-1 Distribution: Number of armed groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4-2 Armed groups splits and mergers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4-3 Armed groups and political violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4-4 Terrorism distribution across Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4-5 Change in number of groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4-6 Baseline effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4-A1 Distribution: Number of armed group in and outside of Balochistan 77
4-A2 Armed groups and political violence (demeaned by country & year) 77
4-A3 Number of armed groups across districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4-A4 Baseline estimate: Arbitrary spatial clustering . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4-A5 Leave one out test: Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4-A6 Event Study: Baloch secession groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4-B1 Nr. of incidences of GTD and GED double coding . . . . . . . . . 92
4-B2 Potential double coding: GTD & GED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4-B3 Potential double coding (Same Names): GTD & GED . . . . . . . 95
4-B4 Potential double coding (matching fatalities): GTD & GED . . . . 96
4-B5 Potential double coding (Same Names & matching fatalities):
GTD & GED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4-C1 Convex hull of BLA incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4-D1 Politically relevant ethnic groups in Pakistan (GeoEPR) . . . . . . 102
5-1 Disbursement/Commitment Amounts by Precision Codes . . . . . 121
5-2 WB- IDA funding position and conflict outcomes for low and high
probability regions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5-3 China: Chinese commodities production and conflict outcomes for
low and high probability regions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5-4 OLS regressions on mechanisms using Afrobarometer for WB and
China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5-A1 No. of Project Locations by Precision Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5-A2 Chinese Aid ADM1 Spatial Join . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5-A3 Sectoral Distribution of Aid: (a) WB’s IDA; (b) China . . . . . . . 149
5-A4 SCAD Data for precision codes 1-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
iv
List of Figures v
5-B1 Robustness of first stage for World Bank Aid - Leaving one country
out . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170




Sustainable economic development is the key driver to improve the livelihood of all
people around the globe and ending poverty. Peace and prosperity for the people
and the planet are the shared vision of the United Nations formulated in 17 distinct
Agenda 2030 goals. Although much has been achieved already and poverty rates
decreased in the past, a certain group of countries is left behind. Countries with high
levels of Fragility, Conflict, and Violence (FCV) did not see a decrease in poverty
in the past decades, and the World Bank estimates that half of the world’s extreme
poor will live in FCV countries by 2030 (Corral et al., 2020).
Conflict-affected countries lack behind in their fight against poverty and witness
detrimental impacts on development gains, such as losses in educational attainment,
losses in life-time earnings, and deeper gender disparities (Buvinić et al., 2013).
Conflicts have a long-term impact on economic growth, as well. For example, the
World Bank (2017) documents strong GDP growth in Syria’s non-oil sectors, but
the Arab Spring triggered protests in Syria that eventually escalated to the Syrian
civil war. GDP losses between 2011 and 2016 due to the war are estimated to be
four times Syria’s 2010 GDP. However, long-term cumulative losses are estimated to
be 20 higher than capital losses due to disrupted economic networks and institutions
that cannot be build up as quickly as capital investments.
Social unrest and armed conflicts appear to be distinct forms of political action
but have a common motivator for group mobilization. Collective grievances are
one major factor with the potential to bring together individuals to voice their
dissatisfaction and fight for political change and better livelihood. Hence, it is not
surprising that protests may also escalate to armed violence, especially if participants
who are willing to use force do not observe any progress of their cause (Ryckman,
2019). When groups of citizens feel severely disadvantaged and have limited means
to be heard, protest and even taking up arms seem to be the only options left.
The marginalization of ethnic people proves to be a powerful mobilizer for social
unrest and maybe a reason to join armed groups. Conflict in late 2007 erupted in
Kenya after the Kikuyu group members won the election over members of the Luo,
Luhya, and Kalenjin. Within two months, almost 1000 people died, mostly from the
Kikuyu tribe, who are perceived to be disproportionately better-off (Wrong, 2010).
There exist various armed groups in Balochistan that fight for more autonomy of
their region, since Balochistan is one of Pakistan’s most resource-rich regions but
remains economically backward compared to other regions in Pakistan. The Euskadi
Ta Askatasuna group, better known as ETA, is responsible for over 800 deaths over
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the course of 30 years in their fight for an autonomous Basque country (Abadie and
Gardeazabal, 2003). Thus, ethnic grievances are present and relevant in countries
across all income levels.
This thesis contributes to understanding how economic exclusion of ethnic groups
may increase social unrest and armed violence, and how official development aid may
increase government repression. Social unrest received surprisingly little attention,
given the vast literature on armed violence. This thesis lays out the construction of a
novel inequality measure to track ethnic grievances. These grievances interact with
external climate shocks and may be expressed as social unrest as the social contract
between the state, and its citizens is crumbling. Moreover, one ethnicity maybe
represented by multiple political or armed groups. A group-level study in Pakistan
shows that competition effects among one specific set of armed ethnic groups causally
increases violence levels. Moreover, the thesis develops a method to combine two
well-known dataset of armed violence, that eliminates double-counting of events and
allows to approximate for government counter-insurgency measures. Additionally,
the thesis scrutinizes how development aid contributes to more stability in civil
war settings, more government repression, and deteriorating norms on democracy
depending on conditions set by the donor.
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 shows that droughts interplay
with ethnic inequality in triggering social unrest and protests. Protests may occur
throughout a country but tend to be locally confined. A counter-example would
be a civil war where fighting units traverse from one location to the next, thereby
expanding their control area. Given the local dimension of protests, the chapter
devices a novel local inequality measure that is decomposable, allows for various
group definition, and can be applied to any spatial resolution. The chapter applies
the local inequality measure to satellite nightlight emission within ethno-linguistic
regions. The results synthesises the literature of inequality as well as climate impacts
on social unrest and violence. The interaction of climate shocks and ethnic between-
group inequality affect social unrest. Droughts increase the probability of social
unrest, when they occur in areas with high levels of ethnic inequality.
Why does the interaction of climate shocks and inequality leads to more conflict?
Chapter 3 argues that the perception of ethnic inequality lead to grievances. A
validation of the local inequality measure of chapter 2 helps to understand if
inequality measured from outer space maps grievances felt by individuals on the
ground. Afrobarometer data on individual perceptions of ethnic group inequality
correlate with the local measure of ethnic between-group inequality. Moreover,
economic distress such as droughts seems to increase the salience of ethnic groups.
Thus, droughts and ethnic inequality together seem to contribute to individual
inequality perception. The results validate the relevance of the novel inequality
measure and suggest that droughts increase social tensions not via economic distress
alone but by a higher perception of group differences.
Chapter 4 focuses on competition among groups of one specific ethnicity in
Pakistan to analyze the internal determinants of armed violence. Focusing on a
specific group allows tracking their activity closely across space and pinpoint specific
events to an upsurge in overall violence. The chapter explores the unique setting in
which the number of armed groups increases through a split of the Baloch Liberation
Army (BLA) into the BLA and United Baloch Army (UBA). The Marri family leads
the BLA, and leadership disputes between two brothers broke out when their father
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died of a natural cause. The death eventually led to the group split, each led by
one of the brothers. The chapter shows that the BLA split increases the number
of incidents within Balochistan compared to the districts outside Balochistan by
3.5, which is an increase of roughly 130%. The study does not only contribute to
understanding the dynamics of competition between armed groups. The chapter also
describes a data-driven approach in identifying double-counts of incidences of two
well-known datasets of armed violence. Moreover, the chapter provides a dataset
of mergers and splits of armed groups in Pakistan for researchers to use in their
group-level analysis.
Social unrest and armed violence is also determined by government action.
Chapter 5 focuses on the role of development aid on armed conflict and government
repression. Development projects are aimed at assisting lower-income economies to
strengthen their economic development. Development assistance is not undisputed,
however. Researchers and policymakers criticize aid as fungible, subject to
elite capture, and contribute to conflict financing and corruption (Isaksson and
Kotsadam, 2018a). China, as the emerging donor, stirs up this literature. China’s
values of non-interference from other states and respecting sovereignty are in stark
contrast with Western donors’ values of human rights and democracy. Neither of
these values can be ranked objectively over the other, but they eventually lead
to different aid impacts. The analysis compares the impact of Chinese aid as an
emerging donor and World Bank aid as a traditional donor. On the one hand,
systematic tests show a lack of evidence that aid affects armed conflict for World
Bank and Chinese aid. On the other hand, the relationship seems to be driven
by the donor’s different tolerance to state repression. While there is no evidence
that World Bank aid affects government repression, regions that receive Chinese
aid experience more state repression incidences. Using governance questions of the
Afrobarometer reveals that individuals living in regions that receive Chinese aid
report a significantly lower identification with democratic ideals. In contrast, the
opposite is true for regions receiving World Bank aid.
The final chapter briefly puts the thesis’ findings into the broader picture of how
social unrest and armed violence may be viewed from a policy perspective.
Chapter 2
Triggering social unrest
Ethnic inequality intensifies drought effects in Africa∗
2-1 Introduction
A commonly held belief is that social unrest is linked to high levels of inequality.
Media narratives suggest that the protests during the ‘Arab spring’ were in part
so intense because of a prevailing sense of inequity. Similarly, the vigorous protests
sweeping Latin America in 2019 have been associated with high levels of inequality in
the region. Protests are typically not started by high levels of inequality, instead they
are often incited by changes in food prices or government subsidies and potentially
become more intense in places where the underlying grievances are strong.
In this paper, we analyze whether droughts trigger social unrest in Africa
and whether local inequalities between ethnic groups intensify such unrest. Put
differently, we ask if severe weather shocks interact with ethnic grievances, and
if ethnic groups compare themselves to nearby tribes or to the entire nation. To
answer this question, we design a new sub-group decomposable index of local spatial
inequalities. We combine this new index with geospatial data to empirically analyze
a large set of protests and violent riots between 1992 and 2013 across the entire
African continent. Our identification strategy leverages exogenous temporal and
spatial variation in the occurrence of severe droughts and its interaction with slowly-
changing local inequalities. This allows us to identify a conditional estimate which
compares the effect of a drought in regions with high ethnic inequality to the effect
in regions with low ethnic inequality.
A key building block is that we motivate and derive an index of local spatial
inequalities that can be decomposed into between and within-group components.
“Horizontal” inequality between ethnic groups or administrative regions is typically
measured at the national level, so that we know very little about whether the
association of inequality with various forms of conflict is driven by localized tensions
or nation-wide grievances. To overcome this issue, we define a local entropy index
which is similar to those proposed in the literature on spatial segregation (e.g.,
Reardon and O’Sullivan, 2004). Our index essentially compares the local distribution
of income to the local distribution of the population in some predefined radius (or
neighborhood) and spatially weights the contribution of each unit to the index.
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Richard Bluhm
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Contrary to non-spatial indexes of inequality, it allows us to study inequality between
and within groups at very local scales where the definition of “local” is determined
by the available data. Hence, we can ask whether the inequality that is observed
locally matters more or less than income comparisons to individuals and groups
located further away. Our measure coincides Theil’s entropy coefficient (Theil, 1967)
if the neighborhood is made arbitrarily large and the weighting scheme is uniform.
We employ this measure to capture local inequality between and within ethnic
groups in Africa (but it could be useful in a number of contexts). Building on Alesina
et al. (2016), who measure nationwide inequalities between ethnic groups with
geospatial data, we use nighttime lights as a proxy for economic activity together
with high-resolution population data to estimate the components of our index. To
this end, we first partition the space into a lattice of units that are less than 10 km
wide and then consider a range of neighborhood sizes for the weighting function,
from 50 km to 200 km. Maps of the spatial distribution of ethno-linguistic groups
help us to identify the ethnic affiliation of each spatial unit. For all neighborhood
sizes, the within-ethnic group component is larger than the between-ethnic group
component, and local inequalities tend to be smaller than comparisons which include
far away units. We then aggregate the data to the standard grid of 0.5◦×0.5◦, which
is typically used in conflict research, and add data on protests and droughts. Our
main specification studies the interaction of droughts and local inequalities at various
neighborhoods, after purging confounding variation that is constant across grid cells
or country-years.
Our results highlight the critical role economic differences between ethnic groups
play in mediating the effect of droughts on social unrest. Droughts primarily trigger
protests and violence in places with underlying grievances between ethnic groups. An
increase of local inequality between ethnic groups by two standard deviations during
drought years increases the protest likelihood by 0.26 percentage points. This effect
resembles about a third of the average protest likelihood in Africa. Moreover, the
estimates we provide are strictly decreasing in the size of the neighborhood, roughly
halving if we double the size from 50 km to 100 km and becoming indistinguishable
from zero at 200 km. We interpret this as evidence that droughts trigger protests and
violence in places where members of one ethnic group can observe another close-by
ethnic group which appears to be better (or worse) off. Directly observing group-
level inequities in income and, perhaps also, differences in public service provision
thus appears to be a prerequisite to food-price related social unrest in Africa.
We present a number of extensions to better understand this finding. First,
we examine whether within-group inequality has a similar amplifying effect on the
propensity to protest. Within-group inequality can help to fund mobilization and
overcome a resource problem of poor groups. Protests, however, are low cost events
and often spontaneous so that this aspect may play less of a role in our context. In
line with the latter, we find little evidence suggesting that inequality within groups
interacts with droughts, especially once we allow interactions with both types of
inequality. Second, we study if horizontal inequality defined along administrative
regions is a relevant between-group cleavage in Africa. We find little support in the
data that regional inequalities interact with droughts, even though administrative
divisions sometimes overlap with ethnic homelands. Third, we analyze the role of
ethnic distances (as opposed to physical distances). Groups whose languages are
more closely related may feel less antagonism towards one another in spite of local
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inequalities compared to groups who are linguistically distant (and thus more likely
to be perceived as an “out-group”). We find some evidence supporting this notion.
The interaction of droughts and local inequality between groups is weakly increasing
in linguistic distance, but these differences are not statistically significant. Finally, a
number of robustness checks show that our main results do not depend on particular
estimation choices.
Our paper relates to several larger bodies of work. Even though climate shocks
are often thought of as a trigger of social unrest, there are surprisingly few studies
on climate as a driver for protests and riots (Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012).1 The
majority of climate disaster-related studies focus on armed conflict or outright civil
war and typically explains local conflicts via sub-national climate variation (Burke
et al., 2015, 2009; Hsiang et al., 2013, 2011; Bohlken and Sergenti, 2010). Our work is
closest to two recent studies. Harari and Ferrara (2018) show that droughts decrease
agricultural income and increases armed conflict in grid cells across Africa, while
Almer et al. (2017) find that droughts intensify competition for water and trigger
riots. Other studies highlight that there is little evidence of a robust relationship
between climate variability and a broader definition of conflict (Bergholt and Lujala,
2012; Buhaug, 2010; Buhaug et al., 2014; Gleditsch, 2012; Theisen, 2012; Theisen
et al., 2012; van Weezel, 2019). In line with this, our results show little association
between droughts and (violent) protests when inequality is not taken into account.
A large literature is focused on the effect of income inequality on conflict.
The theoretical case is well-developed. Within economics, the identification-
alienation approach (Esteban and Ray, 1994, 2011) offers a framework of how
social stratification along income lines is related to conflict intensity. A key insight
in this line of work is that greater inequality between groups leads to greater
alienation vis-à-vis other groups, while ethnic markers can be used to achieve
stronger identification with the group. If poorer groups can expropriate richer
groups, then greater income disparity between groups implies larger spoils of victory.
This conjecture finds support within political science. Stewart (2008) and Østby
(2008), for example, argue that greater ‘horizontal’ inequalities, that is, inequalities
between ethnically or culturally defined groups, can bring about (non-)violent
conflicts. In turn, within-group inequalities can help overcome a resource problem:
universally poor groups may lack the means to fight. Empirically linking income
inequalities to social unrest and conflict has proved difficult. This is partly due to
conceptual issues (e.g. ‘What type of inequality matters? Among whom?’) and in
part due to limited data availability.2 New geospatial data permit the construction
of group-specific income proxies across a wide range of geographies (e.g. Cederman
et al., 2011, 2015; Alesina et al., 2016). We follow this recent literature in how we
1Although a larger literature focuses on the link between food prices and social unrest (see e.g.
Bellemare, 2015; Hendrix and Haggard, 2015).
2Collier and Hoeffler (2004a), for example, argue that most political and social variables hold
little explanatory power when it comes to conflicts. As in most early studies, their measure is
a household survey aggregate of inequality among all individuals in the country. Group-level
economic disparities were only recently captured using household surveys. Østby (2008) uses
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) from 36 developing countries to show that horizontal
social inequalities are related to conflict. Huber and Mayoral (2014) assemble data from more
than 200 household surveys to study the role of vertical and horizontal inequalities between groups.
They decompose total national inequality into within and between group inequalities to show that
a) national comparisons can be deceiving, and b) within group inequalities could be more important
than between group inequalities.
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construct our income proxy and contribute to it by studying differences between
and within groups based on different group delineations.
Although grievances are often thought to be local in nature, they are seldom
measured that way. The social deprivation literature in economics and sociology
recognized this local component from the start. Galbraith, for example, defined
poor people as those whose “income, even if adequate for survival, falls markedly
behind that of the community” (1958, p. 252). Townsend (1962, p. 219) puts it
this way: “individuals and families whose resources, over time, fall seriously short
of the resources commanded by the average individual or family in the community
in which they live, whether that community is a local, national or international one,
are in poverty.” This notion of relative poverty is very close to our concept of local
inequality. In essence, we argue that this is how communities and ethnic groups
perceive themselves vis-à-vis other groups. Still, we do not know if the relevant
comparison is the immediate neighborhood or the larger nation and treat this part
as an empirical question.
A nascent literature on the economic consequences of local inequality suggests a
key mechanism behind local tensions may be exclusion from markets and government
services. Gulati and Ray (2016) study access to basic services, such as health care
or schooling, and emphasize a trade-off between provision and prices. Initially, some
inequality may help to increase the provision and availability of services demanded
by richer neighbors. However, as inequality increases, the poor are eventually priced
out of the market. Araujo et al. (2008) show that social investments in Ecuador
designed to exclusively benefit the poor within a neighborhood are provided less
often to comparatively unequal communities. Their explanation is that local elites
who rule these localities block projects which do not benefit them privately. Thus,
local inequality may also reduce the benefits that poorer individuals may receive
from the government. Our study highlights that external shocks appear to interact
with a pre-existing perception of injustice or a lack of government service. This is
sometimes described as as a fulfillment failure of the social contract which creates
fertile ground for social unrest (Patel and McMichael, 2009).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2-2 introduces
our sub-group decomposable local inequality measure and discusses its properties.
Section 2-3 describes the data and our empirical strategy. Section 2-4 presents
our main results, including several extensions and robustness checks. Section 2-5
concludes.
2-2 Measuring local inequality
The first objective of this paper is design an index of spatial inequalities at the local
level that summarizes the experience of those living in a particular neighborhood.
The two criteria which make inequality local are that observations close by receive
greater weight than those afar, and that the definition of between-group inequality
should depend on the underlying spatial structure, such as, borders separating
ethnic groups or political regions. Drawing on insights from the spatial segregation
literature (Reardon and O’Sullivan, 2004), we motivate and derive a spatially-
weighted Theil index which shares these two properties (Theil, 1967).
In addition to capturing local inequality, an index of spatial inequality that
is suitable for our application should satisfy several principles of inequality
8 Chapter 2. Triggering social unrest
measurement, such as scale independence and the population principle, but not
anonymity (Cowell, 2011). Since location matters, it it not desirable to require
that inequality should not increase or decrease when people, cells, or any other
underlying unit switch positions in two-dimensional space. Instead, the index should
capture how spatial inequality varies depending on where particular values cluster.3
Finally, the index should be additively decomposable, so that we can examine spatial
inequality between different ethnic groups in the application.4 This implies that
the index has to be part of the class of generalized entropy indexes (Bourguignon,
1979; Shorrocks, 1984). There are other approaches in the literature, such as the
spatial Gini proposed by Andreoli et al. (2018), but these measures are not subgroup
decomposable without a residual.
To fix ideas, we now introduce some notation together with the relevant concepts.
Our proposed local inequality measure is defined for a vantage point, p, within a
neighborhood, N . Each unique neighborhood comprises of multiple locations denoted
by c. We may think of such a neighborhood as a collection of relatively small regions,
such as census tracts, or locations on a regular grid.
Spatial proximity between locations is given by some function ψ(p, c) which
denotes the inverse distance between the vantage point p to location c, for all possible
(unordered) pairs of {p, c} in the neighborhood. For now, we impose little structure
on ψ(p, c), apart that it is non-negative and symmetric when p and c are switched.
We will later specify common spatial weighting functions, such as uniform or Bartlett
kernels based on inverse geodesic distances. Let the cumulative mass of proximities
around p be Ψp =
∫
c∈N ψ(p, c)dc.
Based on these ingredients, we define the population density in the neighborhood





where ωc defines the population density in location c. The total population around
p is simply the integral over ωc.
As in Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004), this defines a smooth surface of population
densities for all different vantage points at a given neighborhood size. The
surface forms the basis of the weights used in the index and all spatially-weighted
neighborhood quantities will be denoted by ‘˜’.
Inequality between groups in the neighborhood: We start with the between
group component of the spatially-weighted Theil index. Let there be G mutually
exclusive population subgroups, which later will denote ethnic groups. The
population density of a particular group g around p is ω̃gp , defined implicitly by
substituting ωgc for ωc in eq. (2-1). Similarly, the spatially-weighted per capita
income of group g in the neighborhood around p is ˜̄ygp = Ψp−1
∫
c∈N ψ(p, c)ygcdc,
where ygc denotes the per capita income of group g in c. The spatially-weighted
mean income of the entire neighborhood, ˜̄yp, can be then be obtained by aggregating
3Unfortunately, anonymity is also a requirement for establishing the transfer principle, which
therefore cannot be satisfied by our index.
4Note that throughout the chapter we will treat ethnic groups as distinct population subgroups.
Another approach would be to explicitly incorporate some notion of ethnic distance together with
physical distance, as Hodler et al. (2017) propose in the case of spatial segregation.
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incomes via the spatially-weighted population shares (ω̃gp/ω̃p).5





























where Yp (Y gp ) denotes the total income (of each group) in p.
The index follows the familiar structure of Theil (1967). Contrary to an index
which would only consider inequality directly at location p, e.g. a grid cell or some
small administrative regions, it additionally takes the neighborhood around p into
account but places more emphasis on locations close to p. The second equality shows
that we are essentially comparing spatially-weighted income shares to spatially-
weighted population shares for each group in the neighborhood. Inequality will be
zero if these two are the same. This is precisely how this index differs from measures
of spatial segregation where only the second component plays a role.6
Inequality within groups in the neighborhood: For each ethnic group, local
inequality within the group is defined similarly to that of non-spatial Theil indexes.
The only difference is that we have to take the spatial weights into account when
constructing the index and the relevant income aggregates.
Let Ng ⊂ N be the set of locations in N in which group g has a positive density,
then the spatially-weighted Theil for group g in the neighborhood of p is





























where aj is the area of the location and all other quantities with an Ng superscript
are defined as before but integration now runs over the subset of locations in Ng.
Since more than one ethnic group may be present in a particular area, the local
income shares are then used to aggregate the index for each group to a within-group








T̃ gp . (2-4)
To arrive at overall inequality, we only need to add a weighted Theil index for
inequality within each group to the between group component (Bourguignon, 1979;
Shorrocks, 1984), that is, T̃p = T̃ bp + T̃wp .
In most of the remainder we will emphasize the between group component, T̃ bp ,
as it provides us with an estimate of how different ethnic groups are in the space
around p. The within component, T̃wp , will play a subordinated role but allow us
to test which of these two aspects of inequality is driving our results. As both
components can be analyzed directly, we do not use T̃p at all. While our paper uses
this index to study differences among groups that occupy different areas within a











6In fact, with Ỹ gp = Ỹp the expression collapses to the spatial segregation index defined in
Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004).
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of circumstances where groups are defined according to different criteria and the
underlying data is observed at the individual level.
2-3 Data and empirical strategy
We use our local inequality indexes to study how spatial inequality between and
within ethnic groups magnifies the effects of on social unrest in Africa. The unit
of analysis is a 0.5◦ × 0.5◦ grid cell (roughly 56 × 56 km at the equator) for 45
countries. This data structure follows similar papers studying conflict in Africa
(e.g. see McGuirk and Burke, 2020; Berman and Couttenier, 2015a; Berman et al.,
2017a; Harari and Ferrara, 2018). Here we focus on our main variables of interest,
listed below. The summary statistics for all variables used in the main analysis and
robustness checks are provided in Table 2-A1 in the Appendix.
Ethnic inequality. Our primary measure of grievances is local spatial inequality
between ethnic groups. Creating this measure poses two challenges. First, household
surveys are not undertaken regularly in most of Africa. Second, even if they were,
many surveys do not record the ethnic affiliation of the respondent and are not
representative at smaller spatial scales. We overcome these challenges by following
an burgeoning literature which uses nighttime lights as a proxy for income at the
local level together with maps reflecting the spatial distribution of ethnic groups
(see, e.g., Cederman et al., 2011; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013; Alesina
et al., 2016). Our approach is closely related to Alesina et al. (2016), who construct
Gini coefficients for ethnic inequality across countries based on nighttime lights per
capita and ethnic maps. We use their blueprint to construct income proxies and
assign them to ethnic territories but then take these data as inputs to our own
measures of local spatial inequalities. We proceed in three steps.
We first define the spatial and political entities for which we want to measure
between-group differences. Our baseline measures are based on the Ethnologue
project, which documents the contemporary spatial distribution of about 7000 living
language groups across the globe. The project also collects information about each
language’s ancestors that can be used to construct linguistic trees and aggregate
homelands that have a shared language history (more on this below). For robustness
checks, we also use data from the Geo-referencing of Ethnic Groups (GREG) data—
the digital counterpart of the Atlas Narodov Mira assembled by Soviet ethnographers
in the early 1960s—and administrative boundaries from the Database of Global
Administrative Areas (GADM). As these maps differ in their accuracy and will be
combined with other geospatial data at varying resolutions, we first create a medium
resolution grid of 5 × 5 arc minutes, or about 9.3 × 9.3 km near the equator. We
then intersect this grid with country boundaries and the various political entities to
obtain a unique attribution of each cell to a particular country and (ethnic) region.7
7Note that this creates smaller “squiggly” cells at the borders of a country or borders
between (ethnic) regions which we take as the unit of observation for the inequality measures.
Both Ethnologue and GREG sometimes assigns an area to multiple groups, while administrative
boundaries are non-overlapping. Whenever an area is shared between two groups or more groups,
we duplicate the cell for each group. This has the same effect as distributing light and population
in equal shares across these areas.
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Figure 2-1 – Theil distribution with 100km distance cutoff
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Second, we calculate nighttime lights and population to construct luminosity
per capita—our welfare measure—for each cell in the medium resolution grid.
The nighttime lights data are from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
Operation Linescan System (DMSP-OLS) provided by the National Atmospheric
and Oceanic Administration (NOAA, 2015). The data are available for every year
from 1992 until 2013. The DMSP-OLS system records luminosity as six bit digital
numbers ranging from 0 to 63.8 Although they are well-known problems with these
data in terms of bottom and top-coding (Jean et al., 2016; Bluhm and Krause, 2019),
they measure luminosity in a consistent manner around the globe. The population
data are from the Global Human Settlement Layer (GHSL) project (Pesaresi et al.,
2019a). The GHSL data are available for 1975, 1990, 2000 and 2015. We linearly
interpolate these data over time to obtain annual estimates of population. We then
sum nighttime lights and population using the medium resolution grid.9
Third, we construct our measures of local inequality between and within ethnic
homelands (or regions) for all of Africa over the period from 1992 to 2013. Running
these calculation at the medium resolution grid before aggregating to 0.5◦×0.5◦ using
area-weighted averages makes sure that local inequality does not get “averaged out”
in the process.10 A novel feature of our inequality measure is the flexibility of the
definition of the neighborhood or, more precisely, the weighting function φ(p, q). It
allows us to determine how far people “look” in their assessment of which inequalities
to consider. We do not have a strong prior on how large or small these neighborhood
should be. We typically report results for all cells within a radius of 50 km, 100 km,
8These images are annual composites of various cloud-free satellite pictures taken twice a day
around the globe between 8:30 and 10:00 PM local time.
9The native resolution of the DMSP-OLS data is 30 arc seconds, whereas the GHSL data is
available at a 250 meter or 1 km resolution with an equal-area projection.
10Average light per capita in two 0.5◦ × 0.5◦ cells may be exactly the same even though the
underlying distribution of light within these cells differs. We preserve inhabited regions with no
light by setting their local Theil contribution to zero. Since the local Theil contains a log of the
income share, results for zero income shares are undefined. However, we do not observe exact zeros
due to bottom-coding and noise in the DMSP-OLS data. All we really know is that the income
share of that region becomes vanishingly small. Applying L’Hôpital’s rule to the Theil component
of such a region, suffices to show that the limit is zero. This is equivalent to replacing observed
light or light per capita by arbitrarily small values for regions where zero light is observed. The
aggregation to 0.5◦ × 0.5◦ cells is done with area weights.
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or 200 km. We assume that φ(p, q) is decreasing in the geodetic distance from cell p
to q, leading us to adopt a Bartlett with linearly decreasing weights in the baseline
calculations.
(a) 100km Between Theil at ˜55km2
resolution
(b) SPEIbase drought years
Figure 2-2 – Ethnic inequality and droughts
Figure 2-1 shows that the tail of the within-group component of inequality
tends to be wider than the distribution of between-group inequalities. Moreover,
changes of at least one unit are well within the range of the data. The left panel of
Figure 2-2 presents a map of the average between-group component from 1992 until
2012. It shows that there is substantial spatial heterogeneity in the between-group
component. Both are based on a Bartlett kernel with a 100 km distance cutoff.
Missing values occur when less than two groups live within the specified proximity.
Droughts. Our primary measure of droughts is the Standardized Precipitation
Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI) by Begueŕıa et al. (2010). The SPEI takes
the standardized difference between precipitation and the historic average of
precipitation, while accounting for potential moisture evaporation of the soil. It is a
widely used indicator to capture droughts that allows comparing droughts in rain-
rich and rain-poor areas.11 Droughts are usually classified as “severe” if the SPEI is
below -1.5. We use a binary indicator for droughts that is 1 if a cell experienced a
month with SPEI values below -1.5 (Tollefsen et al., 2012).
11The SPEI has two particular advantages compared to other drought measures. First, unlike
the Standard Precipitation Index (SPI) the SPEI is an extension of the SPI by accounting for
temperature as well to model evapotranspiration of the soil. While the SPI is suitable for
meteorological droughts, droughts driven by warming are unaccounted (Begueŕıa et al., 2013).
Thus, the SPEI is a suitable measure for our sample in Africa by taking into account moisture
evaporation of the soil. Second, our baseline SPEI index is considered to have a more accurate
evapotranspiration model compared than its counterpart reported by Global Drought Monitor,
especially when considering climate change (Begueŕıa et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2017).
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Figure 2-3 – Locations with years of protests
Figure 2-3 illustrate which locations experienced a drought in any month within
a calendar year for the entire sample period between 1992 and 2013. The greatest
area that is affected by droughts is within the sparsely populated Sahara. However,
droughts affect the entire continent and only few areas are considered drought-free.
Riots. Our primary measure of social unrest are ‘demonstrations’ and ‘riots’ as
recorded by the Social Conflict Analysis Database or SCAD version 3.3 (Salehyan
et al., 2012). The database includes protests, riots, strikes, government repression,
communal violence, and other forms of unrest. SCAD tracks online news from the
Associated Press (AP) and Agence France Presse (AFP) for African countries with a
population above 1 million. In this manner, SCAD tracks social disturbances which
attract enough people to be reported on in the media. While this will certainly
undercount small scale events, it is the only database which consistently collects
and geocodes protests in Africa.
Two features make these data better suited for our proposes than other leading
databases. First, SCAD does not impose a battle-death threshold. The project
classifies events that are not well tracked by other major conflict databases. We
use the categories demonstrations and violent riots from their data, no matter if
these were planned or spontaneous.12 These events have in common that they
are directed toward members of a distinct group or direct against the government.
Second, SCAD geo-references each conflict event to provide an approximate latitude
and longitude of its location. The 75% of these events are coded with a precision
reflecting the town or settlement level (we present results using subsets of different
precision codes in the robustness checks). Table 2-1 shows that protests occur only
in a small fraction, less than 1%, of all cell-years but the standard deviation is
sizable. Figure 2-2 adds that the protests are spread out over the entire continent
with some higher concentration in Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa.
12Note that we often drop the distinction between demonstrations and riots in the remainder
and simply refer to them as ‘protests’.
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Table 2-1 – Summary statistics of selected variables
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Protests and riots
(SCAD)
0.0086 0.0924 0 1 262,108
Between Theil (50 km) 0.3962 0.7247 0.00 12.42 106,908
Between Theil (100
km)
0.4104 0.7396 0.00 12.34 152,241
Between Theil (200
km)
0.4005 0.6854 0.00 13.63 189,530
Within Theil (50 km) 0.7619 1.0263 0.00 12.62 231,308
Within Theil (100 km) 1.1927 1.3007 0.00 13.93 231,308
Within Theil (200 km) 1.3644 1.2481 0.00 14.35 231,308
Empirical strategy. Our analysis exploits two types of identifying variation:
within-cell changes in local spatial inequality and within-cell changes in the local
effect of income shocks. Droughts are exogenous to riots, but local ethnic
inequality (whether within or between groups) could, at least in theory, respond
to endogenously to outbreaks of protests and violence. We circumvent this issue by
focusing directly on the interaction of income shocks with lagged local inequality
levels. This gives rise to a conditional interpretation, where we compare the effect
of a drought in regions with high ethnic inequality to the effect in regions with
low ethnic inequality. Bun et al. (2014) show that interactions of exogenous shocks
with level shifters are identified under mild conditions, without the need for external
instruments. Spatial inequality is persistent so that lagging might not fully solve
the issue of simultaneous causality. While returning to this issue below, we note
here that a strong endogenous response is more plausible in the case of civil wars
than for localized protests and riots.
Our specifications of interest are variants of the following form
Pijt = β1Dijt + β2T̃ bi,j,t−1 + β3
(
Dijt × T̃ bi,j,t−1
)
+ x′ijtδ + µij + λjt + εijt (2-5)
where Pijt is an indicator of protests and riots in cell i of country j at time t,
T̃ bi,j,t−1 is a measure of between-group inequality in some pre-defined neighborhood
(or within-group inequality with superscript w), xijt is a vector of controls, µij are
cell fixed effects and λjt are country-year effects. We allows for dependencies in εijt
over space and time by clustering the standard errors by a “supergrid” of 2◦ × 2◦
cells. In other words, 56 km × 56 km cells near the equator are grouped together
in an area which is about 222 km × 222 km. The resulting estimates are robust to
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, spatial correlation, and general variance-
covariance misspecification (Lu and Wooldridge, 2017).
Our primary coefficient of interest is β3. We do not attempt to interpret β2
causally. We are only interested in β1 in terms of its size and relation to β3. There
is a separate literature which deals with the unconditional effects of such shocks
on conflict. The baseline controls include average log light intensity (per capita)
and the log of population. This isolates the neighborhood’s economic distribution
from the level of income (light) in the cell and the cell-level population. Moreover,
using only within-cell variation and allowing for country-year fixed effects purges a
lot of potential confounding variation. Our results are net of the effects of time-
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invariant factors, such as local ethnic heterogeneity or segregation, and economic or
political shocks hitting an entire country in a particular year. In fact, the only type
of unobserved variation that threatens identification in this context are time-varying
omitted variables that affect local protests and droughts simultaneously and have
different effects in regions with high and low local inequality. It seems implausible
that any such variation could be jointly determining the location and duration of
droughts together with changes in local inequality. However, we cannot entirely rule
out feedback from protests to inequality.
2-4 Results
Baseline results. We report our main results using local inequality between
ethnic groups as the relevant cleavage and the incidence of riots as the outcome of
interest in Table 2-2. We always present three “neighborhood sizes,” doubling from
50 km over 100 km to 200 km. We begin with the regressions without interaction
terms in columns (1) to (3). Regardless of the neighborhood size, we find hardly
any evidence in favor of the hypotheses that droughts or between-group inequality
are associated with an increase in the probability of protests and riots.This is in
line with many recent contributions focusing on conflict and climate or inequality
more broadly (see e.g., Buhaug et al., 2014, on climate and conflict or Huber and
Mayoral, 2019, on between-group vs. within-group inequality and conflict).
Table 2-2 – Local ethnic inequality and protests
Theil distance
50 km 100 km 200 km 50 km 100 km 200 km
Drought (Dt) -0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0004
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Between Theil (T̃ bt−1) 0.0010 0.0006* 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Interaction 0.0018** 0.0010** 0.0002
(Dt × T̃ bt−1) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Cell FE X X X X X X
Country-Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Observations 103,133 147,926 186,395 103,133 147,926 186,395
Notes: The table reports fixed effects regression results. The dependent variable is binary
indicator for demonstrations and riots. Standard errors clustered by 2◦ × 2◦ cells are
reported in parenthesis. Significant at * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
Column (4) to (6) turn to our conditional hypotheses that droughts trigger
low-level protest events when ethnic inequality between groups is high. Here we
find substantial evidence in favor of such an interaction, especially at smaller
neighborhood sizes. Column (4) shows that a two standard deviation increase
in between-group inequality measured in the surrounding 50 km increases the
probability of experiencing a riot by 0.26 percentage points. Recall that protest
incidence across all cells is very low. Only about 0.86% of all cell-years experience a
16 Chapter 2. Triggering social unrest
protest or riot so that this is a substantial portion of the baseline effect. The effect
also appears to be relatively local, in the sense that it is highest at neighborhood sizes
of 50 km and decreases in size and significance towards 200 km. At 100 km, a two
standard deviation increase in between-group inequality leads to a 0.15 percentage
point higher probability of protest. All in all, the first results suggest that decreased
incomes due to droughts may lead to more riots in areas with greater inequality
between groups. Droughts thus seem to trigger protests and violence in places with
underlying grievances between groups.
2-4.1 Extensions and mechanisms
Within versus between group inequalities. We now examine the role of
between-group vs. within-group inequality. Esteban and Ray (2011) show that the
intensity of conflict can be linked to inequality (polarization) between and inequality
within groups. They show that inequality within groups has two opposing effects.
On the one hand, it makes coordination more difficult due to lower group cohesion.
On the other hand, it allows for specialization within groups so that richer members
can finance the violence carried out by poorer members. In the context of civil wars,
they suggest that the latter is more important than the former. Huber and Mayoral
(2019) provide evidence from household surveys that within-group inequality is
associated with the onset and intensity of civil wars. Our index allows us to study
these two components separately and jointly for various neighborhood sizes.
Table 2-3 presents results where we include only the interaction of droughts
with inequality within ethnic groups in columns (1) to (3) and then both measures
and their interactions in column (4) to (6). There is very little evidence that a
higher capacity to organize violence, as proxied by within-group inequality, interacts
with droughts. If anything, column (1) suggests a negative interaction which is not
robust to also including between-group inequality in column (4). Column (5) and (6)
suggest that there could be a minimal effect of inequality within groups on protests in
years without severe droughts. However, the interaction of droughts with inequality
between ethnic groups remains robust, and its predominantly local effect is virtually
unaffected by the inclusion of within-group inequality. This seems plausible in our
context. Financing constraints might not be an issue for protests and riots which
are inexpensive to carry out. A lack of within-group cohesion, however, is likely to
make mobilization more difficult.
Regional “horizontal” inequality. So far, we have assumed that ethnic
differences between groups are the prevailing cleavage in Africa. This assumption
draws on Alesina et al. (2016) who show that ethnic inequality is an important
dimension of underdevelopment and the broader literature on ethnic conflict. A
separate literature argues that broader “horizontal” inequalities between regions are
important, or potentially more important, for civil conflict and civil unrest (Østby,
2008; Østby et al., 2009; Fjelde and Østby, 2014). Our inequality index can be
computed for any regional partition to easily test these arguments in the context of
local inequalities and their interaction with droughts.
Table 2-4 shows the corresponding results. We find some evidence of an overall
effect of between-region inequality on protest in column (1) to (3), which is also
present for non-drought years in columns (5) and (6). However, as before, we are
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Table 2-3 – Within-group vs. between-group inequality
Theil distance
50 km 100 km 200 km 50 km 100 km 200 km
Drought (Dt) -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0002
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0008)
Within Theil (T̃ wt−1) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0004* 0.0008**
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Interaction -0.0006** 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0001
(Dt × T̃ wt−1) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Between Theil 0.0001 0.0003 0.0005
(T̃ bt−1) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Interaction 0.0018** 0.0011** 0.0002
(Dt × T̃ bt−1) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Cell FE X X X X X X
Country-Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Observations 229,845 229,845 229,845 103,133 147,926 186,395
Notes: The table reports fixed effects regression results. The dependent variable is binary
indicator for demonstrations and riots. Standard errors clustered by 2◦ × 2◦ cells are
reported in parenthesis. Significant at * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
Table 2-4 – Regional inequalities
Theil distance
50 km 100 km 200 km 50 km 100 km 200 km
Drought (Dt) -0.0010 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0002
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0005)
Between Theil 0.0006 0.0010** 0.0009 0.0006 0.0011** 0.0015*
(T̃ bt−1) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0008)
Interaction -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0013**
(Dt × T̃ bt−1) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0006)
Cell FE X X X X X X
Country-Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Observations 102,148 156,303 205,948 102,148 156,303 205,948
Notes: The table reports fixed effects regression results. The dependent variable is binary
indicator for demonstrations and riots. Standard errors clustered by 2◦ × 2◦ cells are
reported in parenthesis. Significant at * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
hesitant to interpret the inequality variables on their own, as various confounding
factors could influence them. The interactions with droughts are less likely to be
confounded and paint the opposite picture. If anything, inequality between regions
seems to weaken the likelihood of protest, although this only manifests itself at
large neighborhood sizes. Local inequality between ethnic groups thus seems to
capture underlying grievances in Africa whereas inequality between regions captures
something else.
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Ethno-linguistic distances. Conflict theory, including the identification-
alienation framework by Esteban and Ray (1994), emphasizes differences between
groups along identity lines. Contact theory instead states that inter-group contact
can reduce the potential for prejudice and conflict, as long as it takes place among
groups that enjoy “equal status” (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998). Apart from
physical distance, which is the dimension we have exploited thus far, groups can
also differ in terms of their “ethno-linguistic distance”, that is, how related their
languages are and when they have separated from one another. Both frameworks
predict that more linguistically distant groups, which are less likely to understand
each other, are more likely to be in conflict. They are more likely to be perceived
as a separate identity group in the identification-alienation framework or as an out-
group in contact theory. In line with this, Desmet et al. (2012) provide country-level
evidence that group fractionalization (not inequality) at more distant levels of the
language tree seems to be more predictive of conflict than fractionalization among
less distant groups.
Figure 2-4 – Linguistic homelands of the Congo, DRC
(a) At l = 1 (b) At l = 8
Our approach allows us to account for ethnic distances, in addition to physical
distances indirectly. Each pixel in the medium resolution grid not only belongs to
a contemporary ethnic group, but the Ethnologue project also provides us with the
entire phylogenetic tree. The linguistic tree has 15 levels, where the highest level is
the least aggregated level of all contemporary divisions, which we have been using
throughout our baseline results. As our measure can be sub-group decomposed into
any non-overlapping grouping, we aggregate the pixel identities at different levels
of the language tree. Figure 2-B2 in the Appendix illustrates the first eight levels
of the language tree in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Figure 2-4 show
continuous versions of the ethnic maps we are implicitly constructing in this process.
We run our baseline model with the interaction of droughts and between-group
inequality at all 15 levels of the tree to test whether we observe a pattern of increasing
or decreasing effect sizes. Figure 2-5 shows that our results support the notion that
inequalities among groups that are more distant linguistically, yet live close by, is
more strongly associated with protests and riots during severe droughts. At both 50
km and 100 km, the estimated effect is approximately constant for levels 15 to 10
but rises substantially before it becomes indistinguishable from zero at the highest
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aggregation levels. This last part is an artifact of the data. As we aggregate up, the
number of homelands decreases, but their average size increases, making it less and
less likely that linguistically distance groups actually live close by. Thus, we take
this as tentative evidence that there is indeed a conflict gradient that is increasing
in “deeper” ethnic cleavages.
2-4.2 Robustness
Endogeneity of spatial inequality. One concern with our identification strategy
is that the interaction term is identified in the presence of omitted variable bias but
not when there is feedback from protests to ethnic inequality (Bun et al., 2014).
While we have argued that such feedback is more likely with larger-scale conflict, it
is possible that destructions from large scale riots and/or subsequent repressions by
the government create higher spatial inequality.
Table 2-5 – Initial and average inequality
Inequality measured in year(s) . . .
1992 1992–1996
50 km 100 km 200 km 50 km 100 km 200 km
Drought (Dt) -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0008
(0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Interaction (Dt × T̃ b0 ) 0.0005 0.0010** 0.0003 0.0013** 0.0010** 0.0004
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Cell FE X X X X X X
Country-Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Observations 81,598 129,866 181,302 87,397 122,060 152,116
Notes: The table reports fixed effects regression results. The dependent variable is binary
indicator for demonstrations and riots. Standard errors clustered by 2◦ × 2◦ cells are
reported in parenthesis. Significant at * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
In Table 2-5, we construct two simple tests that rule out the possibility of
reverse causality and leverage the persistent nature of ethnic inequality. Given
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that inequality changes slowly, we can construct time-invariant proxies for spatial
inequality based on periods early in the sample and then study subsequent protests
and riots. We always include fixed effects for each cell so that the fixed effects absorb
the initial level of inequality, and only the interaction is identified. Columns (1) to
(3) use only the initial period of the lights data to isolate the persistent component.
This is less than ideal, since fewer cells are illuminated early in the sample than
later on, and we use only one data point to estimate the static component. Column
(4) to (6) improve this by using the average over the first five years of data and
then studying protests and riots after 1996. The second set of results is very similar
to our baseline estimates, which suggests that reverse causality plays a subordinate
role.
Droughts and growing seasons. The literature on droughts and conflict has
not settled on a single best way of capturing the effects of droughts. Harari and
Ferrara (2018) emphasize the importance of focusing on the growing season of all
crops, whereas most contributions in the literature typically use the SPEI index
for the entire year (e.g. Almer et al., 2017). While it seems ex ante intuitive to
focus on the former, it is not clear that the effect of droughts should be limited to
the growing season for several reasons. First, African smallholder farmers tend to
grow a diversity of crops (e.g. McCord et al., 2015; Bellon et al., 2020), so that it
is difficult to attribute shocks to a single main crop. Second, different crop types
have a very different susceptibility when a drought needs to occur to severely affect
their growing cycle and what effects a drought has on their yield (groundnuts versus
maize). Third, pastoral conflict over water will be unrelated to the growing season
(e.g. Almer et al., 2017).
Table 2-6 – Different drought measures, 100 km neighborhood size
SPEIbase drought measured by . . .
Start End Dummy Dummy Share Share
season season all crop all crop
Drought (Dt) 0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0014* -0.0083 -0.0031
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0062) (0.0041)
Between Theil (T̃ bt−1) 0.0006 0.0006 0.0001 0.0004 0.0002 0.0005
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Interaction -0.0005* -0.0001 0.0010** 0.0006 0.0071** 0.0011
(Dt × T̃ bt−1) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0035) (0.0023)
Cell FE X X X X X X
Country-Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Observations 143,077 141,086 147,926 147,926 143,092 129,696
Notes: The table reports fixed effects regression results. The dependent variable is binary
indicator for demonstrations and riots. Standard errors clustered by 2◦ × 2◦ cells are
reported in parenthesis. Significant at * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
Table 2-6 reports a variety of perturbations of our primary drought measure.
Columns (1) and (2) focus on SPEI values during the start and end of the rainy
season. Recall that a SPEI of -1.5 is considered a severe drought. In line with
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Almer et al. (2017), we find little evidence that just one specific aspect of droughts
is driving our results. The negative coefficients imply that negative SPEI values at
the start of the rainy season increase the likelihood of protests, although the effects
are weaker. This in line with the notion that a drought presents a bigger problem to
farmers when it occurs instead of the anticipated rain. Conversely, droughts at the
end of the rainy season are not strongly related with protests as the timing implies a
lower susceptibility to crop failure when the rain is expected to abate. Columns (3)
repeats the baseline results and column (4) uses our baseline indicator of an SPEI
value below -1.5 during the growing season of the cell’s main crop. The absence
of results suggests that adverse effects on diversified farms and other water-related
conflicts seem to matter. We obtain a weaker association between the interaction of
interest and protests if we focus only on the main crop in a cell.13 Columns (5) and
(6) mirror these results using the share of months in which the cell experienced a
drought (for all crops and the main crop). The effects are strongest with the share
measure for all crops. Here a two standard deviation increase in the Theil index in a
cell that has experienced droughts in 3 out of 12 months raises the probability of a
protest by 0.26 percentage points (or by about 1/3 of the unconditional probability).
Other tests. We conduct a battery of other robustness checks whose detailed
results we relegate to the Appendix. Here we only briefly summarize the findings. i)
Using different conflict data and categories of conflict shows that our effect is specific
to non-state actions initiated by civilians and does not predict the involvement of the
government (Table 2-C1), ii) the results are similar if we use a subset of more precise
conflict locations (Table 2-C2), iii) they are robust at 100 km for ethnic regions
obtained via an alternative ethnic mapping (from GREG) but not significant at 50
km due to the substantially larger size of GREG homelands (Table 2-C3), iv) they
are robust to using a uniform weighting scheme in the computation of the inequality
indexes as opposed to a Bartlett kernel with linearly decreasing weights (Table 2-
C4), and v) droughts do not capture broader weather shocks, using temperature or
precipitation in lieu of droughts does not reveal any conditional or unconditional
effects of these variables on protests (Table 2-C5).
2-5 Concluding remarks
This paper shows that droughts trigger social unrest in Africa, but primarily
in location with a high degree of local ethnic inequality between groups. We
construct a novel spatial inequality measure that calculates between and within-
group differences at each location within a given radius. Such spatial variation
allows assessing the importance of different reference groups in the formation of
grievances.
We find that droughts are more likely to trigger social unrest in locations
with high levels of ethnic between-group inequality. Locations with two standard
deviations higher inequality levels between ethnic groups during drought years have
a significantly higher protest incidence than drought affected locations with no
between-group inequality. Second, income differences within smaller geographic
13The main crop is defined as having the highest harvested area in a cell (Tollefsen et al., 2012;
Portmann et al., 2010)
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areas seem to be more relevant in explaining social unrest than differences between
groups which are further apart. This suggests that individuals evaluate their
deprivation relative to other groups in their vicinity and not to some broader
population which they do not directly observe. Third, not all kinds of inequality
matter equally. We show that interactions of droughts with inequality between
administrative regions or within ethnic regions are not associated with more protest
in our data. Finally, the interaction of droughts with inequality between ethnic
groups is weakly increasing in the degree of linguistic distance. This suggests that
groups speaking languages from different branches of the language trees are more
likely to be perceived as out-group members than groups speaking more closely-
related languages.
Satellite data of nighttime luminosity enable the application of the local
inequality measure on a large scale but also has several weaknesses. Ideally, we would
have used georeferenced micro data on the ethnic affiliation or spoken language,
income and protest experience of individuals or households over a similar time
horizon. Such data is not available for all of Africa. However, data is available
for many other potential applications of our local inequality measure. For example,
the index could be used to capture intra-urban inequality at the block level.
The IPCC projects that the frequency and magnitude of drought will rise in
many parts of the world if global temperature increases by 2◦ Celsius instead of
1.5◦ (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018). Our study suggests that this implies social
unrest could increase in areas with large economic differences between ethnic groups.
Climate change adaptation measures can help people cope with climate change
impacts, but could also contribute to lower ethnic grievance by targeting high
inequality regions. Some ethnic grievances can be directly addressed by a more
equal provision of basic services and public goods.
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2-6 Data appendix
2-A1 Additional summary statistics
Table 2-A1 – Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Panel A. Conflict variables
Protests and riots (SCAD) 0.0086 0.0924 0 1 262,108
Conflict incidence (GED) 0.0256 0.1578 0 1 263,010
Nonstate conflict (GED) 0.0056 0.0748 0 1 263,010
Statebased conflict (GED) 0.0150 0.1214 0 1 263,010
Onesided conflict (GED) 0.0108 0.1034 0 1 263,010
Panel B. Ethnologue variables
Between Theil (50 km) 0.3962 0.7247 0.00 12.42 106,908
Between Theil (100 km) 0.4104 0.7396 0.00 12.34 152,241
Between Theil (200 km) 0.4005 0.6854 0.00 13.63 189,530
Within Theil (50 km) 0.7619 1.0263 0.00 12.62 231,308
Within Theil (100 km) 1.1927 1.3007 0.00 13.93 231,308
Within Theil (200 km) 1.3644 1.2481 0.00 14.35 231,308
Log luminosity (DMSP) -0.9141 5.1575 -4.61 12.31 231,308
Log population (GHSL) 6.6708 6.0881 -4.61 16.62 231,308
Panel C. First-order region variables
Between Theil (50 km) 0.2276 0.5106 0.00 11.57 108,371
Between Theil (100 km) 0.2372 0.5260 0.00 12.21 165,071
Between Theil (200 km) 0.2428 0.4860 0.00 9.54 216,926
Within Theil (50 km) 0.7454 1.0492 0.00 13.61 262,966
Within Theil (100 km) 1.2083 1.3678 0.00 14.42 262,966
Within Theil (200 km) 1.4421 1.3488 0.00 18.89 262,966
Log luminosity (DMSP) -1.2554 4.9926 -4.61 12.31 262,966
Log population (GHSL) 5.8537 6.4101 -4.61 16.62 262,966
Panel D. GREG variables
Between Theil (50 km) 0.2999 0.5974 0.00 12.22 94,302
Between Theil (100 km) 0.2803 0.5663 0.00 11.72 144,024
Between Theil (200 km) 0.2516 0.5178 0.00 11.13 188,084
Within Theil (50 km) 0.7667 1.0631 0.00 13.55 250,712
Within Theil (100 km) 1.2449 1.3763 0.00 14.76 250,712
Within Theil (200 km) 1.4960 1.3483 0.00 18.60 250,712
Log luminosity (DMSP) -1.1245 5.0587 -4.61 12.84 250,712
Log population (GHSL) 6.1824 6.2869 -4.61 16.62 250,712
Panel D. Other variables
Log temperature
(GHCN+CAMS)
24.6376 3.9257 7.51 39.53 260,626
Log precipitation (GPCC) 701.3178 609.7708 0.12 3,275.41 263,010
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2-B2 Additional figures






Figure 2-B2 – Linguistic tree of Congo (DRC) up to l = 8
Note: The figure shows the linguistic tree of the Democratic Republic of Congo from level 1
to 8. We have added a level 0 (the origin) for display purposes only.
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2-7 Analytical appendix
Table 2-C1 – Conflict type, 50 km neighborhood size
Conflict database and measure . . .
SCAD GED GED GED GED
repression overall nonstate statebased onesided
Drought (Dt) 0.0068 -0.0001 -0.0015** 0.0014 -0.0016
(0.0213) (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0011)
Between Theil (T̃ bt−1) -0.0756 0.0011 -0.0013 0.0028** -0.0004
(0.0673) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0010)
Interaction (Dt × T̃ bt−1) -0.0175 -0.0007 0.0017** -0.0023* -0.0006
(0.0496) (0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0009)
Cell FE X X X X X
Country-Year FE X X X X X
Controls X X X X X
Observations 1,776 103,362 103,362 103,362 103,362
Notes: The table reports fixed effects regression results. The dependent variable varies by
column. Standard errors clustered by 2◦ × 2◦ cells are reported in parenthesis. Significant at
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
Table 2-C2 – SCAD protest with different precision codes
SCAD precision codes . . .
1–4 1–5
50 km 100 km 200 km 50 km 100 km 200 km
Drought (Dt) -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0004
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Between Theil 0.0003 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001
(T̃ bt−1) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Interaction 0.0013* 0.0010*** 0.0003 0.0013* 0.0010** 0.0003
(Dt × T̃ bt−1) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Cell FE X X X X X X
Country-Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Observations 103,133 147,926 186,395 103,133 147,926 186,395
Notes: The table reports fixed effects regression results. The dependent variable is binary
indicator for demonstrations and riots. Standard errors clustered by 2◦ × 2◦ cells are
reported in parenthesis. Significant at * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
Table 2-C3 – Between-group inequality based on GREG (Atlas Narodov Mira)
Theil distance
50 km 100 km 200 km 50 km 100 km 200 km
Drought (Dt) -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0003
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Between Theil (T̃ bt−1) 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Interaction 0.0010 0.0010** 0.0000
(Dt × T̃ bt−1) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Cell FE X X X X X X
Country-Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Observations 89,246 136,813 179,078 89,246 136,813 179,078
Notes: The table reports fixed effects regression results. The dependent variable is binary
indicator for demonstrations and riots. Standard errors clustered by 2◦ × 2◦ cells are
reported in parenthesis. Significant at * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
Table 2-C4 – Uniform weighting in distance function
Theil distance
50 km 100 km 200 km 50 km 100 km 200km
Drought (Dt) -0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0004
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Between Theil (T̃ bt−1) 0.0013 0.0012** 0.0007 0.0001 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Interaction 0.0024** 0.0011* 0.0002
(Dt × T̃ bt−1) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0005)
Cell FE X X X X X X
Country-Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Observations 103,133 147,926 186,395 103,133 147,926 186,395
Notes: The table reports fixed effects regression results. The dependent variable is binary
indicator for demonstrations and riots. Standard errors clustered by 2◦ × 2◦ cells are
reported in parenthesis. Significant at * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
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Table 2-C5 – Climate
Climate shock measured by . . .
Log Temperature Log Precipitation
50 km 100 km 200 km 50 km 100 km 200 km
Shock (St) 0.0005 0.0003 0.0005 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Between Theil (T̃ bt−1) 0.0052 -0.0011 0.0026 -0.0003 0.0008 0.0012
(0.0037) (0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0007)
Interaction (St × T̃ bt−1) -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Cell FE X X X X X X
Country-Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Observations 102,217 146,323 184,436 103,133 147,926 186,395
Notes: The table reports fixed effects regression results. The dependent variable is binary
indicator for demonstrations and riots. Standard errors clustered by 2◦ × 2◦ cells are
reported in parenthesis. Significant at * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
Chapter 3
Local inequality
Validating a spatial measure
3-1 Introduction
A large body of literature argues that inequality relates to subjective well-being
or creates grievances that contribute to armed conflicts and civil wars (Ray and
Esteban, 2017). Especially horizontal inequality, such as inequality between ethnic
groups, are critical factors to violence (Østby, 2008). Household-level surveys show
clear evidence of inter-personal income differences, also known as vertical inequality.
However, it is unclear if individuals perceive these objective measures of inequality.1
What is more, it is unclear how individuals internalize the more abstract concept of
horizontal inequality, that is, inequality between identity groups.
This chapter analyzes whether individuals perceive inequality that we measure
in the data. Chapter 2 of this thesis presents the construction of a local inequality
measure based on differences of nighttime light across ethnic regions. I regress
individual responses of perceived inequality on the local measure of ethnic inequality
to assess if individuals also recognize ethnic inequality. Moreover, I will test the
relationship of perceived inequality and increasing group salience through economic
distress in two ways. First, I test if individuals with ethnic self-identification are
more likely to observe local inequality than individuals without a clear ethnic
awareness. Second, I test if ethnic inequality is more meaningful to inequality
perception if individuals are affected by droughts. In this context, droughts could
exacerbate existing ethnic grievances, as individuals experience economic distress.
The results suggest that local ethnic between-group inequality mirrors perceived
measures of inequality between ethnic groups. A one-standard-deviation increase
in the ethnic between-group inequality increases the probability of respondents
perceiving their identity group as worse off, or much worse off. Moreover, the
relationship between local ethnic inequality relates stronger to inequality perception
if individuals have a clear ethnic identity. Finally, droughts worsen the evaluation
of group inequality potentially due to increased group alienation or unequal
distribution of scarcer resources.
This study contributes to the literature on ethnic inequality and inequality
perception by bridging the gap between the two strands. Research on inequality
1In this chapter, objective or measured inequality refers to inequality measures based on
observed income data, while subjective inequality refers to respondents’ evaluation
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consequences assumes that actors observe these differences and act accordingly, such
as voting for redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981) or participating in violent
conflict (Østby, 2008; Cederman et al., 2013; Esteban et al., 2012; Lessmann and
Steinkraus, 2019). However, it is unclear how individuals perceive inequality, and if
they experience such grievance from objective ethnic inequality measures at all. The
results of this study lend faith that individuals assessment of their group’s income
position is correlated with objective measures of inequality.
Still, inequality perception is subject to a large degree of errors. There
seems to be a consensus that individuals’ valuation of their income ranking is
mostly wrong (Gimpelson and Treisman, 2017) or “self-enchanced”, an effect where
individuals rank themselves better than the average person (Loughnan et al.,
2011). Furthermore, the social milieu or immediate neighborhood are crucial
reference groups of an individual’s income ranking (Cruces et al., 2013; Evans,
2004). Meanwhile, high inequality perception is correlated with stronger demands
for government redistribution (Gimpelson and Treisman, 2017), as well as higher
acceptance for violence (Miodownik and Nir, 2015). The relationship between an
objective measure of ethnic inequality and perceived ethnic group inequality is not
clear-cut, given the systematic bias in inequality assessment of individuals on a
personal or group level. Understanding the relationship between ethnic inequality
measures by remote-sensing data and survey-based perception values enables further
analysis of the influence of ethnic inequality on economic development in a data-
scarce environment.
The analysis of inequality perception needs to be distinguished from the literature
of subjective well-being, even though the concepts are related. Subjective well-
being alone assesses the individual’s quality of life (Diener, 1984). Subjective well-
being correlates positively with economic inequality for individuals who have a
high fairness perception as they attribute inequality with social mobility (Bjørnskov
et al., 2013). However, perceived inequality evaluates the experienced difference in
livelihood between individuals or identity groups. Thus, a low subjective well-being
evaluation may be the outcome of high perceived inequality that eventually could
lead to widespread social unrest (Devarajan and Ianchovichina, 2017).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3-2 introduces the
underlying data. The empirical strategy is described in Section 3-3. Section 3-
4 shows the results on explaining perceived personal and group level inequality.
Section 3-5 concludes.
3-2 Data
The unit of observation is the individual level respondent of the Afrobarometer.
The Afrobarometer is a survey about public attitudes about different aspects of
development, such as governance and livelihood. Afrobarometer conducts these
surveys since 1999 for up to 36 African countries depending on the survey round.2
As such, the Afrobarometer is a repeated cross-sectional dataset on opinions and
attitudes, including the perception of livelihood.
I match the individual-level responses to inequality perception with ethnic
inequality measures local to the respondent’s location, i.e., the grid cell. Table 3-A2
2Table 5-A7 provides a full list of countries included in each survey round.
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shows the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables across rounds 1–5.
Inequality perception. The Afrobarometer asks three different questions on
perceived inequality. The first question asks about a comparison of their personal
living condition compared to other citizens of their country. Similarly, the second
and third questions ask about the respondent’s economic conditions or ethnic and
tribal group compared to other identity or ethnic and tribal groups. Respondents
answer both questions on a scale between 1–5. The responses have been harmonized.
Thus, the values from 1–5 correspond to “much worse”, “worse”, “same”, “better”,
“much better”. Table 3-1 show the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables
along with some control variables. 3
Table 3-1 – Descriptive statistics of ordered variables
Ordered opinion variables
Much Much
worse Worse Same Better better Obs
In general, how do you rate: Your living
conditions compared to those of
other [countrymen]? 0.10 0.28 0.34 0.25 0.03 105,828
Is your [identity group]’s economic
conditions worse, the same as,
or better than other groups? 0.12 0.23 0.41 0.20 0.05 65,511
In general, how would you describe:
Your own present living conditions? 0.19 0.30 0.22 0.26 0.04 93,250
When you look at your life today,
how satisfied do you feel compared
with one/five year(s) ago 0.11 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.05 109,960
When you look forward at your life’s
prospects, how satisfied do you
expect to be in one year’s time? 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.43 0.18 96,038
Interpersonal comparison of livelihood is available for all rounds of the
Afrobarometer but conceptionally relates vaguely to the measure of local inequality
within or between ethnic groups. The Afrobarometer question asks about a
general comparison of the respondent’s livelihood to other “countrymen.” Thus,
the reference point is neither an ethnic group nor any other group type (e.g.,
occupation, class). However, one possibility to test the relationship between
perceived interpersonal inequality and local spatial inequality is to use within-region
administrative inequality.
The measure of local ethnic between-group inequality relates most likely to
the question on economic conditions compared to other ethnic and tribal groups.
Respondents were asked about their identity group and ethnic belonging in an open
question without any pre-defined group names. However, the specific framing of the
question in rounds 1–2 makes them unusable for this study’s purpose.
Rounds 1–2 asks about their identity group’s economic conditions compared
to others, while rounds 3–4 ask explicitly about the ethnic or tribal economic
3Table 3-A1 lists all the questions used from Afrobarometer for each round.
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conditions. A closer look at the question on the identity reveals that the questions
are not aiming for ethnic identification.4 The identities stated in rounds 1–2
are about 30% “Language/Tribe/Ethnic,” and while identities such as “Religion,”
“Occupation,” and “Class” comprise about 55%.
Rounds 3–4 pose more specific questions on ethnicity and tribal belonging. The
specific question on their identity is, “What is your tribe? You know, your ethnic or
cultural group.” Not surprisingly, answers to this question are much more diverse.
While rounds 1–2 have about 16 unique categories (e.g., “Religion,” “Occupation,”
and “Class”), round 3 alone lists about 290 tribal and ethnic identities. The
estimates on between-group inequality will be based mostly on questions in rounds
3–4, given these conceptual differences and the fact that round 5 does not ask about
the economic situations of a tribe or ethnic group,
Local ethnic inequality. The local inequality measure within and between
administrative regions and ethnic groups is elaborated in detail in Chapter 2. Briefly,
we develop a local Theil measure that accounts for income per capita within a
defined radius of an arbitrary vantage point on a 55 × 55km2 grid. The measure
has three features: First, using distance weighting, locations farther away from the
vantage point receive less weight than nearby locations. Distance weighting assumes
that closer locations stipulate a more meaningful comparison group. Second, the
distance threshold is flexible; that is, we test if locations within 50, 100, or 200 km
are more meaningful reference points. Third, to proxy for income and population,
we use satellite nightlight data and population grids from NOAA (2015); Pesaresi
et al. (2019b).5 The local inequality measure on the grid cell is attributed to each
respondent within that cell.
Economic distress. Drought events at the beginning of the rain season are
used for evaluating the impact of economic distress on group salience. Begueŕıa
et al. (2010) offers a comprehensive database for the Standardized Precipitation
Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI) around the globe.6 The SPEI index calculates
standardized differences in precipitation compared to historical average values. This
measure is similar to the Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) but additionally
accounts for the evapotranspiration of soil moisture. Hence, the SPEI considers
temperature variation as well to compute the severeness of droughts instead of
relying on precipitation alone.7
4The following question is asked before any identity-related question. For example, the specific
question for Nigeria is: “We have spoken to many Nigerians and they have all described themselves
in different ways. Some people describe themselves in terms of their language, ethnic group, or
religion, and others describe themselves in economic terms, such as working class, middle class, or a
farmer. Besides being Nigerian, which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?”
5The population grid is available for from 1990 until 2015 in a five-year interval. We interpolate
the population data linearly and calculate the sum of light and the total population in each cell to
get a proxy variable for income per capita.
6The SPEI index is available on a spatial resolution of 55× 55km2 from Tollefsen et al. (2012)
7There exist two SPEI measures. One is called SPEIbase with the Penman-Monteith
evapotranspiration model, while the SPEI Global Drought Monitor uses the Thornthwaite model of
moisture loss. Yang et al. (2017) analyzes the sensitivity of these different measures and conclude
that the Thornthwaite is becoming less applicable under climate change situations. Hence, the
analysis relies on the SPEIbase.
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3-3 Empirical strategy
The analysis aims to measure the degree of how ethnic inequality experienced by
an individual is associated with perceived inequality. The main model for Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) and ordered probit regressions is specified as follows:
Ỹipt = βT̃ bi,p,t + γT̃wi,p,t + x′iptδ + µit + εipt (3-1)
Ỹipt is an latent ordered variable on opinion, T̃ bi,p,t−1 (T̃wi,p,t) is a measure of between
(within) region or group inequalities within an area of 50km, 100km, or 200km from
an individual’s cell location. µit are country-year effects. x′ipt is a vector of controls
including cell population, cell light, respondent’s gender, age, age2, urban location
indicator, as well as, livelihood in current, past and future situation.
Controlling for two sets of living conditions affecting the Theil variable and the
dependent variable itself is crucial for the analysis. First, changes in light amount
and population could leverage reporting on how individuals perceive inequality.
Controlling for both factors allows an interpretation of the Theil as differences
between ethnic groups regardless of increases in per capita light. Second, past,
current, and expected livelihood may affect the reporting of perceived inequality as
well. For example, respondents may state that they have the same living conditions
as others in anticipation and expectation of economic growth even though they may
have worse living conditions.
Standard errors are clustered at the cell level.8 The independent variables are
standardized to facilitate interpretation. Thus, each unit increase represents an
increase of the respective variable by one standard deviation.
3-4 Results
Each table reports regression coefficients for Theil indices with 50, 100, and 200km
distance cut-offs. Given the coding laid out in Table 3-1, a negative sign of the
coefficient corresponds to a marginal effect with a worsening of the outcome variable.
Theoretically, individual level and group level inequality may have different
relationships between a perceived and an objective measure. In principle, an identity
group’s actual economic conditions (for example, an ethnic identity group) are
expected to be negatively related to perceived differences in economic conditions.
That is, an individual may have better living conditions than most of her peer-group,
but systematic ethnic differences are likely to be visible. Observing the systematic
differences may form some degree of grievance, leading to a lower evaluation of
the group’s relative economic conditions. In contrast, a high ethnic within-group
inequality may be positively related to the perceived evaluation of the group’s
economic condition. Such a relationship is consistent with attributing the wealth of
individuals of the same ethnicity to a collective understanding of ethnic kinship.
8Clustering at the cell level accounts for the possibility that individuals from the cell report
similar answers to a survey questions over time. Such a pattern would otherwise decrease the
information content of each observation within a cell. In contrast, clustering at a higher regional
dimension may be undesirable, since each observation has a legitimate perception of their living
conditions even if it resides close to each other (e.g., in a neighboring cell). Thus, the information
content of each respondent across geographical cells should not be discounted.
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Similarly, the relationship between measured and perceived inequality on a
personal or within-inequality level is ambiguous as well. On the one hand,
higher within-inequality measured objectively could negatively relate to perceived
personal inequality because more respondents from the lower end of the income
distribution are likely to be sampled in an area with high inequality. On the other
hand, an individual could report feeling much better off than the rest of other
citizens in an environment with high inequality, because they are aware that they
contribute to higher within inequality or self-enhance their ranking. Hence, the
relationship between relative well-being measured objectively on the individual level
and perceived within-inequality could be positive.
3-4.1 Unconditional results
Table 3-2 shows that the relationship between measured and perceived inequality
seems to be straightforward. The first three columns report the results on the
individual-level assessment of relative living conditions for Theil indices, and
columns 4 to 6 show the results on the relative assessment of the economic living
conditions of the respondent’s identity group compared to other groups. Generally,
the perceived differences in livelihood and economic conditions on the personal and
group level negatively correlate with the between-group and within-group Theil over
the three different distance cut-off points. On the personal level (column 1 to 3),
both ethnic inequality types significantly explain the perceived differences. The
stronger correlation of the between-group Theil highlights that the general question
of comparing their livelihood against “other countrymen” may be understood as a
between-identity-group comparison.
Between-group differences seem to explain perceived group differences in
economic conditions. Columns 4 to 6 show that isolating identity groups as reference
points effectively reduces noise in the variable of perceived inequality. The within-
Theil do not exhibit strong explanatory power anymore. In contrast, a one standard
deviation increase in the between-group Theil worsens the respondent’s evaluation
of their group’s economic conditions compared to other groups.
OLS regressions, though convenient to interpret, may not be the ideal estimator
to explain ordered variables. Hence, Table 3-3 shows the results applying ordered
probit estimations. The statistical significance level is nearly identical, which
confirms that the OLS results are not subject to biases related to different functional
form estimations.
A key advantage of ordered probit regressions is the appropriate marginal effects
representation of the explanatory variables. Table 3-4 reports the marginal effects
of the ordered probit estimation for the between-group Theil indices only. The last
column shows that a one standard deviation increase in the 200km between-group
Theil increases the probability of a respondent saying that their identity group is
“much worse” off than other groups by 0.5%. This coefficient is about 4% of the
probability that respondents rate their group’s economic conditions as “much worse.”
The estimated relationship appears to have a relatively small economic
significance. The literature on inequality perception documents that individuals
themselves are unable to identify their relative position in the income distribution.
Hence, it is not unsurprising that various factors determine the perception of
inequality.
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Table 3-2 – Ethnic inequality and perceived relative living conditions (OLS)
Economic conditions vs. others on . . .
personal level group level
Theil distance 50km 100km 200km 50km 100km 200km
Between-Theilt -0.0152*** -0.0216*** -0.0306*** -0.0231** -0.0192 -0.0278**
(0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0116) (0.0132) (0.0129)
Within-Theilt 0.0005 -0.0148** -0.0170** -0.0050 -0.0221* -0.0177
(0.0069) (0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0120) (0.0126) (0.0166)
Sum of lightt 0.0048 0.0131 0.0192 0.0119 0.0113 0.0124
(0.0126) (0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0244) (0.0239) (0.0236)
Populationt 0.0037 -0.0045 -0.0082 0.0266 0.0212 0.0219
(0.0101) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0271) (0.0260) (0.0263)
N 62,254 68,658 70,732 37,420 40,924 41,833
Adj. R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.10 0.10 0.10
Country-Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Notes: Dependent variables are ordered variables on respondent’s valuation of their
economic conditions compared to others (personal-level) or other identity groups
(group-level). Standard errors clustered at the cell level in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
Table 3-3 – Ethnic inequality and perceived relative living conditions (Ordered
probit)
Economic conditions vs. others on . . .
personal level group level
Theil distance 50km 100km 200km 50km 100km 200km
Between-Theilt -0.0182** -0.0264*** -0.0374*** -0.0248* -0.0206 -0.0298**
(0.0072) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0127) (0.0144) (0.0141)
Within-Theilt 0.0009 -0.0186** -0.0210** -0.0047 -0.0237* -0.0190
(0.0087) (0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0130) (0.0136) (0.0180)
Sum of lightt 0.0069 0.0178 0.0255 0.0136 0.0129 0.0142
(0.0168) (0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0265) (0.0260) (0.0257)
Populationt 0.0029 -0.0078 -0.0125 0.0284 0.0225 0.0232
(0.0129) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0291) (0.0280) (0.0284)
N 62,254 68,658 70,732 37,420 40,924 41,833
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.04
Country-Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Notes: Dependent variables are ordered variables on respondent’s valuation of their
economic conditions compared to others (personal-level) or other identity groups
(group-level). Standard errors clustered at the cell level in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
3-4.2 Salience of ethnicity
The overall result shows that perceived group inequality can be mapped by the local
measures of spatial inequality, regardless of the individual’s ethnicity awareness.
However, the comparison between ethnic inequality with an equivalent subjective
measure must also be related to ethnicity.
I analyze two hypotheses in turn. First, the relationship between the ethnic
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Table 3-4 – Ordered probit marginal effects for between-group Theil indices
Marginal effect: economic conditions vs. others on . . .
personal level group level
TBetween 50km 100km 200km 50km 100km 200km
Much worse 0.0025** 0.0036*** 0.0051*** 0.0045** 0.0037 0.0053**
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Worse 0.0032** 0.0046*** 0.0065*** 0.0042* 0.0035 0.0051**
(0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0024)
Same -0.0005** -0.0007*** -0.0010*** -0.0013** -0.0011 -0.0015**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Better -0.0040** -0.0058*** -0.0082*** -0.0049* -0.0041 -0.0059**
(0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0028)
Much better -0.0011** -0.0017*** -0.0024*** -0.0024* -0.0020 -0.0029**
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Notes: Dependent variables are ordered variables on respondent’s valuation of their
economic conditions compared to others (personal-level) or other identity groups
(group-level). Only the marginal effects of the Between-Theil variables are shown. Standard
errors clustered at the cell level in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
Theil measure and the perception measure may be more accurate for persons with
an awareness of their ethnicity. One would only expect a relationship between
perceived ethnic group differences with a measure of ethnic inequality. Second, the
salience of ethnicity may be higher during economic distress. This may be when
agents highlight between-group ethnic differences as they experience the unequal
effects of a particular shock. Such an increase in animosity has been observed by
Schilling et al. (2012). The author finds that droughts were the main reason for
higher communal cattle-raiding in the poorest and most marginalized county of
Kenya. These attacks eventually lead to stronger distrust between two particular
community groups.
The Afrobarometer enables to test the relationship of ethnic awareness and
perceived group differences. Round 3 and 4 include questions on the respondent’s
tribal belonging or ethnic identity. Respondents stated their identity without any
pre-defined lists. Respondents stating national identification without regards to
ethnicity most likely introduce measurement error as they do not observe ethnic
differences. Thus, it is expected that individuals with self-identification to an ethnic
or tribal group exhibit a stronger relationship between perceived group differences
and ethnic between-group Theil.
Columns 1 to 3 of Table 3-5 report the results to the subset of round 3 and round
4 of the Afrobarometer. Compared to Table 3-2, the unconditional relationship
of the 200km Between-Theil is about twice as large for the subset with a precise
framing of ethnic and tribes as groups. The variable Ethnic identification for
columns 4 to 6 is defined as 1 if the respondent self-identifies to a specific tribe
or ethnic group. The base variable Between-Theil is statistically insignificant and
shows that respondents without tribal or ethnic identification do not connect local
ethnic inequality with perceived group differences.9 In contrast, the interaction term
9Non-ethnic identification includes age, gender, occupation, or class, for example.
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shows that respondents with an ethnic identification have a strong and statistically
significant association between the local ethnic between-group Theil and worse
economic conditions for their ethnic group.
Table 3-5 – Ethnic identification
Economic conditions vs. others on group level
Theil distance 50km 100km 200km 50km 100km 200km
Between-Theilt (Tt) -0.0178 -0.0341*** -0.0457*** -0.0255 0.0088 0.0130
(0.0132) (0.0128) (0.0144) (0.0177) (0.0207) (0.0231)
Ethnic identification (E) 0.0951** 0.1099** 0.1130***
(0.0441) (0.0428) (0.0428)
Tt ×E 0.0100 -0.0462** -0.0624**
(0.0222) (0.0213) (0.0247)
Within-Theilt 0.0044 -0.0052 -0.0119 0.0037 -0.0058 -0.0131
(0.0131) (0.0138) (0.0185) (0.0131) (0.0137) (0.0184)
N 25,976 28,454 29,115 25,976 28,454 29,115
Adj. R2 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13
Country-Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Light and population X X X X X X
Notes: Dependent variable is ordered variable on respondent’s valuation of their economic
conditions compared to other identity groups (group-level). Standard errors clustered at the
cell level in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
The lack of evidence above that respondents without a clear ethnic identification
connect perceived inequality with local inequality may be driven by an insufficient
number of respondents with non-ethnic identification. Table 3-6 test if local
inequality based on administrative regions interplays with ethnic identification.
The first three columns show that between-group administrative inequality (i.e.,
local inequality based on administrative region 1 instead of ethnic regions) shows a
strong negative relationship with the respondent’s identity group perceived economic
well-being. This relationship is in line with ethnic regions overlapping with
administrative regions. Crucially, columns 4 to 6 show that the interaction term
is statistically insignificant. That is, respondents with ethnic self-identification are
not more likely to relate local inequality between administrative regions with worse
economic conditions of their ethnic group. However, respondents without a clear
ethnic identification still observe administrative between-group inequality as the
constituent term for the between-Theil is negative, large, and statistically significant.
This highlights that perceived inequality is not only ethnically observed, but the
administrative region can also serve as a meaningful reference group for perceived
spatial inequality without any reference to ethnicity.
Given that ethnic identification plays a key role in perceived inequality, how fluid
is the salience of ethnicity? Economic distress can lead to inter-ethnic tensions and
distrust (Schilling et al., 2012). I test this hypothesis by regressing the perceived
inequality on the interaction of droughts and local between-group inequality. The
marginal effect of droughts is:
∂Y
∂Drought
= β2 + β3T̃ bi,p,t
Since a drought value of -1.5 indicates a severe drought, β2 + β3T̃ bi,p,t > 0 would
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Table 3-6 – Ethnic identification with GADM1 regions
Economic conditions vs. others on group level
Theil distance 50km 100km 200km 50km 100km 200km
Between-Theilt (Tt) -0.0083 -0.0704*** -0.1407*** -0.0084 -0.0807** -0.0960**
(0.0153) (0.0212) (0.0318) (0.0437) (0.0354) (0.0398)
Ethnic identification (E) 0.0928** 0.0933** 0.0835**
(0.0422) (0.0390) (0.0386)
Tt ×E -0.0000 0.0108 -0.0483
(0.0443) (0.0327) (0.0395)
Within-Theilt -0.0019 -0.0184* -0.0382*** -0.0021 -0.0180* -0.0381***
(0.0132) (0.0109) (0.0131) (0.0132) (0.0109) (0.0132)
N 25,046 27,922 29,540 25,046 27,922 29,540
Adj. R2 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13
Country-Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Light and population X X X X X X
Notes: Dependent variable is ordered variable on respondent’s valuation of their economic
conditions compared to other identity groups (group-level). Standard errors clustered at the
cell level in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
indicate that respondents report worse economic conditions of their ethnic group
compared to other groups, vice versa.
Table 3-7 shows that there is no evidence that droughts increase the perception
of group inequality. However, a Chow test for structural break reveals that the
Afrobarometer rounds 1 and 2 are significantly different from round 3 and 4 and
may not be estimated in a pooled regression. Moreover, a Chow test does not
reject the null hypothesis that there is no structural break between rounds 3 and
4. The structural break is created through the different framing of asking about
the differences in the economic conditions of the identity groups. The question in
round 1 and 2 are less distinct about ethnic differences, whereas round 3 and round
4 explicitly ask about the respondent’s ethnic and tribal identification. Therefore,
splitting the sample is justified due to the high measurement error introduced by
the broad definition of identity groups in the first two rounds of the Afrobarometer.
There is no evidence that droughts and local ethnic inequality worsen the
perception of group differences in the first 4 columns. However, the last two columns
show that droughts (SPEIvalues < 0) are associated with worse perceived economic
conditions of the own identity group compared to other groups. This effect is even
stronger, the higher the ethnic between-group inequality.
Both findings suggest that perceived inequality relates to ethnicity in two ways.
First, ethnic inequality measured by structural nightlight differences is mirrored in
people’s perception of ethnic differences. Second, the perception of inequality is not
static, but maybe heightened by economic distress. Alternatively, economic distress
may increase perceived inequality by an actual increase in ethnic inequality. For
example, an economic shock may have unequal effects across ethnic groups in a
country. All in all, the results suggest that perceived inequality is a fluid concept.
3-4.3 Sensitivity analysis
Dependent variable. Table 3-B1 further facilitates the interpretation of the
effect size. The binary dependent variable is 0 if respondents state that they are
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Table 3-7 – Drought impact on group salience
Group-level economic conditions vs. others
rounds 1–2 rounds 3–4
Theil distance 50km 100km 200km 50km 100km 200km
Between-Theilt (T) -0.0258* 0.0026 0.0017 -0.0119 -0.0348*** -0.0517***
(0.0147) (0.0155) (0.0175) (0.0143) (0.0129) (0.0152)
Droughtt (D) -0.0140 -0.0082 -0.0076 0.0703*** 0.0589*** 0.0492***
(0.0276) (0.0263) (0.0260) (0.0189) (0.0179) (0.0168)
Tt ×Dt 0.0196 -0.0128 -0.0058 0.0059 0.0241** 0.0448***
(0.0182) (0.0129) (0.0174) (0.0125) (0.0106) (0.0121)
Within-Theilt -0.0358** -0.0575*** -0.0356** -0.0004 -0.0120 -0.0205
(0.0158) (0.0157) (0.0144) (0.0133) (0.0141) (0.0191)
N 20,317 22,442 22,974 25,148 27,562 28,213
Adj. R2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.11
Country-Year FE X X X X X X
Controls partial partial partial partial partial partial
Light and population X X X X X X
Notes: Dependent variable is ordered variable on respondent’s valuation of their economic
conditions compared to other identity groups (group-level). The control variable do not
include the respondents current absolute evaluation of living standards to include
Afrobarometer 1 in the analysis. Table 3-B8 shows that the results are very similar if
including the full set of control variables but dropping round 1. Standard errors clustered at
the cell level in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
”much worse” or ”worse” off than other groups, and 1 for answering ”same,” ”better,”
and ”much better.” The last column highlights that a one standard deviation increase
in the 200km between-group Theil increases the probability that respondents feel
much worse or worse off compared to other groups by around 1.4%. The results of
Table 3-B7 account for the structural break in the perceived group-level inequality
between rounds 2 and 3–4. The interpretation of the unconditional effect of Table 3-2
does not change.
Ethnic inequality. The results are robust to a different definition of ethnicity
by using ethnic homelands defined by GREG, a digital version of the Soviet Atlas
Narodov Mira (Table 3-B5). Moreover, the main results are also robust to a uniform
weighting scheme of the local inequality variable. This means that the results of
Table 3-B6 include local ethnic inequality measures where each cell receives an equal
weight within the distance cut-off point instead of a linear decay.
Control variables Table 3-B2, Table 3-B3, and Table 3-B4 are correspond to
Table 3-2, Table 3-3, and Table 3-4. The regressions include the additional control
variable of the binary indicator of the respondent’s ethnic self-identification. The
magnitudes are generally greater due a reduction on measurement error.
Drought measurement. Table 3-B9 uses the SPEI global drought monitor
data with the Thornthwaite model of moisture loss. The interaction relationship
is generally weaker but remains significant for the 200km ethnic-between group
inequality. Table 3-B10 adds a control variable for the ethnic identification for
results on the SPEIbase and SPEIgdm drought indicator. Controlling for ethnicity
increases the size of the coefficients by a small degree.
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3-5 Concluding remarks
This chapter aims to understand if and how objective an ethnic inequality measure
mirrors individuals’ inequality perception. Moreover, I test if the relationship
between the objective and subjective inequality measures change with individuals’
awareness of their ethnicity and experience of economic distress.
The results show that an increase of the local between-group within the
individual’s living environment is negatively correlated with the individual’s
evaluation of her ethnic group’s economic condition compared to other groups. The
relationship appears to be relatively small in economic terms. However, an objective
measure of inequality between ethnic groups will not reflect inequality between
groups if the group identity is not ethnic in itself. The results show that ethnic
self-identification is a crucial factor for such a relationship. Finally, the relationship
between the objective and subjective measures tends to be higher during drought
periods at the start of the raining season. This finding is consistent with the loss of
crops or increased tensions due to water scarcity and higher salience of ethnicity as
a group marker.
The results highlight that ethnicity is an important group marker and that the
link between the objective and subjective measure of ethnic inequality becomes
stronger with economic distress. This finding has some particular implications for
the so-called grievance literature that links horizontal inequality to social unrest. It
is not only the case that ethnic inequality can materialize as an actual grievance
for ethnic individuals. However, there is the potential that economic shocks deepen
the division between groups as resources become scarcer (see Döring, 2020; Schilling
et al., 2012). Therefore, this study suggests that future research on ethnic inequality
and social unrest should not discard the opportunity costs channel. Economic




Table 3-A1 – Overview of Afrobarometer questions by questionnaire rounds
Afrobarometer round . . .
No. Question 1 2 3 4 5
1 In general, how do you rate: Your living conditions
compared to those of other [countrymen]?
pfeerd q2B q5 q5 q4
2 Are [members of your identity group]’s economic
conditions worse, the same as, or better than other
groups in this country?
pfegrp q55 - - -
3 Think about the condition of [respondent’s ethnic group]
Are their economic conditions worse, the same as, or
better than other groups in this country?
- - q80A q80 -
4 What is your tribe? You know, your ethnic or cultural
group
- - q79 q79 q84
5 In general, how would you describe: Your own present
living conditions?
- q1B q4B q4B q3B
6 When you look at your life today, how satisfied do you
feel compared with one/five year(s) ago
pfepas q3B q6B q6B q5B
7 When you look forward at your life’s prospects, how
satisfied do you expect to be in one year’s time?
pfefut q4B q7B q7B q6B
8 Respondent’s age age q80 q1 q1 q1
9 Urban (1=Urban) urbrur urbrur urbrur urbrur urbrur
10 Respondent’s gender (1=Male) gender q96 q101 q101 q101
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Table 3-A2 – Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
Ethnologue
Between T50km -0.00 1.00 -0.56 13.87 92,261
Between T100km -0.00 1.00 -0.63 14.57 101,482
Between T200km -0.00 1.00 -0.83 11.76 104,245
Within T50km -0.00 1.00 -1.26 8.33 110,150
Within T100km 0.00 1.00 -1.35 9.05 110,150
Within T200km 0.00 1.00 -1.54 14.33 110,150
Sum of cell light -0.00 1.00 -0.40 9.56 110,150
Total cell population 0.00 1.00 -0.56 12.27 110,150
GREG
Between T50km 0.00 1.00 -0.50 14.38 77,578
Between T100km 0.00 1.00 -0.53 21.50 90,658
Between T200km -0.00 1.00 -0.62 32.90 99,021
Within T50km 0.00 1.00 -1.26 8.04 109,846
Within T100km -0.00 1.00 -1.34 10.06 109,846
Within T200km -0.00 1.00 -1.51 14.49 109,846
Sum of cell light -0.00 1.00 -0.32 10.61 109,846
Total cell population -0.00 1.00 -0.53 11.05 109,846
ADM1
Between T50km -0.00 1.00 -0.60 12.89 95,814
Between T100km -0.00 1.00 -0.67 15.90 105,287
Between T200km -0.00 1.00 -0.78 6.72 110,151
Within T50km -0.00 1.00 -1.22 9.12 110,524
Within T100km -0.00 1.00 -1.27 11.50 110,524
Within T200km 0.00 1.00 -1.41 13.43 110,524
Sum of cell light 0.00 1.00 -0.39 9.72 110,524
Total cell population 0.00 1.00 -0.55 12.99 110,524
Afrobarometer variables
Respondent’s age 36.36 14.42 0 130 109,433
Urban indicator 0.39 0.49 0 1 110,331
Respondent’s gender 0.50 0.50 0 1 111,101
Ethnic self-identification 0.49 0.50 0 1 73,674
Drought indicator
SPEIbase at start period -0.00 0.93 -3.92 2.80 103,493
SPEIgdm at start period -0.17 1.01 -3.92 5.92 106,395
SPEIbase at end period -0.07 0.98 -2.68 2.73 99,486
SPEIgdm at end period -0.24 1.03 -2.95 4.26 106,403
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Table 3-B1 – Main with dummy dependent variable
Economic conditions vs. others on . . .
personal level group level
Theil distance 50km 100km 200km 50km 100km 200km
Between-Theilt -0.0111*** -0.0134*** -0.0197*** -0.0097* -0.0089* -0.0138**
(0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0050) (0.0053) (0.0057)
Within-Theilt 0.0003 -0.0048 -0.0067** -0.0108** -0.0146*** -0.0108
(0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0053) (0.0056) (0.0073)
Sum of lightt 0.0014 0.0045 0.0063 -0.0029 -0.0028 -0.0030
(0.0048) (0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0083) (0.0081) (0.0080)
Populationt 0.0051 0.0024 0.0008 0.0155 0.0140 0.0151
(0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0048) (0.0116) (0.0113) (0.0113)
N 62,254 68,658 70,732 37,420 40,924 41,833
Adj. R2 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.11 0.11 0.12
Country-Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Notes: Dependent variables are a binary variables indicating 0 if respondents value their
economic conditions ’much worse’ or ’worse’ and 1 if ’same’, ’better’, or ’much better’
compared to others (personal-level) or other identity groups (group-level). Standard errors
clustered at the cell level in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
Table 3-B2 – Main with tribe control
Economic conditions vs. others on . . .
personal level group level
Theil distance 50km 100km 200km 50km 100km 200km
Between-Theilt -0.0184*** -0.0266*** -0.0382*** -0.0163 -0.0328** -0.0441***
(0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0064) (0.0133) (0.0129) (0.0145)
Within-Theilt -0.0035 -0.0192*** -0.0242*** 0.0037 -0.0056 -0.0124
(0.0080) (0.0072) (0.0074) (0.0131) (0.0138) (0.0185)
Sum of lightt 0.0147 0.0216 0.0308** 0.0131 0.0080 0.0114
(0.0151) (0.0150) (0.0157) (0.0290) (0.0291) (0.0288)
Populationt -0.0019 -0.0095 -0.0153 0.0132 0.0092 0.0045
(0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0313) (0.0307) (0.0306)
N 49,111 54,304 56,098 25,976 28,454 29,115
Adj. R2 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.12 0.12 0.13
Country-Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Notes: Dependent variables are ordered variables on respondent’s valuation of their
economic conditions compared to others (personal-level) or other identity groups
(group-level). Standard errors clustered at the cell level in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
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Table 3-B3 – Ordered probit with tribe
Economic conditions vs. others on . . .
personal level group level
Theil distance 50km 100km 200km 50km 100km 200km
Between-Theilt -0.0223** -0.0332*** -0.0472*** -0.0186 -0.0380** -0.0513***
(0.0088) (0.0086) (0.0081) (0.0154) (0.0150) (0.0168)
Within-Theilt -0.0043 -0.0243*** -0.0303*** 0.0049 -0.0059 -0.0138
(0.0102) (0.0091) (0.0094) (0.0151) (0.0159) (0.0214)
Sum of lightt 0.0203 0.0295 0.0412** 0.0167 0.0106 0.0147
(0.0192) (0.0191) (0.0199) (0.0334) (0.0336) (0.0333)
Populationt -0.0041 -0.0142 -0.0216 0.0142 0.0096 0.0040
(0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0357) (0.0351) (0.0350)
N 49,111 54,304 56,098 25,976 28,454 29,115
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.05
Country-Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Notes: Dependent variables are ordered variables on respondent’s valuation of their
economic conditions compared to others (personal-level) or other identity groups
(group-level). Standard errors clustered at the cell level in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
Table 3-B4 – Ordered probit marginal effects with tribe
Marginal effect: economic conditions vs. others on . . .
personal level group level
TBetween 50km 100km 200km 50km 100km 200km
Much worse 0.0032** 0.0047*** 0.0066*** 0.0031 0.0063*** 0.0085***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0028)
Worse 0.0039** 0.0057*** 0.0082*** 0.0032 0.0065** 0.0087***
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0029)
Same -0.0010** -0.0013*** -0.0018*** -0.0012 -0.0023*** -0.0031***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010)
Better -0.0049** -0.0073*** -0.0103*** -0.0036 -0.0073** -0.0098***
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0032)
Much better -0.0012** -0.0018*** -0.0026*** -0.0016 -0.0032** -0.0044***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0015)
Notes: Dependent variables are ordered variables on respondent’s valuation of their
economic conditions compared to others (personal-level) or other identity groups
(group-level). Only the marginal effects of the Between-Theil variables are shown. Standard
errors clustered at the cell level in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
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Table 3-B5 – Main table with GREG regions
Economic conditions vs. others on . . .
personal level group level
Theil distance 50km 100km 200km 50km 100km 200km
Between-Theilt -0.0125** -0.0255*** -0.0244*** -0.0009 -0.0204* -0.0382**
(0.0059) (0.0056) (0.0061) (0.0173) (0.0124) (0.0174)
Within-Theilt 0.0010 -0.0109 -0.0205** -0.0136 -0.0211 -0.0205
(0.0081) (0.0072) (0.0080) (0.0160) (0.0152) (0.0177)
Sum of lightt -0.0125 -0.0041 -0.0024 0.0075 0.0088 0.0038
(0.0119) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0207) (0.0198) (0.0205)
Populationt 0.0247** 0.0140 0.0127 0.0181 0.0132 0.0189
(0.0121) (0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0280) (0.0248) (0.0256)
N 53,237 61,616 67,281 31,708 36,575 39,123
Adj. R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.10 0.10 0.10
Country-Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Notes: Dependent variables are ordered variables on respondent’s valuation of their
economic conditions compared to others (personal-level) or other identity groups
(group-level). Standard errors clustered at the cell level in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
Table 3-B6 – Main results with uniform distance weigthing
Economic conditions vs. others on . . .
personal level group level
Theil distance 50ukm 100ukm 200ukm 50ukm 100ukm 200ukm
Between-Theilt-1 -0.0169*** -0.0239*** -0.0314*** -0.0211* -0.0174 -0.0229*
(0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0059) (0.0119) (0.0131) (0.0130)
Within-Theilt-1 0.0025 -0.0148** -0.0132** -0.0058 -0.0226* -0.0036
(0.0069) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0132) (0.0130) (0.0147)
Sum of lightt 0.0048 0.0134 0.0189 0.0118 0.0108 0.0085
(0.0126) (0.0124) (0.0127) (0.0245) (0.0240) (0.0235)
Populationt 0.0034 -0.0051 -0.0065 0.0262 0.0223 0.0324
(0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0105) (0.0271) (0.0263) (0.0269)
N 62,254 68,658 70,732 37,420 40,924 41,833
Adj. R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.10 0.10 0.10
Country-Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Notes: Dependent variables are ordered variables on respondent’s valuation of their
economic conditions compared to others (personal-level) or other identity groups
(group-level). Standard errors clustered at the cell level in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
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Table 3-B7 – Main with split sample
Group-level economic conditions vs. others
rounds 2 rounds 3–4
Theil distance 50km 100km 200km 50km 100km 200km
Between-Theilt -0.0374** 0.0125 0.0180 -0.0178 -0.0341*** -0.0457***
(0.0183) (0.0190) (0.0226) (0.0132) (0.0128) (0.0144)
Within-Theilt -0.0328 -0.0673*** -0.0297 0.0044 -0.0052 -0.0119
(0.0222) (0.0221) (0.0244) (0.0131) (0.0138) (0.0185)
Sum of lightt 0.0026 0.0059 -0.0011 0.0122 0.0073 0.0108
(0.0359) (0.0353) (0.0352) (0.0290) (0.0291) (0.0288)
Populationt 0.0696 0.0650 0.0877 0.0153 0.0108 0.0058
(0.0661) (0.0649) (0.0660) (0.0312) (0.0306) (0.0305)
N 11,444 12,470 12,718 25,976 28,454 29,115
Adj. R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.13
Country-Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Notes: Dependent variables are a binary variables indicating 0 if respondents value their
economic conditions ’much worse’ or ’worse’ and 1 if ’same’, ’better’, or ’much better’
compared to others (personal-level) or other identity groups (group-level). Standard errors
clustered at the cell level in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
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3-B2 Sensitivity test of interaction results
Table 3-B8 – Drought impact on group salience with full control set
Group-level economic conditions vs. others
round 2 rounds 3–4
Theil distance 50km 100km 200km 50km 100km 200km
Between-Theilt (T) -0.0416* 0.0094 0.0110 -0.0146 -0.0363*** -0.0525***
(0.0226) (0.0190) (0.0241) (0.0137) (0.0125) (0.0146)
Droughtt (D) -0.0096 0.0057 0.0014 0.0660*** 0.0554*** 0.0466***
(0.0419) (0.0413) (0.0407) (0.0179) (0.0169) (0.0159)
Tt ×Dt -0.0071 -0.0250* -0.0295 0.0067 0.0240** 0.0432***
(0.0275) (0.0150) (0.0221) (0.0120) (0.0104) (0.0116)
Within-Theilt -0.0350 -0.0714*** -0.0355 -0.0021 -0.0154 -0.0242
(0.0227) (0.0224) (0.0251) (0.0129) (0.0137) (0.0184)
N 11,243 12,224 12,472 25,085 27,494 28,141
Adj. R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.13
Country-Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Light and population X X X X X X
Notes: Dependent variable is ordered variable on respondent’s valuation of their economic
conditions compared to other identity groups (group-level). Standard errors clustered at the
cell level in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
Table 3-B9 – Drought impact on group salience (SPEIgdm)
Group-level economic conditions vs. others
round 1–2 rounds 3–4
Theil distance 50km 100km 200km 50km 100km 200km
Between-Theilt (T) -0.0268** 0.0034 0.0097 -0.0105 -0.0251** -0.0377**
(0.0136) (0.0145) (0.0169) (0.0137) (0.0126) (0.0150)
Droughtt (D) -0.0315* -0.0238 -0.0244 0.0395** 0.0315** 0.0271**
(0.0176) (0.0161) (0.0159) (0.0158) (0.0148) (0.0138)
Tt ×Dt 0.0038 -0.0128 -0.0137 0.0139 0.0154 0.0218**
(0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0135) (0.0104) (0.0096) (0.0094)
Within-Theilt -0.0298* -0.0505*** -0.0302** 0.0045 -0.0027 -0.0056
(0.0160) (0.0158) (0.0139) (0.0130) (0.0138) (0.0188)
N 21,028 23,180 23,721 26,042 28,497 29,162
Adj. R2 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.11
Country-Year FE X X X X X X
Controls partial partial partial partial partial partial
Light and population X X X X X X
Notes: Dependent variable is ordered variable on respondent’s valuation of their economic
conditions compared to other identity groups (group-level). The control variable do not
include the respondents current absolute evaluation of living standards to include
Afrobarometer 1 in the analysis. Standard errors clustered at the cell level in parenthesis. *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
Table 3-B10 – Drought impact on group salience
Group-level economic conditions vs. others
SPEIbase SPEIgdm
Theil distance 50km 100km 200km 50km 100km 200km
Between-Theilt (T) -0.0129 -0.0347*** -0.0506*** -0.0115 -0.0249** -0.0375**
(0.0138) (0.0127) (0.0148) (0.0134) (0.0122) (0.0146)
Droughtt (D) 0.0652*** 0.0547*** 0.0461*** 0.0390** 0.0309** 0.0268**
(0.0180) (0.0170) (0.0159) (0.0153) (0.0142) (0.0133)
Tt ×Dt 0.0062 0.0236** 0.0430*** 0.0160 0.0165* 0.0212**
(0.0119) (0.0104) (0.0116) (0.0101) (0.0097) (0.0093)
Within-Theilt -0.0026 -0.0157 -0.0245 0.0012 -0.0076 -0.0106
(0.0129) (0.0137) (0.0184) (0.0125) (0.0135) (0.0181)
Ethnic identification 0.1119*** 0.0916** 0.0824** 0.1031** 0.0884** 0.0774*
(0.0408) (0.0396) (0.0397) (0.0413) (0.0398) (0.0397)
N 25,085 27,494 28,141 25,976 28,426 29,087
Adj. R2 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13
Country-Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Light and population X X X X X X
Notes: Dependent variable is ordered variable on respondent’s valuation of their economic
conditions compared to other identity groups (group-level). Standard errors clustered at the
cell level in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
Chapter 4
Armed groups in conflict
Competition and political violence in Pakistan∗
4-1 Introduction
The proliferation of armed groups is often associated with a rise of organized political
violence1 and failing states. Prominent examples include Libya and Syria since
2011, or the Democratic Republic of Congo during the Great War of Africa.2 An
additional armed group can destabilize the status quo by threatening the influence of
incumbent groups and the government. The threat can be amplified if the additional
group claims to fight for the same cause as an established group. In such cases, the
additional group not only challenges the monopoly of violence from existing players
but threatens their distinct support base, e.g., financial supporters and recruits. A
prominent example is the appearance of Hamas in the Gaza strip and the West Bank
challenging the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole agent of the
Palestinians.3
Empirical evidence is still limited, despite strong priors that more armed groups
intensify political violence. Currently, the literature can only report positive
correlations between the number of armed groups and the frequency and severity of
political violence.4 The main problem in estimating the causal effect of an increase in
the number of armed groups on political violence is that the number of armed groups
within a given geographic area is endogenous. First and foremost, groups most likely
actively select themselves into given areas (Gaibulloev, 2015). The selection in turn
reasonably depends on the strength of incumbent actors as well as attributes inert
to the area in question.5 Second, groups have different goals and strategies, respond
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Martin Gassebner and Paul Schaudt (Gassebner
et al., 2020).
1We use the term organized political violence as a general term for politically motivated
violence, such as civil war, terrorism, and counter-insurgencies.
2Taken to the extreme, proliferation of armed actors means a war of everyone against everyone,
famously making life “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes, 1969).
3Outbidding theory predicts that the amount and severity of violence will increase as the
competing groups aim to demonstrate that they are the most effective agent for the political goals
of a particular population (Kydd and Walter, 2006). The logic behind outbidding theory is that
groups would like to commit less costly attacks as long as they can obtain their political goals.
4See Findley and Young (2012); Nemeth (2014); Conrad and Greene (2015).
5Such as weak state capacity (Fearon and Laitin, 2003a) resulting from a higher distance to
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to incentives differently, and might have different support groups (see Kis-Katos
et al., 2014; Toft and Zhukov, 2015). Hence, new groups might be formed to cater
to previously neglected interests and grievances. Finally, political violence itself
affects the number of armed groups, as some groups bleed out during a conflict, or
are attracted by the fighting itself, e.g., hunting their enemies across locations.
This paper provides causal evidence on the effect of group proliferation on the
frequency and intensity of organized political violence. We exploit a unique setting
in which the number of armed groups increases through a split of a separatist group
that is plausibly exogenous to the conflict dynamics. Specifically, we exploit the
split of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) into the BLA and United Baloch Army
(UBA), operating primarily within the Balochistan Province in Pakistan. The split
between the BLA and UBA goes back to a leadership dispute between two brothers
who, in short, could not agree on the organization’s leadership. While disagreement
between the brothers could be related to some unobserved conflict dynamics, the
split of the BLA has the additional feature that the groups only effectively split after
the father of the two brothers died of natural causes following a relatively short and
severe illness.6
The exogenous timing of the father’s death and the geographically concentrated
area of operations of both groups allow us to specify difference-in-difference (diff-
in-diff) specifications. We estimate the causal effect of an additional armed group
on the quantity and lethality of political violence within the districts of Pakistan.7
We argue that the main channel underlying this effect is competition (for publicity,
recruits, and/or financing) between armed groups. Furthermore, we estimate semi-
elasticities between the number of armed groups and political violence using the
geographically differential impact of the father’s death as an instrument for the
number of armed groups. Additionally, concerns about unobserved confounders
explaining group formation are alleviated since the general goals, target audience,
primary opponent, and tactics of the BLA and UBA are similar.8
The empirical analysis combines data from multiple publicly available data
sources on political violence committed by the various armed groups within Pakistan.
To measure the number of armed groups correctly, we systematically document all
mergers and splits of armed groups in Pakistan between 1990 and 2018. Thus, we
provide a unified analysis of organized political violence, including terrorism, guerilla
warfare, as well as more symmetric forms of political violence. This allows us to
test if armed groups change their strategies in response to increased competition.
Recent theoretical and empirical work highlights that groups alter their strategies
in response to changing constraints, of which increased competition could be an
important factor.9
the capital (Campante et al., 2019), the presence of lootable resources (Berman and Couttenier,
2015b), and the hostility or acceptance of the local population (Berman et al., 2011).
6Khair Baksh Marri died within five days after being admitted to the hospital (Khan, 2014;
News International, 2014).
7We introduce the setting and the involved actors in detail in Section 4-2.
8Looking at raw data shows that on the district-year level 21 % of BLA attacks do not cause
bodily harm, while this number 26 percent for the UBA. Both groups conduct a single severe attack
in 52 % of the district years in which they are active. Regarding targets both groups target private
citizens only one third of the time and businesses about 20% (BLA) and 23% (UBA), respectively.
9For a theoretical model see Bueno de Mesquita (2013). For empirical evidence showing how
different groups use different strategies, see Stanton (2013); Fortna (2015). For the varying impact
of shocks and support groups on different groups see Dube and Naidu (2015); Toft and Zhukov
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Combining data on terrorism from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)
(START, 2019) and political violence more broadly from the UCDP Georeferenced
Event Dataset (GED) (Sundberg and Melander, 2013) allows us to increase coverage
and to proxy for government counter-insurgency efforts. We differentiate insurgency
from counter-insurgency by exploiting the different inclusion criteria of events for
each database.
Our results show that, on average, the BLA split increases the number of
incidents within districts in Balochistan compared to the districts outside of
Balochistan by 3.5. This corresponds to an increase of roughly 130%, both in the
reduced form specifications and in the 2SLS models in which we estimate the effect
of an additional armed group. To put this effect into perspective, an increase in the
number of armed groups by one is, on average, an increase in the number of armed
groups operating within a given district by 37 %. Accounting for counter-insurgency
measures highlights that the violence is driven by armed groups and not a reaction
of the government to the split of the BLA.
We contribute to various strands of the literature. Our results confirm that
the proliferation of armed groups increases organized political violence, adding
additional insight to a vast literature on the determinants of political violence
(see for excellent overviews Hegre and Sambanis, 2006; Blattman and Miguel, 2010;
Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2019). Note that group proliferation is a potential omitted
variable in many studies and cannot be captured by fixed effects in monadic settings.
Furthermore, the issue cannot be resolved by focusing on smaller units such as grid-
cells.10
Methodologically, we provide a novel approach of incidence matching to combine
two widely used datasets on armed groups. The main problem in combining different
data sources, such as the GTD and GED, is the possibility of double-counting
incidents and thus the introduction of measurement error. As we highlight in
Section 5-3.1, the definitions of political violence and inclusion criteria used by
the different datasets overlap. Hence, multiple data sources potentially include
the same incidences of some groups in some regions. Such double-counting would
distort the relative activity of a specific group. We provide a data-driven solution
for addressing the threat of double-counting when using multiple data sources of
political violence. Specifically, we implement an uncertainty-based measure applying
spatial and temporal buffers surrounding each incident within the GTD database
and flag all incidents included in the GED dataset involving the same group that fall
within the joint buffer. Adjusting the buffer sizes allows trading off false-positive vs.
false-negative assignments of double-counts. Double-counting in Pakistan applies to
5% to 10% of the GED incidents for reasonable parameters, but our main results
are robust to the issue over a wide range of thresholds.11 The cleaned match further
allows to identify incidents with government involvement which are not treated as
terrorist incidents by the GTD. Hence they are plausibly initiated by the government
and can be used to proxy for counter-insurgency efforts. Our approach is general and
allows other authors to analyze directional incidents of political violence, previously
(2015).
10See Buhaug and Rød (2006); Tollefsen et al. (2012); Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014); Condra
et al. (2018) for prominent examples.
11The range between 5% and 10% is based on the procedure including name matches and
distance thresholds no bigger than 32km (see Section 4-10, which we find most reasonable).
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limited to specific settings (Jaeger and Paserman, 2008; Abrahams et al., 2019).
We also provide evidence of interactions between groups in a unique setting, as
there are several armed groups in Balochistan fighting the government, attacking
civilians and businesses, but only sporadically each other. What is more, there
are up to five established separatist groups operating in Balochistan. These groups
are supported by local financiers to some degree and strife for a more autonomous
Balochistan. Thus, our setting is markedly different from related studies in which
the conflict parties, however defined, are engaged in a battle royal, try to loot local
resources in areas that they capture (as in Morelli and Rohner, 2015; Adhvaryu
et al., 2018; Gehring et al., 2019), and engage in shifting alliances (König et al.,
2017).
Finally, we provide new time-variant data on the armed group level, including
mergers and splits for armed groups in Pakistan. The field has made tremendous
strides identifying the effects of local conditions and temporal shocks, and static
group characteristics affect political violence.12 Still, the literature is mostly silent
on changes within the actors that organize, political violence on a broader scale; the
armed groups themselves. Two notable exceptions are the contributions by König
et al. (2017) and Trebbi and Weese (2019) that document observed and unobserved
coalition structures over time.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 4-2 introduces
our setting in detail. Section 4-3 presents our data, and the definition of our core
variables. Section 4-4 discusses our empirical strategy. Section 4-5 reports our
main results and discusses threats to identification. Section 4-6 explores alternative
mechanisms, and estimates semi-elasticities for an additional armed group. Finally,
Section 4-7 provides a brief overview of the robustness tests and Section 4-8
concludes.
4-2 Background: Setting
The Balochistan conflict is an ethnic dispute concentrated in the Balochistan
province13 of Pakistan14. It started in 1948 when newly independent Pakistan
annexed the autonomous Baloch state of Kalat. Since the start, there have been
several violent waves between Pakistan and Balochi insurgents: 1958-59, 1962-63,
1973-77, and ongoing since the early 2000s (Times of India, 2016). One of the most
important figures that emerged during the 1970s insurgency was Kahir Bakhsh
Marri (KBM), who led the Balochistan People’s Liberation Front (BPLF). After
concessions from the government, the conflict burned out, although it smoldered
beneath the surface until it flared up again in the early 2000s. Most current insurgent
groups (the BPLF no longer exists) call for an independent Balochistan. Among the
many reasons for the insurgency is systemic repression and marginalization of Baloch
people as well as the exploitation of natural resources without improvements in local
12See Berman et al. (2011); Dube and Vargas (2013); Berman and Couttenier (2015b) for
examples on conditions and shocks, while Kis-Katos et al. (2014); Fortna (2015); Polo and Gleditsch
(2016) examine characteristics.
13One of the four provinces in Pakistan which form the first sub-national layer together with
two autonomous territories and the Federal Territory of Islamabad.
14Traditional Balochistan has been divided between Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan following
the colonial period.
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living conditions, an issue that has continuously been raised since the 1960s.15 As
Dashti (2017, chapter 1) puts it: “[t]he Baloch are considered the poorest people
while their land is amongst the richest in the world.” The recent development follows
a vicious cycle of violence: Pakistan follows a “pick up and dump strategy” whereby
the Baloch opposition is rounded up and subsequently tortured and killed (Rashid,
2014). The insurgents initially attacked the military, but they have also turned
against non-Baloch natives recently.
The BLA is one of the key players in the insurgency movement, led by the
Marri tribe. It was founded around 2000 by the eldest son of KBM. Other
Baloch insurgency groups exist, such as the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), Baloch
Republican Army (BRA), Balochistan Liberation United Front (BLUF), or United
Baloch Army (UBA). The groups’ area of operation is concentrated on locations
within Balochistan. All of the Baloch insurgency groups are considered terrorist
organizations by the Pakistani government (NACTA, 2020).
Despite the similarity of the groups, Baloch insurgency groups are distinct
entities that compete against each other. Groups primarily compete for attention,
financial backers and recruits within the Baloch Province, but only rarely fight
each other. Hence, visibility is key for each group. A decrease in media
attention decreases the attention pay-offs for a group, which may reduce the
group’s capabilities (Jetter, 2017). Attacks on protected government institutions
and incidences with high fatalities demonstrate the capability of a group and will
generate more attention. This logic seems especially crucial in this setting since the
established insurgency groups of Balochistan have similar platforms. Furthermore,
Baloch insurgency groups rely heavily on financing from other governments, wealthy
individuals, and middle-class Baloch (Economist, 2012).
The set of Baloch insurgency groups, apart from the appearance of the UBA,
has remained constant since 2005. Let us now discuss how the UBA came to enter
the conflict, and if it is plausible that its appearance is exogenous with respect to
the local conflict dynamics. Baloch groups usually do not openly communicate
who their leaders are. In the case of the BLA, KBM seems to be the person
who has been calling the shots. In 2007, the previous leader of the BLA, Balach
Marri, was killed in action (Dawn.com, 2014). Balach Marri is one of six sons of
KBM and BLA leadership passed to the next born brother, Hyrbyair Marri. His
younger brother Mehran Marri was in dispute with Hyrbyair regarding leadership
and strategy. Personal correspondence with Baloch journalist Malik Siraj Akbar
revealed that the BLA recruited from non-Marri tribes starting from 2006 onwards.
Some members did not agree with recruiting people that are outside their tribe.
Mehran Marri supposedly stole weapons and money as well to form his own group,
the UBA. The UBA seems to be part of the BLA as a faction, given that KBM
asked the BLA leader to pardon his younger brother’s theft and uprising (Ali, 2015;
Nabeel, 2017). A joint truce statement of the BLA and UBA in 2018 reveals that
leadership disputes lead to the formation of the UBA in 2011(Balochistan Post,
2018).
The real split and alienation occurred after the death of the brothers’ father.
15The Baloch region is abundant, among other things, in natural gas, copper, and gold (Shah,
2017). It also provides access to the Straits of Hormuz. De Luca et al. (2018) document that while
most of Pakistan’s gas is produced in Balochistan, the central government charges lower prices for
it and pays fewer royalties compared to gas from other regions.
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Only five months after the death of KBM, both groups started to attack each other
(see START, 2019; Sundberg and Melander, 2013). We later address anticipation
effects of KBM’s death and find no evidence that groups acted independently
beforehand. The critical question is whether KBM died of a natural cause. All
accounts support this: he died at age 86 due to a brain hemorrhage in June 2014
(Khan, 2014). Such cerebral bleed occurs suddenly, and the most frequent reason
for such bleeding types is high blood pressure. He was admitted to the hospital, and
physical damage to his head is unlikely to go unnoticed and under-reported given
his popularity. Thus, we conclude that the splitting of the BLA and UBA is driven
by the natural death of the leader’s father.
In summary, the timing of the actual split between the BLA and UBA is not
driven by the competition of the already established groups, nor by some external
factors influencing the political violence within Balochistan. As such, we are
confident that the group split provides exogenous variation in the number of armed
groups operating within Balochistan.
4-3 Data
The units of observation are the districts of Pakistan between 1994 and 2018.16
Districts in Pakistan correspond to the the third administrative layer. The main
results are mostly based on a balanced panel for 141 districts between 1995 and
2018 (we lose 1994 due to differencing of some variables). The primary variables
of interest are the level of organized political violence and the number of armed
groups accounting for group mergers, group splits, and naming conventions (e.g.,
“Al-Qa’ida” vs. “Al-Qaida”).
4-3.1 Dependent variable: Organized political violence
Our dependent variable is organized political violence. We take the number of
incidents committed by armed groups to measure the frequency of organized political
violence, and the number of fatalities to measure the severity of political violence.
Data is primarily taken from the “Global Terrorism Database” (GTD) (START,
2019), and complemented by information from the “UCDP Georeferenced Event
Dataset” (GED) (Sundberg and Melander, 2013). The GTD, officially tracking
terrorism, is our preferred source due to two reasons.17 First, since our armed
groups of interest are classified as terrorist organizations, the coverage of incidents
in which they have been involved turns out to be most comprehensively tracked by
the GTD. The GTD codes more than 500 incidents committed by either the BLA
or UBA, while alternative open source databases such as the GED or the “Armed
Conflict Location & Event Data Project” (ACLED) (Raleigh et al., 2010), contain
far fewer incidents (333 and 90) in which one of the two groups is involved.18 Second,
16We cannot start our sample earlier as GTD does not provide data for the year 1993,
due to a loss of data (see https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/about/). Our approach needs an
uninterrupted time-series.
17The GTD defines a terrorist attack as: “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and
violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear,
coercion, or intimidation.”(START, 2019)
18Since most events are purely domestic the ITERATE database is not applicable.
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the GTD does not have a fatality threshold to include incidents – as is the case for
the GED – or has known geographic biases in the recording of incidents – as has
been shown for ACLED (Eck, 2012). The GTD is, however, likely to suffer from
under-reporting as is common to all open source database relying on news reports
to track organized political violence (Van der Windt and Humphreys, 2016a). This
last issue is less of a problem in our setting since our identifying variation will come
from relative changes in the amount of political violence committed in treated vs.
untreated districts. To the best of our knowledge, the under-reporting bias does not
change differently between the treatment and control group over time and is thus
unlikely to bias our results. Note that we can only use incidents from the GTD
and GED which contain information on the district where they occur. This leads
to a loss of 95 incidents in the GTD and 180 incidents in the GED, leaving us with
14,063 and 5,611 incidents in the respective database.
Counting fatalities deserves some special consideration. First, fatalities in the
databases are recorded with considerable uncertainty. Incidences are always reported
if there is newspaper coverage. On the contrary, fatalities may not be stated
if the source is too vague or may not state how many people died during an
incident. Most notably, the most recent source is used for the fatality estimate.
If several newspapers report fatalities for an incident, the modal figure will be
included in the database. Second, the number of fatalities is subject to a larger
degree of randomness. While armed groups may conduct their attacks with certain
expectations with regard to how “big” an attack should be, there are a couple
of factors that contribute to the actual number of deaths. In case of a specific
assassination, collateral damage may be acceptable depending on how reliant the
group is on public support by the affected civilians (as in Toft and Zhukov, 2015).
Moreover, the perpetrators are included in the death toll. For example, a suicide
attack resulting solely in the perpetrators’ death is coded as a fatal attack. Even
though fatality rates are difficult to predict, they are informative on the group’s
intention and capabilities.
A downside of the GTD database is its’ focus on terror attacks. Although
the applied definition of terrorism is rather broad, it is not clear if a “proper”
battle between an armed group and the Pakistani government on a “clearly
defined” battlefield would be coded. It should not as this constitutes symmetric
warfare. Furthermore, the GTD does not code counter-insurgency operations by
the government. An example would be an airstrike in northwest Pakistan killing
20 militants by the Pakistani government reported on 28th of June 2015, which is
included in the GED but not the GTD. To answer our research question, we need to
ensure to capture these types of events as well. Thus we supplement the GTD data
with data from the GED. Specifically, we complement it with GED data on internal
armed conflict and one-sided violence against civilians.19 Using both databases also
allows us to test if groups switch from more symmetric political violence, i.e., actions
against government troops (coded predominantly by the GED), to more asymmetric
types of violence, i.e., against civilians or employing hit and run tactics (the bulk of
incidents included in the GTD).
Employing two databases that track organized political violence comes at a cost,
19The GED defines an event as: “an incident where armed force was by an organized actor
against another organized actor, or against civilians, resulting in at least 1 direct death at a
specific location and a specific date” (Stina, 2019).
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however. The risk of double-counting incidents introduces potential measurement
errors. Double-counting arises if both the GED and GTD code the same incidents
for the same groups. We propose to address this issue by assigning an uncertainty
measure for double-counting to each incident in the GED dataset. Specifically, we
introduce several temporal and spatial buffers around each incident in the GTD
database and flag GED incidents that fall within the buffer. Thus, the reader may
decide with which buffer she is comfortable. The sole assumption necessary for this
approach to work is that double-counting is only an issue between databases but not
within them. Section 4-10 discusses our approach and how double-counting affects
our results in detail.
4-3.2 Independent variable: Number of armed groups
Our primary independent variable is the number of armed groups. We use these to
measure the degree of competition. We consider all actors contained in the GTD
and GED as armed groups if they have an individual name. That means we exclude
actors such as gunmen or tribesmen.20 After independently cleaning the data, we
compare our groups with the groups reported in (Hou et al., 2020) and find no
omissions. In our baseline specifications, we use the active number of armed groups.
We define any group as active within a district if it commits at least one attack
during the year in that district. The number of active armed groups is then just the
count of those groups.
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Number of active armed groups
Notes: Depicts the distribution of the number of active groups in district-years with at least
one active group. Active means conducting at least one attack in a given year and district.
Figure 4-1 depicts the distribution of the number of armed groups over district
years that have a positive amount of armed groups operating within them, which
20We also exclude so-called one-hit wonders (Blomberg et al., 2010), which are groups that
only commit a single attack. We test for the sensitivity of our results to including them in the
robustness section. A full list of all armed groups is provided in Section 4-13.
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are about 15% of the district-years. That is not to say that most districts never
experience group activity. Of the 141 districts included in our sample, only 25% do
not experience any activity during the sample period.21
Counting groups only as active in a district if they commit an attack during a
year is by no means the only way how to think about group presence. For one, it
ignores the strategic choice of locality (Marineau et al., 2020). Hence, we employ
alternative measures of the number of active groups, such as the potential number
of active groups. That is, we set existing groups as potentially active in all districts
in which they ever have been active in any year if they are active somewhere in
Pakistan in a given year. Groups that cease to exist cannot be potentially active
in a district. The idea behind the potential active group measure is that a group
reveals the set of districts in which it competes to us only over time while other
groups are already aware of them. Furthermore, we are ambivalent about the exact
locational choice in a specific year that might be driven by operational or strategic
concerns which we are not able to observe.22
Other issues when counting the number of independent armed groups are splits
and mergers of armed groups and related measurement error within our source
databases. The GTD and GED do not track the split and mergers of different armed
groups but assign the perpetrator or conflict party of a given incident based on who
claimed involvement in an incident, or a third party that attests the identity of the
included actors. Hence there is the potential to attribute an incident to a group
called X-A which is simply a faction of A, but might later become an independent
group. Much like in the case of the BLA and UBA. Note that both the GTD and
GED change past entries in their databases if they receive new information, and it
is not clear if they also backward correct specific names. To minimize the problem
without reducing our sample too much, we use only data until 2018, assuming that
most corrections occur within the first year, rather than later on.
To address the issue of potential splits and mergers, we conduct an in-depth
analysis of all armed groups within Pakistan and track if they split or merge with
other groups during our sample period. The analysis is based on full-text online
searches of major media outlets. Figure 4-2 provides an overview of the timing of
all splits and mergers occurring in our sample, while Section 4-14 provides detailed
documentation of each case. We can then reassign incidents to the corresponding
pre-merger or post-split groups and adjust the number of groups for each district,
to reflect splits and mergers correctly. Note that we will not use the other splits or
mergers to identify the competition effect since we cannot rule out that the timing
of the mergers and splits are endogenous to the conflict dynamics within Pakistan.
However, controlling for the number of groups allows us to proxy for changes in
the degree of competition within our treatment and control groups unrelated to our
treatment. Table 4-A1 shows that most group splits would neglect the increase in
groups within our control group, i.e., districts outside of Balochistan. Full descriptive
statistics for our variables of interest are reported in Table 4-A2.
How unique is Pakistan as a case study for our proposed mechanism? To get an
21Figure 4-A1 reports the active group distribution for districts in and outside of the Baloch
province separately. The distribution of the number of armed groups is skewed slightly more to
the right for districts within Balochistan compared to those outside of Balochistan.
22Section 4-11 shows how this changes the landscape of active groups and its effect on our core
results.
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Figure 4-2 – Armed groups splits and mergers
(a) Group splits (b) Group mergers
Notes: Reports the year in which groups split (panel A) or merge (panel B). Baloch
Liberation Army (BLA), Harakat ul-Mujahidin Al-Almi (HuMA), Harakat ul-Mujahidin
(HuM), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Jamaat-ul-Ahrar(JuA), Jundullah (Jun),
Lashkar-e-Balochistan (LeB), Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ),
Sipah-e-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP), Tehrik-e-Islami (TeI), United Baloch Army (UBA)
initial idea, we plot the elasticity between aggregated incidents and fatalities on the
number of active armed groups at the country level for all countries included in the
GTD. Figure 4-3 shows the results, highlighting Pakistan-Year observations in red.
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Notes: Depicts a scatter plot of unfiltered (log of) groups vs (log of) incidents & fatalities
created by these groups. The unit of observation is country-year. Pakistan is represented in
red. The line illustrates the best linear fit using the global GTD sample between 1994 and
2018.
The first impression is quite stark. First, there is an apparent correlation between
the number of armed groups active within a country and the amount of organized
political violence perpetrated. Second, Pakistan is not located in the extremes but
seems to fit the linear fitted line quite well. Of course, this is only suggestive evidence
on the country level, but it is supportive of notion that more armed groups lead to
more political violence.23




We are interested in the causal effect of an increase in the number of active groups
on the amount of political violence within Pakistani districts. As already mentioned
in the preceding sections, we exploit the fact that Khair Bakhsh Marri (KBM) died
of a natural cause, which leads to the break up of the BLA into the BLA and UBA,
to obtain exogenous variation in the number of competing armed groups within
districts.
In the spirit of Draca et al. (2011), we will use two complementary identification
strategies to answer our question. We will run panel difference-in-difference
estimations in which we regress political violence on the interaction of districts
in Balochistan with the post KBM death period, as well as 2SLS regressions where
we use the same interaction to predict the number of armed groups active within
a district. The idea behind the 2SLS approach is that the split in the BLA due
to KBM’s death leads to plausible exogenous variation in the number of armed
groups within Balochistan compared to districts outside of Balochistan. This second
strategy allows us to estimate the semi-elasticity of an additional armed group on
political violence. We return to the 2SLS specification in the mechanism section of
the paper and start with the reduced form specification (diff-in-diff) here.
The intuition behind the diff-in-diff specification is that the death of KBM splits
the BLA. This affects the 28 districts in Balochistan more compared to districts
outside of Balochistan since both the BLA and UBA almost exclusively operate in
Balochistan (close to 95% of the incidents).24 Our baseline specification is defined
as follows:
Yit = β(Balochi × PostKBMt) + X
′
it + ηi + γt + εit (4-1)
where Yit is the amount of political violence (either incidents or fatalities)
perpetrated in district i during year t. Balochi × PostKBMt is the interaction
between districts located in the Baloch province with the KBM post-mortem period,
X′ is a vector of control variables we use to control for potentially unobserved
confounders between the control and treatment districts over time. We include
the log of the population to normalize the count of incidents relative to the local
population. We also employ a set of geographic characteristics interacted with time
to proxy for changes in state capacity within districts over time (Fearon and Laitin,
2003a; Buhaug et al., 2009).25 ηi and γt are district and year fixed effects, and εit is
an error term assumed to be well behaved.
24See Table 4-A1 for the incidences of BLA and UBA within and outside of Balochistan.
25The log of population density is calculated based on the GWP (CIESIN, 2016). Note that
the GWP is only provided every five years and only provides detailed spatial population estimates
for the reference years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2010, and 2015. We linearly interpolate and extrapolate
the population data between those reference years and 2018, the last year of our sample.
We use several geographic characteristics to proxy for the government’s capability to project
power within a given district. We include the log of ruggedness, elevation and road density, as well
as the count of airports located within a district. Note that we interact all of those time-invariant
variables with year fixed effects to allow for a distinct impact each year.
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We also specify an event study to test for possible violations of the common






it + ait + bit + X
′
it + ηi + γt + εit (4-2)
where bsit is our time-varying treatment indicator (Balochi×PostKBMt) across
the sequence s.26 s is a sequence s = (−3,−2, 0, 1, 2, 3) centered at the treatment
year 2014 for each district. We bin the endpoints of our treatment effect window
with two dummies labeled a and b. a is a dummy that is unity for each district in the
Baloch province following the post-treatment sequence under consideration (in our
case 2018), while b is a dummy that is unity for all years before the sequence starts,
i.e., 2010 or earlier. X′ is a vector of control variables containing the same variables
as in equation 4-1. The coefficients of interest are βs, which report the difference-
in-difference estimate separately for each year within the sequence (apart from 2013
or t− 1, which is our omitted category). This stacked or event study approach has
several advantages compared to standard difference-in-difference methods.
First and foremost, event studies provide the best insight into potential pre-
treatment trends since we obtain direct estimates for them. Second, event-studies
can depict the dynamics of the treatment effect and provide insight into how long
it lasts.27 However, there are also downsides. Ideally, one would have a clear idea
of the timing of the effect ex-ante, i.e., for how long it should last and design the
post-treatment period accordingly, but we lack such a clear prior. Note that we are
also constrained since we only have four post-treatment years of data available to
us. Furthermore, the estimation method is also more demanding. Borusyak and
Jaravel (2017) recommend, for example, to drop the pre-treatment coefficients if the
null of no pre-trends cannot be rejected in the initial event study.
4-4.2 Identifying Assumptions
For standard DiD and event-study estimates to be valid, they need to satisfy two
central assumptions. First, we need to assume common trends, or bias stability,
which means that differences in the expected potential non-treatment outcomes over
time are not related to the subsequent treatment groups. Second, we need to assume
exogeneity of our control variables and pre-treatment outcomes. This implies that
the timing of the treatment is exogenous. If both assumptions are satisfied, we can
recover the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT).
The exogenous timing of our treatment is the main advantage of our unique
setting. As outlined above, KBM died in a hospital from a brain hemorrhage. Thus,
as long as we agree to assume that the brain hemorrhage was not the result of
more intensive competition between the groups within the Baloch province, we have
little problems in that regard. The anticipation of his death is, however, another
issue. We acknowledge that KBM was already comparably old, which could have
led to some of his sons anticipating his death. In such a case, one could argue
that the UBA and BLA already compete before his death, i.e., when the UBA
26The treatment indicator is simply the previous introduced interaction.
27Additionally, recent studies have shown that symmetry in the pre- and post periods bring
DiD estimates closer to experimental benchmarks (Chabé-Ferret, 2015).
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Figure 4-4 – Terrorism distribution across Pakistan
Panel A: Pre-treatment BLA Panel B: Post-treatment BLA
Panel C: Post-treatment UBA Panel D: Other groups
Notes: Illustrates the average number of terror events. The bold red line represents the
borders of the Baloch province. The darkest shade within Balochistan in Panels A-C is
Quetta, the capital.
faction formed. Our analysis below will show, however, that this seems not to be
the case. The composition of the treatment groups is another crucial issue. In our
main specification, we define districts in Balochistan as the treatment group, since
it is the region in which the BLA has traditionally operated. If, for example, we
would find that the UBA and BLA never overlap after their split, our mechanism
of an exogenous increase in the number of groups could be jeopardized. Figure 4-4
suggests that we do not face this problem, since the main area of operation remains
within Balochistan. Additionally, there is a high degree of operational overlap, since
almost all districts with UBA activities see BLA activities as well.
Panel A of Figure 4-4 shows the spatial distribution of BLA attacks in the pre-
treatment period, while panel B depicts the post-treatment period distribution. The
activity within Balochistan has been relatively stable, while a few districts outside
of Balochistan have not experienced any further violence by the BLA. In panel C,
we plot the spread of UBA incident in the post-treatment period. Comparing the
spatial spread of the UBA to the BLA shows that the UBA also engages in some
minor activity outside of the Baloch province, but both groups share their most
active districts. Finally, the last panel shows the overall distribution of incidents by
other groups. It should be apparent that while Balochistan is a major hotspot for
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Figure 4-5 – Change in number of groups
Notes: Reports the change in group numbers between 2009-2013 (pre-treatment) and
2014-2017 (post-treatment). The bold green line represents the borders of the Baloch
province.
terrorism, there are other districts with a similar level of violence, e.g., the districts
within the Federal Tribal Areas in the north-west (see panel D).
We provide additional suggestive evidence that our treatment operates via an
increase in the number of armed groups in Figure 4-5. Figure 4-5 plots the difference
in the number of groups for the five years before treatment to the five years after
treatment. As expected, after KBM’s death the number of active armed groups
increases most within districts where the BLA has been active. Furthermore,
districts that already host more groups in the first place see a higher group count
after KBM’s death (Figure 4-A3).28
Finally, let us briefly discuss the parallel trends assumption and potential
anticipation effects. Given that the UBA faction established itself already in 2011,
and KBM was already relatively old, one could argue that the UBA faction was
already affecting competition between groups before KBM’s death. We address the
issue in the next section. To preview our findings, neither parallel trends, the faction
creation, nor anticipation effects seem to be a problem in our setting.
28We directly test for the mechanism of increases in the group count after the group split using




Table 4-1 reports our baseline results for the difference-in-difference specifications.
The coefficient in column 1 is highly statistically significant, regardless of clustering
on the district or the division level, and when allowing for spatial dependence in the
error terms29. The estimate suggests that districts within Balochistan experience an
increase of around 3.5 incidents in the post-treatment period compared to districts
outside Balochistan. The results for fatalities are sizeable as well, although less
statistically significant. The treatment districts experience roughly 5.5 fatalities
more compared to the non-treatment districts annually during the post-treatment
period.
Table 4-1 – Baseline results
Incidents Fatalities Ln Incidents Ln Fatalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Balochi × Postt 3.5904 5.5364 2.1067 1.5800
(0.9554)*** (2.8711)* (0.3787)*** (0.4420)***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 3144 3144 3144 3144
Adj. Within-R2 0.235 0.164 0.136 0.101
Notes: The controls include log of population and geographical characteristics interacted
with year dummies (see footnote 25). Standard errors clustered at the district in parenthesis.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In columns 3 and 4, we take logs of our dependent variables to address the
skewness of our dependent variables. Note that we add a small constant of 0.01 to
both incidents and fatalities in order to keep district-year observation in the sample
that experiences no activity. Column 3 suggests that our treatment effect leads to
an increase of roughly 210% in incidents, while column 4 suggests an increase in
fatalities of around 160%. Since those estimates are potentially biased due to the
constant that we add we also replicate the estimations using Poisson and negative
binomial regressions, which produce somewhat lower effects from around 100% for
incidents and between 50% to 90% for fatalities (see Table 5-B38 and Table 4-A6).
The statistical significance is relatively stable throughout the specification.30
29Divisions are the second administrative layer of Pakistan (below the provinces). There are 30
divisions in total, six of which lie within the Baloch Province. We also allow for arbitrary spatial
dependence following Colella et al. (2019). Figure 4-A4 reports the results using the “acreg”
command to estimate our baseline specification using Conley HAC standard errors (Conley, 1999)
across several distance cutoffs for the spatial dependence. We find that our estimates remain
highly statistically significant and stable even above a cutoff of 1,500 km. Table 4-A4 reports the
alternative standard errors for Table 4-1.
30We also run log specifications without adding the constant, thus focusing on the intensive
margin. Results are similar to the Poisson and negative binomial results (see column 1 Table 4-
A7).
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The qualitative effects remain stable if we employ more conservative
specifications by adding district-decade fixed effects and linear time trends for each
district (see Table 4-A8).31 What is more, our incident results are not driven by
nonlethal events, but are comparable if we focus on incidents in which at least one
person was wounded or killed (Table 4-A10).
Table 4-2 – Controlling for other groups
Incidents Fatalities Ln Incidents Ln Fatalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Other groups in changes
Balochi × Postt 3.6534 5.8153 2.1867 1.6526
(0.9790)*** (2.9540)* (0.3857)*** (0.4454)***
∆ No. other groups 0.9081 4.0179 1.1531 1.0458
(0.1420)*** (0.8920)*** (0.1298)*** (0.1449)***
Adj. Within-R2 0.249 0.180 0.239 0.166
Panel B: Other groups in levels
Balochi × Postt 2.2596 0.1187 1.2159 0.6821
(0.7291)*** (2.1189) (0.2817)*** (0.3137)**
No. other groups 2.5476 10.3715 1.7054 1.7189
(0.2179)*** (1.4648)*** (0.2407)*** (0.2683)***
Adj. Within-R2 0.381 0.300 0.426 0.328
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 3144 3144 3144 3144
Notes: The controls include log of population and geographical characteristics interacted
with year dummies (see footnote 25). Standard errors clustered at the district level in
parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
One potential unobserved factor is the number of other armed groups active
within districts. The number of other groups active within treatment and control
districts could bias our estimates in either direction. If, for some reason, competition
declines within the control group over time, we would get an upward bias in our
estimates, while our estimates would suffer from a downward bias if group activity
increase for some reason within our control group. The same holds true if either
development occurs within our treatment districts, or within treatment and control
districts.
To address these concerns, we include the change in the number of other active
groups in each district from t− 1 to t, and alternatively, the number of other active
groups as additional control variables.32 Table 4-2 replicates the specifications of
Table 4-1 including the change of other active groups in Panel A, and the amount
31Note that those additional fixed effects and trends can partly capture discoveries of natural
resources for which we do not have data for our treatment period. Results are also similar if
we exclude all controls (see Table 4-A9). Furthermore, our results are not driven by any specific
district. In Figure 4-A5 we report the baseline coefficients of column 1 dropping one district at
the time.
32Other active groups are the active number of groups excluding the BLA and UBA from the
count. If we do not exclude the BLA and UBA from the count, our treatment would be perfectly
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of other active groups within the district in Panel B, as additional control variables.
Columns 1 to 4 in Panel A show that our results are virtually unchanged if we control
for the change in the number of active groups within districts. When controlling
for the level of other active groups our coefficients are roughly halved, except for
the fatality specification in which the coefficient drops to 0.1. Note that the level
specification of other groups performs significantly better in terms of model fit,
which is why we slightly prefer this specification. What is more, our log estimations
move much closer to the nonlinear estimates (see Table 5-B38 and Table 4-A6).
4-5.2 Threats to identification
As outlined in Section 4-4.2 our identification requires the death of KBM to be
exogenous and unanticipated. Furthermore, districts in Balochistan need to exhibit
parallel pre-treatment trends in violence compared to the rest of Pakistan.
We directly test for violations of the pre-trends and anticipation effect using
an event-study with the full set of baseline controls and the number of other active
groups. Figure 4-6 reports diff-in-diff coefficients and their corresponding point-wise
95% confidence intervals, using incidents as the dependent variable.




2011 2012 2013 Treatment 2015 2016 2017
year
Notes: Reports the coefficient and their accompanying 95% CIs for an event study
specification corresponding to column 1 in Table 4-2. The controls include log of population
and geographical characteristics interacted with year dummies (see footnote 25), as well as
dummies binning the endpoints of the event window.
The statistically insignificant coefficients in the pre-treatment period in Figure 4-
6 lead us to not reject the null of common trends or no pre-trends. Furthermore,
it highlights that our effect is rather short-term. The point estimates we have
obtained previously seem to be driven by competition between groups during the two
colinear with the number of active groups. We use the number of active groups including the BLA
and UBA in the instrumental variable regressions in Section 4-6.
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years after treatment occurs. Note that the incident coefficients become statistically
significant only from 2015 onward, which is not surprising given that KBM died
in June of 2014 and the UBA split did not materialize for the first half year. The
effect vanishes in t+ 3.
Another issue is the correct timing of our treatment. As discussed in Section 4-
2, the UBA faction formed during 2011, due to disagreements about strategy and
competing leadership aspirations of two of the Mari sons.33 Hence, it could be
possible that the presence of the UBA faction already affects competition between
groups that we currently neglect. We test for this possibility directly and include
the following additional interaction term Balochi × UBAfactiont that represents
the counterfactual effect in Baloch districts from 2011 onward instead of after 2014.
The results are reported in Table 4-3.
Table 4-3 – UBA faction vs. UBA group
Incidents Fatalities Ln Incidents Ln Fatalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Balochi × UBAfactiont 0.4716 -1.6000 0.2465 0.0506
(0.6338) (4.9944) (0.3265) (0.4155)
Balochi × Postt 1.8651 1.4571 1.0097 0.6398
(0.5578)*** (3.5682) (0.3243)*** (0.3825)*
No. other groups 2.5402 10.3968 1.7015 1.7181
(0.2172)*** (1.4412)*** (0.2412)*** (0.2691)***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 3144 3144 3144 3144
Adj. Within-R2 0.381 0.300 0.426 0.328
Notes: The controls include log of population and geographical characteristics interacted
with year dummies (see footnote 25). Standard errors clustered at the district level in
parenthesis. The results are similar when using the ∆ of No. other groups instead of the
level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In line with our argument, we find that the coefficient of Balochi×UBAfactiont
is statistically insignificant throughout all specifications. In turn, our coefficient of
interest Balochi × Postt is statistically significant and comparable in size to the
estimates of our previous specifications and supports our previous reasoning in the
incident specifications. The fatality specifications are more fickle.
4-6 Extensions and alternative channels
In this section we further scrutinize how our treatment affects competition between
armed groups. We explore if the type of organized political violence changes through
the treatment and to which part our results are explained by the government’s
33Note that if the split between the BLA and UBA has already really occurred in 2011 due to a
dispute over leadership between the two brothers, this would have been an alternative identification
strategy. At least as long as the struggle for leadership was not driven by the conflict itself, but
by personal ambitions of the brothers.
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response. Furthermore, we scrutinize how the BLA itself was affected by the split
of the UBA and if the government changes its response to the BLA compared to
other groups. Lastly, we obtain semi-elasticities of an additional armed group on
the quantity and quality of violence within districts.
4-6.1 Targets of armed groups
We think that our effect runs via an increase in the number of armed groups within
Baloch districts that compete for attention, as visibility facilitates the attraction
of financiers and recruits. We find this effect to be particularly strong in terms of
the number of incidents and weaker regarding the number of fatalities. Consistent
with this we do not find a statistically significant result when using fatalities per
incident as the dependent variable.34 This indicates that there seems to be no
strategy change towards more lethal attacks. However, our findings so far could also
be a result of increased infighting between groups, i.e., armed groups attacking each
other. If KBM was a unifying figure, he might have stopped different groups from
attacking each other (such as his sons).
Our data allow us to test this alternative explanation directly. The GTD list the
target type of an incidents, e.g., Terrorists/Non-State Militia or Violent Political
Party among others. We create an alternative incident count using only incidents
that target either of those categories and rerun our core specification.
Table 4-4 – Targets
Incidents Incidents Incidents Incidents Incidents
vs. other vs. vs. public vs. vs.
Groups Gov. Infrastructure Business citizens
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Balochi × Postt -0.0527 1.4151 0.9838 0.4582 0.8959
(0.0416) (0.5738)** (0.3688)*** (0.1365)*** (0.3394)***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 3144 3144 3144 3144 3144
Adj. within-R2 0.246 0.482 0.222 0.327 0.295
Notes: The definition of the dependent variables (GTD target type) are listed in Table 4-A3.
The controls include log of population and geographical characteristics interacted with year
dummies (see footnote 25). Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Column 1 of Table 4-4 shows that our treatment does not affect infighting in
the treatment vs. the control group. Hence, KBM’s death does not seem to have
increased infighting between groups. To further verify that group competition is, in
fact, not directed against each other, we examine the target of Baloch insurgency
groups. In contrast to the GTD, the GED systematically lists both conflict parties.
Before the BLA splits in 2014, there is no recorded incident of a Baloch group against
another Baloch insurgency group. However, after 2014, we find that the BLA and
34Results available upon request.
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UBA did attack each other once. The incident reassures us that the groups’ real
alienation started only after the death of KBM, while at the same time infighting is
not the driver of our result.
We use the target type information provided by the GTD to qualify further
what kind of competition effect we are observing, specifically if the type of
political violence has changed. Columns 2 to 5 in Table 4-4 replicate our baseline
specification, using incidents against the government, against public infrastructure,
business, and private citizens as the dependent variable.35 We find that the
coefficient on attacks against the government is most sizable. However, we cannot
reject that the increase of attacks against the government, public infrastructure,
businesses, and private citizens are not different from one another. In summary, it
seems that the type of competition relating to the targets that groups pick, has not
changed due to the treatment.
4-6.2 Government response: Counter-insurgency
Is our observed effect of increased political violence in fact driven by counter-
insurgency efforts of the government? One alternative explanation of our proposed
mechanism is that the government sees the death of KBM as a chance to crack down
on separatist groups within Balochistan. Thus, the increase in political violence
could simply be increased counter-insurgency activity by the government.
We test for this possibility by analyzing if our effect sizes change if we explicitly
include counter-insurgency efforts of the government of Pakistan. To do so, we
need a proxy for incidents instigated by the government against armed groups.
Obtaining a suitable proxy is not without problems. Recall that the GTD only
codes terrorists events and hence misses counter-insurgency operations, such as the
airstrike mentioned in Section 4-3.1. The GED on the other hand, codes event dyads
but those are not directional, i.e., there is no indicator variable informing us if the
incidents was initiated by the government or an armed group.
To proxy for counter-insurgency activity by the government, we use the incidents
between the government and armed groups that are reported in GED but not in
GTD. The assumption is that if we subtract the incidents between the government
and any armed group included in the GTD and thus identified as a terrorist activity
by the GTD, the events left can be used as reasonable proxies of operations instigated
by the government.
The main operational obstacle is to deal with measurement uncertainty between
the two databases. We tackle this issue with our proposed double counting
procedures, which we explain in detail in Section 4-10. In short, we draw a buffer
of 25km around each GED event and flag it as a potential double count if the GTD
codes an event of the same armed group during the same day.36 Events that are
flagged as potential double counts are excluded form the analysis, which leaves us
with a set of incidents that will use as our counter-insurgency proxy (roughly 60%
of government incidents). Our count of counter-insurgency incidents obtained from
this procedure is roughly 47% of all incidents in which the government is involved
(46 % within the Baloch province and 48% outside of the Baloch province).
35Table 4-A3 provides the specific definitions for each of the measures.
36We use only events for which the geographic precision provided by the GED is 1 to 25km for
this exercise.
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Table 4-5 – Government response
Incidents Incidents Gov. Incidents vs. Gov.
(1) (2) (3)




Controls Yes Yes Yes
District-FE Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes
Obs 3144 3144 3144
Adj. Within-R2 0.291 0.0106 0.0525
Notes: Column 1 uses our baseline dependent variable. Column 2 uses our
counter-insurgency proxy as the dependent variable. Column 3 uses the count of incidents
against the government (column 2 Table 4-4) and counter-insurgency measures by the
government as the dependent variable. The controls include log of population and
geographical characteristics interacted with year dummies (see footnote 25). Standard errors
clustered at the district level in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Column 1 of Table 4-5 replicates our baseline reduced form effect (column
1 of Table 4-1) adding counter-insurgency efforts of the government as an
additional variable. While counter-insurgency is positively correlated with violence
(e.g., revenge) this does not alter our initial finding. Note that the effect of
government counter-insurgency on political violence is theoretically ambiguous
(Bueno De Mesquita, 2005). In column 2 we change our dependent variable. We
now explicitly look at the determinants of counter-insurgency. We see that our
treatment does not affect government-induced actions. In column 3, we add counter-
insurgency events to the attacks against the governments by organized groups. We
get a significant treatment effect but if we compare it to column 2 of Table 4-4, we
see that adding counter-insurgency leaves the treatment effect virtually unchanged.
We take the results reported in Table 4-5 as evidence that the increase in violence
is primarily driven by increased activity of the armed groups, and not by counter-
insurgency efforts in the wake of KBM’s death.
4-6.3 Capacity effect and strategy changes
Our reduced-form effect has multiple potential channels that can explain the increase
in political violence. First and foremost, the split changes the absolute and relative
capacity of the BLA itself, as well as the relative capacity of other groups within the
districts. Furthermore, the changes in relative capacity could lead the government
to treat the BLA and UBA differently post treatment, i.e., targeting them more
or less. We test for both possibilities. First, we analyze how the BLA as well as
BLA and UBA jointly compare to other well established separatist groups within
Balochistan. Second, we test if the government targets its counter-insurgency efforts
more towards the BLA (and UBA) compared to other well established separatist
groups in the Baloch province.
Ex-ante, we would expect that the amount of violence perpetrated by the
BLA should decrease compared to other Baloch separatists groups (at least in
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relative terms). That is, if the UBA split did indeed significantly reduce BLA’s
assets. However, it could also simply change the composition of political violence
perpetrated by the BLA without changing the absolute violence level, e.g., switching
from symmetric to asymmetric warfare, i.e., targeting civilians (Bueno de Mesquita,
2013). We test for both possibilities, running a diff-in-diff specification on the sample
of Baloch separatist groups active within districts, defined as:
Yijt = δ(BLAij × PostKBMt) + ηij + γit + εijt (4-3)
where Yijt is political violence committed by group j within district i at time t ,
(BLAij×PostKBMt) is the interaction of out post-treatment period with the BLA,
ηij are district-group fixed effects controlling for the time-invariant capacity a group
has within a district, γit are district-year fixed effects controlling for competition
between groups, as well as government capacity within a district-year, and εijt is
the error term. δ is the diff-in-diff coefficient between the BLA and the other well
established Baloch separatist groups, specifically the BRA, BLF, and BLUF. Note
that the UBA is excluded for now, but we return to the UBA momentarily. Note
further that we restrict the control group to the other big Baloch separatist groups
since they are present both in the pre- and post-treatment periods and often operate
in the same districts as the BLA. These last two points are of importance since our
fixed effects restrict our identifying variation to differences in the outcome of within-
district groups over time while also partialling out any district-specific time variation
common to all groups. Thus a district-group-year observation is only informative if
the BLA and at least one of the other groups operate in a district during the same
year.37
Table 4-6 – DiD: Within Baloch separatist groups
Inci Inci all Inci civil Fatal Fatal all Fatal civil
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLAij × Postt -0.0795 -0.2202 -0.1073 0.0348 -0.1143 -0.0802
(0.0565) (0.0917)** (0.0519)** (0.0788) (0.1815) (0.1056)
District-Group-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 7896 7896 7896 7896 7896 7896
Adj. within-R2 0.374 0.378 0.295 0.291 0.328 0.237
Notes: Columns (1) and (4) include our standard GTD measure, (2) and (5) combine GTD
and GED, (3), and (6), combines GTD and GED events against civilians. Standard errors
clustered at the district level in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The results, presented in Table 4-6, provide some evidence that the BLA
reduces its activity compared to the other armed Baloch groups. While we find no
statistically significant effect using our standard measure (column 1), the combined
GTD and all GED events (column 2), and violence against civilians exclusively
37Since we change the treatment and control groups, we have to reconfirm the common trend
assumption. We do so using an event study as before. The results are reported in Figure 4-A6 and
show that also in this setting the null of no pre-treatment trends cannot be rejected.
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(column 3) show a reduction.38 Note that the reduction in attacks against civilians
(column 3) is only about half the magnitude compared to the reduction in all attacks
(column 2), which is consistent with a strategy shift by the BLA due to reduced
capacity. With respect to inflicted fatalities we cannot reject that the ratio of
fatalities between the BLA and other armed Baloch groups remains constant.39
We take this as evidence that the additional violence in our baseline results is
likely not exclusively driven by an increase in BLA activities, but also from the
increasing activity of other well established armed groups competing for the top
spot. The within-group analysis highlights that the BLA commits somewhat fewer
incidents compared to other established groups within Balochistan. However, this
does not necessarily mean that BLA commits fewer incidents overall. If we run a
first-difference analysis on the BLA exclusively, we cannot find robust evidence that
the BLA changed the number of incidents it committed.40
Moreover, we find that the UBA is compensating for the decrease in BLA
activities somewhat. Table 4-A11 in the Appendix replicates Table 4-6 with the
sole difference that incidences from the UBA are added to the BLA, simulating
that the groups did not split. The negative effect on all incidents is both lower in
magnitude and statistically significance, while the effect on violence against civilians
vanishes. We also find some evidence that the BLA and UBA jointly increase their
activity compared to all other groups.41
We now test if the government focuses its counter-insurgency efforts to a higher
degree on the BLA (and UBA) following its split. The assumption would be that the
government sees the death of KBM as a chance to finish the group off. In such a case
our reduced form effect would exhibit an alternative channel besides the competition
effect we have in mind.
To test for this possibility we generate group specific proxies for counter-
insurgency efforts by the government and regress these proxies on the BLA×Postt
interaction. Note that the same restrictions apply as in Section 4-6.2. We only
use incidents from the GED as proxies for counter-insurgency efforts that do not
plausible appear in the GTD database, following our introduced double counting
thresholds. We also include the respective amount of incidents and fatalities
committed by each group as additional control variables, in order to partial out
any government response driven by the time-varying activity levels of the groups.
Table 4-7 reports the results of this specification using both counter-insurgency
incidents as well as fatalities as the dependent variable. Column 1 and 2 show that
we cannot reject the null that the government does not change its focus towards
the BLA following KBM’s death compared to the other separatist groups within
Balochistan. The same holds true in columns 3 and 4 in which we treat the UBA
38In column 3 we add up GTD incidents and GED incidents against civilians.
39Even when estimating non-state incidences and fatalities, e.g., group against another group,
the results are largely unchanged. That is, non-state incidences are statistically lower in the post-
treatment period for the BLA and insignificant for fatalities.
40Results not reported but available upon request.
41To further verify that it is indeed the BLA and other Baloch separatist groups that primarily
seem to increase their violence, we flip the specification of Table 4-6 and use all other groups as
a control group. Note that since the comparison group is now more heterogeneous, we control
for group ideology following Kis-Katos et al. (2014). We find some evidence that the UBA and
BLA jointly commit more violence compared to other groups following the split (see Table 4-A12).
Note, however, that the common support of incidents in districts during the same years is much
more limited as mentioned above.
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Table 4-7 – DiD: Government action against BLA/UBA
BLA only BLA & UBA
Inci Fatal Inci Fatal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BLAij × Postt 0.0036 0.0034 0.0030 -0.0108
(0.0035) (0.0250) (0.0034) (0.0302)
Inci (GTD) 0.0187 0.0144
(0.0047)*** (0.0074)*
Fatal (GTD) 0.1901 0.1185
(0.1161) (0.0779)
District-Group-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 7896 7896 7896 7896
Adj. within-R2 0.0973 0.136 0.0702 0.0851
Notes: The dependent variable is counter-insurgency. Inci(GTD) and Fatal(GTD) are terror
attacks and fatalities by major Baloch groups. Standard errors clustered at the district level
in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
and BLA as the same group. Hence, it seems unlikely that the government changed
its behavior towards our core groups of interest following KBM’s death. Finally,
more terror attacks by the Baloch terror groups positively relates to government
counter-insurgency efforts.
The within group analysis shows that there seem to be capacity effects that one
would expect following Bueno de Mesquita (2013) and that the government does not
seem to be particularly affected by the split itself. Rather, it seems the case that
the government reacts to group activity in general, which poses no challenge for our
preferred interpretation of the effect, as competition between groups.
4-6.4 Semi-elasticity of armed groups on political violence
Our previous findings are consistent with competition effects between armed groups
resulting from group proliferation. Thus, we are interested in the marginal effect
of an additional armed group on the amount of political violence. We estimate
2SLS models where we use our previous interaction as an instrument to predict the
number of active groups within a district. Note that by definition, we get at least
one additional active group within most districts located in the Baloch province,
namely the UBA.
Before we present the results, let us be transparent about a caveat. Using our
interaction as an instrument assumes that the death of KBM only has a differential
effect within Baloch districts compared to districts outside of Balochistan via an
increase in the number of armed groups, specifically the UBA. Hence, we need to
assume that the additional violence committed by the other well-established groups
within Balochistan is a reaction to the additional competition and not driven by
some other issue related to KBMs death. While our previous analysis is in line with
this assumption, we cannot rule out alternative explanations entirely. Apart from
this drawback, there is also a major benefit of the 2SLS analysis, namely addressing
potential measurement error in the number of active groups.
Table 4-8 presents the results form the 2SLS estimation. The first stage result
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Table 4-8 – 2SLS evidence
Second Stage
Incidents Fatalities Ln Incidents Ln Fatalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No. active groups 4.0887 6.3049 2.3991 1.7993
(0.8452)*** (2.5344)** (0.3652)*** (0.2851)***
Avg. no. act grps in act districts: Treatment group: 2.3509 Control group: 1.7669
Std dev no. act groups: Treatment group: 1.6395 Control group: 1.6595
First Stage DV: No. of active groups
Balochi × Postt 0.8781
(0.2035)***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 3144 3144 3144 3144
Adj. Within-R2 0.3095 0.3004 0.3789 0.3576
F-stat IV 18.59
First stage adj. R2 0.698
Notes: Reports the 2SLS results using Balochi × Postt as an instrument for the number of
active groups operating within a district. The controls include log of population and
geographical characteristics interacted with year dummies (see footnote 25). Standard errors
clustered at the district level in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
in the lower panel shows that, on average, the number of active groups rises by just
short of one. A point estimate of below one is to be expected, given that the UBA
does not operate in all districts of Balochistan. Instrument power also seems fine,
given that our first stage F-stat passes the conventional threshold comfortably.
The second stage results in column 1 and 2 are similar to our reduced form
effects. The semi-elasticities reported in columns 3 and 4 are also close to our
reduced form. An additional group increases the number of incidents by roughly
240% and fatalities by around 180%. On average, we have 2.4 active groups within
a district42. This means that on average, the number of groups increases by roughly
37 %. As in the reduced form setting, the incident coefficients decrease if we use
non-linear instrumental variable specifications Table 4-A13. Poisson and negative
binomial methods coupled with control functions, provide estimates of between
a 128% and 176% for incidents. In the case of fatalities, Poisson estimations
obtain point estimates corresponding to an increase of 118%, while the negative
binomial results point to an increase of 280%. We trust the conservative incidents
estimates the most, since they are consistent with our reduced-form evidence and
less volatile compared to the fatality estimates, nor as dependent on the exact
model specification. Furthermore, we only include population as control variable
in the negbin models due to convergence issues. Nevertheless, even the conservative
estimates are quite sizeable given that an increase by one group – an increase in
armed groups of on average 37% – leads to an increase in political violence of
135%. Additionally, the first stage residuals in Table 4-A13 point towards a sizable
downward bias if one does not control for the endogeneity of the number of groups.
How heterogeneous is the effect across districts? Did other groups see the BLA’s
42Conditional on having at least one attack in our sample.
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Table 4-9 – 2SLS evidence: Heterogeneous treatment effects?
Second Stage
Incidents Fatalities Ln Incidents Ln Fatalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No. active groups 4.6398 10.1287 1.7409 1.5004
(1.0095)*** (3.0336)*** (0.3502)*** (0.3111)***
First Stage DV: No. of active groups
Treatsharei × Postt 5.2300
(0.8993)***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 3144 3144 3144 3144
Adj. within-R2 0.219 0.282 0.429 0.335
F-stat IV 33.77
First stage adj. R2 0.710
Notes: Reports the 2SLS results using Treatsharei × Postt as an instrument for the number
of active groups operating within a district. The controls include log of population and
geographical characteristics interacted with year dummies (see footnote 25). Standard errors
clustered at the district level in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
split as a chance to enter its areas of operation? We test this hypothesis by exploiting
the intensive margin of BLA and UBA activity within our instrument. Table 4-9
shows a similar 2SLS regression as in Table 4-8. The first stage’s interaction term
is the post-treatment indicator times the share of BLA and UBA presence in a
particular district. That is treatsharei ranges between 0 and 1. A treatsharei value
of 1, indicates that the BLA or UBA launched at least one attack in the particular
district in every year of the sample period. The maximum value of treatsharei
is about 0.5. This corresponds to attacks every other year, on average. In these
districts, the model predicts two additional groups, on average. The results support
the notion that other groups might have seen the split of the BLA as a chance to
enter districts with a high BLA presence.
4-7 Robustness tests
We perform several additional tests to understand the sensitivity of our findings,
which we report briefly here and in greater detail in the Appendix.
We start by testing how our results are affected if we create our dependent
variables from two separate datasets in Section 4-10. Section 4-B1 shows that using
both incidents from GTD and GED increases the point coefficients of our baseline
specification, although they are not statistically different from one another. We take
this as suggestive evidence that our results are not driven by a change in strategy
of the groups operating in the treatment districts towards events more likely to be
covered by the GTD. Section 4-B2 investigates the problem of “potential” double-
counting, which is introduced if one uses information from two datasets that, in
theory, have an overlap of events that they code. Our probability-based approach
to assess the likelihood of potential double counts suggests that double counting is
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around 10% for realistic scenarios in our case, which might explain the higher point
coefficients in Section 4-B1. However, our results do not change if we exclude those
potential double counts from our estimation.
We also further probe our concept of active armed groups (see Section 4-11).
Section 4-C1 introduces the concept of potential active groups, defined as groups
that are active anywhere in the country, and have been active at least once in
a specific district. This approach loosens the requirement that a group needs to
commit an attack in a specific district to be counted as active there, and in theory,
allows for spatial choices of the armed groups that we do not observe. Again,
our results remain remarkably robust. Note that the measure of potential active
groups and active armed groups are reasonably well correlated (77%). The overlap
highlights another property of our setting. Specifically, the armed groups in our
sample seem to have well-defined areas of operation. We also extended the potential
active armed groups measure to cover all districts falling within the convex hull of a
groups incidents. Again our results remain stable. Section 4-C2 test if the inclusion
of “one-hit-wonders” (Blomberg et al., 2010) in our measure of active armed groups
affects our results. Note that “one-hit-wonders” are counted identically in both
potential armed groups and armed groups counts since they commit only a single
incident. Once more, our results remain stable.
Finally, we test if our effects are driven by the ethno-political representation of
the ethnic groups living across our treatment and control districts (see Section 4-12).
Given that the conflict in Balochistan has an ethnic origin, one might expect that
our estimates could be biased by changing political representation of ethnic groups
across our treatment and control districts (Bormann et al., 2019). Proxying for the
ethno-political representation of both districts and provinces using data from the
geocoded version of the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (GeoEPR) (Wucherpfennig
et al., 2011; Vogt et al., 2015), we can reject this threat to our identification.
4-8 Conclusion
This paper studies the causal effect of an increase in the number of independent
armed groups on political violence. While the arguments in favor of such a
mechanism have long been present in the literature, we are the first paper to provide
causal evidence on the matter.
Our estimates predict that one additional active armed group (corresponding
to a 37 % increase in the number of groups within our sample) more than doubles
organized political violence. The result highlights that the elasticity between armed
groups and political violence is about two. These significant effects are consistent
with competition between armed groups for local dominance. In a communication
to the Indian newspaper The Hindu (Bhattacherjee, 2019), the BLA indicated that
“they are planning to intensify the struggle against Pakistan as they remain ‘the
most popular’ militant organization in Balochistan.”
Exploiting group mergers and splits is a promising avenue to analyze how the
number of armed groups involved in a conflict interacts with other determinants
of conflict. The main advantage of exploiting group splits and mergers, is that
the number of combatants (or foot soldiers) should remain constant in the short-
run and that there are no selection effects in and out of the combat zone. Hence,
researchers can better isolate how economies of scale and increased competition
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affect the amount of political violence perpetrated by armed groups. This is not to
say that the situation in which a new group enters into a combat zone are of no
interest. Quite the opposite, we believe it vital to compare our results to situations
in which a new actor actively selects into a combat zone, such as the Islamic State
starting operations within Afghanistan.
Finally, mergers and spits of armed groups have in general received little
attention so far, which makes them a promising topic of future studies. Future
research needs to trace the reasons why new groups form or split up and encroach
upon the territories of other groups. Understanding within group dynamics is largely
absent from the literature so far. We believe this to be a major obstacle when it
comes to policy recommendations. Consider the evaluation of counter-insurgency
efforts against a specific group for example. It is impossible to evaluate whether
the policy can reduce political violence if we ignore how other groups are indirectly
affected. Our study offers a toolkit to engage in those kind of studies by providing a
method to calculate proxies for counter-insurgency efforts, by combining the GTD
and GED databases. What is more, matching of incidences between the GTD and
GED datasets enables researchers to holistically analyze political violence of armed
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Notes: Panel A depicts the distribution of the number of active groups in district-years with
at least one active group in Balochistan. Panel B depicts the distribution of the number of
active groups in district-years with at least one active group in outside of Balochistan.
Active means conducting at least one attack in a given year and district.
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Notes: Depicts a scatter plot of the (log of) groups vs (log of) incidents & fatalities created
by these groups, demeaned by country and year. The unit of observation is country-year.
Pakistan is represented in red. The line illustrates the best linear fit using the global GTD
sample between 1994 and 2018.
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Figure 4-A3 – Number of armed groups across districts
(a) Number of groups within districts
(pre-treatment)
(b) Number of groups within districts
(post-treatment)
Notes: Panel A reports the number of groups active in districts in the pre-treatment period.
Panel B plots the number of groups active within a district in the post-treatment group.
The bold green line represents the borders of the Baloch province.
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Notes: Reports the point coefficient and their accompanying 95% CIs for different distance
thresholds of spatial clustering corresponding to columns 1 to 4 of Table 4-1. The horizontal
line depict that actual baseline estimate and its accompanying 95% CIs from clustering on
the district level.
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Notes: Reports the point coefficients of our baseline specifications in Table 4-1, dropping one
district at the time together with their 95% CI. The blue horizontal line is the respective
baseline coefficient (full sample) with its 95% CIs (dashed lines).
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2011 2012 2013 Treatment 2015 2016 2017
year
Notes: Reports the point coefficient and their accompanying 95% CIs for column 1 of
Table 4-6. The controls include dummies binning the endpoint of the event window.
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4-A2 Tables
Table 4-A1 – Treated groups (mergers and splits) and location of incidents and
fatalities
Group name Rest of Pakistan Balochistan
Incidences Fatalities Incidences Fatalities
Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) 11 17 195 433
United Baloch Army (UBA) 7 35 84 138
Harakat ul-Mujahidin Al-Almi (HuMA) 1 3 0 0
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM) 1 6 0 0
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) 3 5 0 0
Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA) 19 93 0 0
Jundullah 22 311 3 14
Lashkar-e-Balochistan (LeB) 2 5 29 3
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) 97 738 81 805
Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI) 129 422 0 0
Taliban 1,442 6,330 88 640
Sipah-e-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP) 15 59 1 1
Appendix 83
Table 4-A2 – Descriptive statistics
Mean SD Min Max N
Dependent variables
Incidents 0.93 4.02 0.00 71.00 3,144
Incidents (at least one wounded) -3.59 2.20 -4.61 4.26 3,144
Incidents (at least one fatality) 3.27 17.34 0.00 398.00 3,144
Counter insurgency -3.63 2.43 -4.61 5.99 3,144
Ln fatalities 13.50 78.01 0.00 1,543.00 3,144
Fatalities GED+GTD -3.10 3.03 -4.61 7.34 3,144
Ln Fatalities GED+GTD 0.65 3.00 0.00 61.00 3,144
Fatalities per incidence 0.55 2.58 0.00 45.00 3,144
Incidents vs. other Groups 0.63 4.46 0.00 124.00 3,144
Incidents vs. Gov. 0.06 0.55 0.00 22.00 3,144
Incidents vs. Infrastructure 0.40 2.04 0.00 43.00 3,144
Incidents vs. Business 0.11 0.89 0.00 31.00 3,144
Incidents vs. Citizens 0.08 0.49 0.00 9.00 3,144
0.25 1.40 0.00 27.00 3,144
Treatment variables
Treatshare (UBA or BLA) 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.52 3,144
Control variables
Nr. active groups 0.41 1.06 0.00 15.00 3,144
Nr. other groups 0.34 0.93 0.00 14.00 3,144
∆ nr. other groups 0.01 0.49 -4.00 5.00 3,013
Nr. potential other groups 1.11 1.64 0.00 20.00 3,144
∆ nr. potential other groups 0.05 0.50 -5.00 6.00 3,013
Incidence concentration 0.15 0.33 0.00 1.00 3,144
Fatalities concentration 0.12 0.31 0.00 1.00 3,144
Ln population 13.49 1.11 8.66 16.07 3,144
Airport presence 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 3,144
Ln ruggedness 10.45 2.14 6.03 14.07 3,144
Ln elevation (in meters) 5.83 1.47 2.20 8.50 3,144
Ln road density -9.50 0.80 -11.60 -6.57 3,144
Area share of discriminated ethnic groups (district) 0.15 0.30 0.00 1.00 2,921
Area share of junior partner ethnic groups (district) 0.25 0.39 0.00 1.00 2,921
Area share of powerless ethnic groups (district) 0.20 0.37 0.00 1.00 2,921
Area share of senior partner ethnic groups (district) 0.40 0.47 0.00 1.00 2,921
Group-level variables
Incidents GTD 0.08 0.82 0.00 37.00 9,870
Incidents GTD + GED 0.13 1.22 0.00 47.00 9,870
Incidents asymmetric 0.09 0.87 0.00 37.00 9,870
Incidents non-state 0.08 0.82 0.00 37.00 9,870
Fatalities GTD 0.10 1.12 0.00 36.00 9,870
Fatalities GTD + GED 0.23 2.35 0.00 89.00 9,870
Fatalities asymmetric 0.12 1.36 0.00 51.00 9,870
Fatalities non-state 0.10 1.12 0.00 36.00 9,870
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Table 4-A3 – Definition of the dependent variables in Table 4-4
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Table 4-A4 – Baseline results: Alternative standard errors
Incidents Fatalities Ln Incidents Ln Fatalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Balochi × Postt 3.5904 5.5364 2.1067 1.5800
(1.1315)*** (2.8108)* (0.3803)*** (0.4671)***
[1.5985]** [3.1686]* [0.8213]** [0.6232]**
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 3144 3144 3144 3144
Adj. Within-R2 0.235 0.164 0.136 0.101
Notes: Reports the baseline results in Table 4-1. Standard errors clustered at the division
level in parenthesis, and allowing for spatial dependence with a distance cutoff of 2000 in
brackets. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4-A5 – Baseline results: PPML
Incidents Fatalities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Balochi × Postt 0.9903 1.0780 0.6847 0.9216 1.0364 0.4163
(0.2283)*** (0.2284)*** (0.1639)*** (0.3191)*** (0.3120)*** (0.2514)*
∆ No. other groups 0.2256 0.2855
(0.0461)*** (0.0650)***
No. other groups 0.4341 0.4779
(0.0718)*** (0.0685)***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 2640 2640 2640 2448 2448 2448
R2 0.7806 0.7779 0.7878 0.6552 0.6565 0.6756
Notes: Reports the baseline results in Table 4-1 using Poisson estimation method. Standard
set of controls (population and geographical characteristics interacted with year dummies,
see footnote 25) included but not reported. Standard errors clustered at the district level in
parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4-A6 – Baseline results: Negative Binomial
Incidents Fatalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Balochi × Postt 1.2092 1.2504 0.9838 0.9900
(0.1710)*** (0.1584)*** (0.2161)*** (0.2097)***
∆ No. other groups 0.3271 0.5389
(0.0599)*** (0.0909)***
District-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 2592 2592 2328 2328
Log likelihood -1697 -1655 -2237 -2188
Notes: Reports the baseline results in Table 4-1 using negative binomial estimation method.
Standard set of controls is reduced to log of population due to convergence issues. Other
group level specification is left out due to convergence issues. Standard errors are based on
250 bootstraps. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4-A7 – Log DV intensive margin
Ln Incidents Ln Fatalities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Balochi × Postt 0.9577 0.9891 0.8326 0.7246 0.7892 0.5649
(0.1781)*** (0.1743)*** (0.1385)*** (0.2655)*** (0.2754)*** (0.2786)**
∆ No. other groups 0.0983 0.1294
(0.0300)*** (0.0622)**
No. other groups 0.2488 0.2468
(0.0410)*** (0.0653)***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 561 561 561 434 434 434
Adj. within-R2 0.192 0.205 0.267 0.0371 0.0457 0.0712
Notes: Reports the baseline results in Table 4-1 using a logarithmic transformation of the
dependent variable. The controls include log of population and geographical characteristics
interacted with year dummies (see footnote 25). Standard errors clustered at the district
level in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4-A8 – Baseline results: Additional fixed effects
Incidents Fatalities Ln Incidents Ln Fatalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Balochi × Postt 3.4631 3.4597 1.5282 1.2294
(0.9192)*** (3.8167) (0.3961)*** (0.4398)***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-Decade-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 3144 3144 3144 3144
Adj. within-R2 0.0302 -0.0240 0.0459 0.0279
Notes: Reports the baseline results in Table 4-1 but includes additional fixed effects. The
controls include log of population and geographical characteristics interacted with year
dummies (see footnote 25). Standard errors clustered at the district in parenthesis. ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4-A9 – Baseline results: no controls
Incidents Fatalities Ln Incidents Ln Fatalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Balochi × Postt 3.9227 6.2560 2.4174 1.9353
(1.2703)*** (3.2534)* (0.3948)*** (0.4625)***
Controls No No No No
District-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 3144 3144 3144 3144
Adj. within-R2 0.0339 0.00453 0.0570 0.0280
Notes: Reports the baseline results in Table 4-1 but excludes all control variables. Standard
errors clustered at the district in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4-A10 – Baseline results: severe and fatal incidents
Incidents Incidents Ln Incidents Ln Incidents
severe fatal severe fatal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Balochi × Postt 1.6786 1.2365 1.5031 1.2911
[0.7169]** [0.6236]** [0.3805]*** [0.3677]***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 3144 3144 3144 3144
Adj. Within-R2 0.270 0.254 0.114 0.111
Notes: Reports the baseline results in Table 4-1 using only incidents in which at least one
person got wounded (severe) or died (fatal). The controls include log of population and
geographical characteristics interacted with year dummies (see footnote 25). Standard errors
clustered at the district in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4-A11 – DiD: Within Baloch separatist groups (BLA & UBA)
Inci Inci all Inci civil Fatal Fatal all Fatal civil
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLAij × Postt -0.0211 -0.1618 -0.0630 0.1721 0.0230 0.0528
(0.0679) (0.0850)* (0.0535) (0.1056) (0.1875) (0.1084)
District-Group-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 7896 7896 7896 7896 7896 7896
Adj. within-R2 0.374 0.424 0.337 0.288 0.357 0.291
Notes: BLA and UBA are treated as one group. Standard errors clustered at the district
level in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4-A12 – DiD: Within Non-Baloch separatist groups (BLA & UBA)
Inci Inci all Inci civil Fatal Fatal all Fatal civil
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLAij × Postt 0.0741 -0.0952 -0.0145 0.1404 -0.0366 -0.0298
(0.0308)** (0.0810) (0.0420) (0.0872) (0.1894) (0.1139)
Ideology Controls × year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-Group-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 57246 57246 57246 57246 57246 57246
Adj. within-R2 0.0529 0.299 0.353 0.273 0.248 0.223
Notes: BLA and UBA are treated as one group. Ideology controls are extensive dummies
created from the three ideology dimension in Kis-Katos et al. (2014). Standard errors
clustered at the district level in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4-A13 – Nonlinear instrumental variable results
Second Stage
Poisson Negative Binomial
Incidents Fatalities Incidents Fatalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No. active groups 1.280∗∗∗ 1.186∗∗ 1.763∗∗∗ 2.834∗∗∗
(0.440) (0.525) (0.475) (0.847)
Residual 1st-stage -0.942∗∗ -0.749 -1.239∗∗∗ -0.731
(0.407) (0.580) (0.452) (0.760)
First Stage DV: No. of active groups
Balochi × Postt 0.9569 0.9031
(0.2117)*** (0.2214)***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 3384 3384 3384 3384
Log likelihood -1495 -5580 -1915 -2526
F-stat IV 20.432 16.652
First stage adj. Within−R2 0.4330 0.2783
Notes: Standard errors of the second stage are based on 250 bootstraps. First stage is
estimated with OLS. Standard set of controls is reduced to population due to convergence
issues. Note that we use population instead of ln(population) due to the nonlinear
transformation introduced by Poisson and negative binomial second stages. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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4-10 Counting incidents and fatalities
We take a closer look at how the incidents and fatalities reported by the different
databases GTD and GED enter our specifications. We start by testing the robustness
of our results regarding different issues in the data, such as if an armed group has
officially claimed an event. We then proceed and discuss further what problems arise
if one combines events of organized political violence across databases and how we
deal with those issues.
4-B1 Counting all forms of organized political violence
The main specifications primarily rely on incidents and fatalities provided by the
GTD. The reason is that the GTD has the best coverage for most of the actors
we are interested in (see Section 5-3.1). However, having the best coverage for our
actors of interest among the available databases has the potential to bias our results.
The GTD, by its definition, focuses on organized political violence that fits their
definition of terrorism. Thus, if following our treatment, all groups would switch to
committing more violence fitting the GTD definition, it could be that GTD provides
us the best coverage, without substantially changing the overall violence level. For
example, following treatment, the actors could be involved in fewer events that
fulfill the criteria of internal armed conflict, which is the primary focus of the GED
database. We test for the aggregated effect across databases in Table 4-B1, where
we replicate our baseline table including all events committed by armed groups from
the GTD, and GED.43
Table 4-B1 – All incidents and fatalities
Incidents Fatalities Ln Incidents Ln Fatalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Balochi × Postt 4.7563 19.4801 1.7329 1.5295
(1.3502)*** (14.4061) (0.3549)*** (0.4600)***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 3144 3144 3144 3144
Adj. within-R2 0.303 0.110 0.496 0.460
Notes: Replicates our 2SLS specifications combining incidents and fatalities form GTD and
GED. Standard set of controls (population and geographical characteristics interacted with
year dummies, see footnote 25) included but not reported. Standard errors clustered at the
district level in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4-B1 shows that the size and statistical significance of our point estimates
remains roughly constant across our specifications.44 Thus, the competition effect,
which we obtained in our main specifications, does not seem to be driven by a switch
in a strategy that is over-reported by a specific database.
A related issue is our classification of an armed group. Recall that we only count
actors as armed groups if they have a unique name that identifies them; hence, we
43See Section 5-3.1 for our definition of an armed group.
44An exception is the fatality count, which tends to be less stable across different specifications.
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exclude events from actors such as “Tribesmen” or “Gunmen”. However, excluding
the events committed by those actors might also bias our results in unexpected ways.
Furthermore, given that both the GTD and GED rely on publicly available data,
those names could also reflect uncertainty about the actual perpetrator of the event.
Fortunately, the GTD codes if an armed group has officially claimed an event, which
allows us to test if our results are driven by uncertainty about events or our group
definition.
In Table 4-B2, we replicate our core specification on incidents and fatalities,
using all events included in the GTD in column 1 and 2, those claimed by a group
in column 3 and 4, and finally all events included in the GTD and GED in column
5 and 6.
Table 4-B2 – All events
All GTD Events Claimed GTD Events All GTD & GED Events
Incidents Fatalities Incidents Fatalities Incidents Fatalities
Balochi × Postt 6.6975 6.7272 3.4439 4.7646 7.8635 20.6708
(2.0678)*** (3.3198)** (0.9636)*** (2.8339)* (2.2933)*** (14.8812)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 3144 3144 3144 3144 3144 3144
Adj. Within-R2 0.202 0.166 0.296 0.178 0.158 0.0144
Notes: The controls include log of population and geographical characteristics interacted
with year dummies (see footnote 25). Standard errors clustered at the district level in
parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Again, we obtain economically more significant effects in columns 1, 2, 5, and
6, which suggests that our competition effect also influences less organized actors.
Furthermore, columns 3 and 4 show comparable estimates to columns 1 and 2 of
Table 4-1, highlighting that the armed groups that we identify seem to claim a lot of
the incidents they commit publicly. Summing up, our results seem not to be driven
by GTD specific coding rules.
4-B2 Double counting organized political violence
Our larger estimates using both GTD and GED events of organized political violence
could be a result of double-counting. Double counting arises if both the GED and
GTD code the same incidents for the same groups. Even though they have different
definitions of organized political violence, this is not implausible, at least for a subset
of events that might fit both definitions.
Testing for double counting is not straight forward, due to two reasons.
First, GTD and GED have slightly different group names and different levels of
aggregation. Generally, the level of aggregation is usually higher in the GED
compared to the GTD. For example, GED will code a group “X”, and the GTD
will code the same group “X” as “X − 1” referring to some faction within “X” and
“X− 2”, referring to another faction within “X”. Second, each event is coded based
on publicly available source material subject to human interpretation. Thus, GTD
and GED may attribute events to different actors due to conflicting and or different
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source material. This may also lead to alternative coding decisions concerning the
day or exact location of a specific event.
The first issue is easily solved by harmonizing the group names. In practice, we
aggregate the GTD group names up to the GED group name for all matches.45 The
second issue has no clear solution. Hence, we allow for varying levels of time and
location precision in both datasets.
With these limitations in mind, we propose a solely uncertainty based approach
to address the issue. Specifically, we quantify the likelihood that a GED event
is a potential double count of a GTD event, depending on the distance both in
space and time from one GED event committed by group i to all GTD events
also committed by group i. The advantage of our approach compared to other
possibilities, i.e., checking the source material of each incident, is the scalability for
samples containing more than 10,000 events, as in our setting. Furthermore, it is
transparent and allows the reader to decide with which buffer size she is comfortable
with, instead of crosschecking our individual coding decisions.
The procedure of incidence-matching is simple. We classify a GED event
committed by group i as being a potential double-count, if the temporal distance
to any GTD event committed by the same group i is within a bandwidth t starting
from +/− one day and simultaneously below a certain distance threshold d starting
from one kilometer. To allow for multiple different events within a close proximity at
the same time period, we require the number of people killed reported by the GTD
to fall within the bounds (low and high estimate) of the fatality count provided
by GED.46 Note that the matching of fatalities becomes more important as soon
as the temporal and distance buffer increase, as the likelihood of false positives
increases with wider buffers. Note that for this approach to be valid, we need to
assume that double counting is only an issue between databases but not within.
We do not find this assumption problematic since both databases conduct internal
quality control, and it seems unlikely that they systematically misinterpret the set of
sources they judged to be meaningful. Finally, the approach may also be performed
without matching groups and fatalities from both databases. The only effect this
has is that one is more likely to classify GED events as potential double counts,
which in truth are not. In general, the approach has a clear trade-off between the
likelihood of committing type 1 vs. type 2 errors, depending on the thresholds and
the same-group criterion.
We illustrate the impact on the double-counts for each criterion. Panel A
of Figure 4-B1 shows the the naive approach (excluding the same group name
and fatality criteria). The number of GED events that are considered potential
double counts of GTD events for parameter constellations of daily temporal
bandwidth t = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), and a distance threshold ranging from d =
(20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28), which corresponds to 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, and
256 kilometers, respectively. Note that the temporal threshold affects the potential
double count status of a GED event much less, compared to the distance threshold.
As soon as we use a distance threshold of 32km, every GED event is a potential
45The specific matching of group names between the GTD and GED dataset is documented in
Section 4-13
46Both the GED and GTD count all fatalities related to a specific incidents. If our approach is
applied to sources using different methods for counting fatalities, this criteria should be dropped
from the procedure.
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Figure 4-B1 – Nr. of incidences of GTD and GED double coding
(a) Without group name matching (b) With group name matching
(c) With fatality matching
(d) With group name and fatality
matching
double count. In other words, whenever a GED event is coded in any day during
our sample period, there is at least 1 GTD event coded within 32km distance of
that GED event.
Panel B of Figure 4-B1 replicates the approach but applies the same-group name
criterion. The picture becomes much more nuanced. Raising the distance threshold
affects the number of assigned double counts beyond 32km. Furthermore, the
interaction between the temporal and distance buffer is more pronounced. Lastly,
the maximum amount of GED incidents flagged as potential double counts is 65%
of those in the naive approach.
Panel C and D show that the inclusion of the fatality-match decreases the
number of assigned double-counts dramatically. The maximum amount of assigned
double counts falls to just above 2000 without name matching and below 1000 if one
includes the name match. The general effect of increasing the distance and temporal
thresholds remains similar to the respective approach without fatality matching.
We conclude that the naive approach may involve too many type 1 errors. Type
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1 errors are likely to be high if one ignores the same name criterion, given a high
number of armed groups active within Pakistan. Hence, the name-matching seems
a necessary condition for a meaningful application of the approach, in our setting.
The fatality criterion seems more optional if one already includes the same-name
requirement and keeps the distance thresholds moderate. Still, it is unclear when
the trade-off between type 1 and type 2 errors is minimized for the temporal and
distance buffers.
Next, we assess the stability of our core results concerning double-counting. Since
we have no clear guidance regarding the optimal thresholds for t and d we test the
stability of our results for all combinations of t and d introduced above. Note that
there is no upper limit on the combination one could test. Nevertheless, we restrict
ourselves to the introduced set for brevity. We start with the naive approach for
illustrative purposes.
Panels A to F of Figure 4-B2 plot the point coefficients of our baseline
specification (column 1 Table 4-1) for increasing distance thresholds across different
time buffers, starting with +/− one day in Panel A, in the upper part of each panel
and the fraction of GED events in use (not flagged as a potential double-count) in
the lower panel. Furthermore, each panel plots the baseline estimate of column 1
Table 4-1 with its 95% CIs (black solid and dashed lines), as well as the estimate
using all events attributed to armed groups in GTD and GED (corresponding to
column 1 Table 4-B1) with its 95% CIs (blue solid and dashed lines).
Figure 4-B2 shows that our core results seem relatively robust to double-counting
since we cannot reject that they are identical to our baseline effect of the effect from
Table 4-1. Note that we also fail to reject that the baseline effect is the same when
using only GTD compared to using both GTD and GED events.
Panels A to F of Figure 4-B3 report the results for the more nuanced approach
relying on the same-name criterion. Again the results remain remarkably stable.
The major difference between the two approaches is that the fraction of included
GED events is much more stable in Figure 4-B3 compared to Figure 4-B2. The
stable result is to be expected since the same-name criterion drastically reduces the
set of potential double counts regardless of the buffers. This pattern does not change
if one adds the fatality criteria to either approach. In fact the only major difference
is that both approaches use a higher fraction of the GED events, while the decline
in usable GED events in the distance and temporal buffer remain similar.47 In
summary, the results make us confident that our combined results using the full set
of available events of organized political violence, is not biased by some systematic
measurement error due to double counting.
47Results nor reported but available upon request.
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Figure 4-B2 – Potential double coding: GTD & GED
(a) A: +/- 1 days (b) B: +/- 2 days
(c) C: +/- 3 days (d) D: +/- 4 days
(e) E: +/- 5 days (f) F: +/- 6 days
Notes: Reports the point coefficient and their accompanying 95% CIs for different potential
double-counting thresholds both in time and space. The horizontal dark-grey solid line is the
baseline coefficient using only GTD incidents. The two horizontal dark-grey dashed lines are
the accompanying 95% CIs. The horizontal blue solid line is the coefficient using all GED
and GTD incident ignoring potential double counting. The two horizontal blue dashed lines
are the accompanying 95% CIs.
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Figure 4-B3 – Potential double coding (Same Names): GTD & GED
(a) A: +/- 1 days (b) B: +/- 2 days
(c) C: +/- 3 days (d) D: +/- 4 days
(e) E: +/- 5 days (f) F: +/- 6 days
Notes: Reports the point coefficient and their accompanying 95% CIs for different potential
double-counting thresholds both in time and space. The horizontal dark-grey solid line is the
baseline coefficient using only GTD incidents. The two horizontal dark-grey dashed lines the
accompanying 95% CIs. The horizontal blue solid line is the coefficient using all GED and
GTD incident ignoring potential double-counting. The two horizontal blue dashed lines the
accompanying 95% CIs.
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Figure 4-B4 – Potential double coding (matching fatalities): GTD & GED
(a) A: +/- 1 days (b) B: +/- 2 days
(c) C: +/- 3 days (d) D: +/- 4 days
(e) E: +/- 5 days (f) F: +/- 6 days
Notes: Reports the point coefficient and their accompanying 95% CIs for different potential
double-counting thresholds both in time and space. The horizontal dark-grey solid line is the
baseline coefficient using only GTD incidents. The two horizontal dark-grey dashed lines are
the accompanying 95% CIs. The horizontal blue solid line is the coefficient using all GED
and GTD incident ignoring potential double counting. The two horizontal blue dashed lines
are the accompanying 95% CIs.
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Figure 4-B5 – Potential double coding (Same Names & matching fatalities): GTD
& GED
(a) A: +/- 1 days (b) B: +/- 2 days
(c) C: +/- 3 days (d) D: +/- 4 days
(e) E: +/- 5 days (f) F: +/- 6 days
Notes: Reports the point coefficient and their accompanying 95% CIs for different potential
double-counting thresholds both in time and space. The horizontal dark-grey solid line is the
baseline coefficient using only GTD incidents. The two horizontal dark-grey dashed lines the
accompanying 95% CIs. The horizontal blue solid line is the coefficient using all GED and
GTD incident ignoring potential double-counting. The two horizontal blue dashed lines the
accompanying 95% CIs.
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4-11 Counting independent groups
How many groups are competing within a district at any point in time? Given
that our competition argument is based primarily on the number of active armed
groups within a local market of violence, this question is of paramount importance.
However, as in the case of measuring organized political violence, measurement
choices are abundant, theoretical guidance is limited, and empirical best practice
absent.
Recall, the number of active groups in our main specifications is a simple count
of the armed groups that commit at least one incident within a district in a given
year. Yet, one might argue that the actual incident committed is a strategic choice
that maximizes utility over several dimensions for the group, e.g., ease of committing
the attack vs. potential payoff (Marineau et al., 2020). If strategic considerations
drive actual attacks, counting groups only as active within a district if they commit
an attack during a year is an imperfect measure of their presence.48 In turn, this
will lead to an imperfect count of active groups and thus an imperfect proxy for
group competition. It seems plausible that group effort is a result of the actual
competition and not the imperfect perceived one. In general, we assume that local
groups, as well as the government, have better information about the currently active
groups within a district. Another issue closely related is the treatment of “one-hit
wonders” Blomberg et al. (2010), defined as armed groups that only commit one
attack during our sample. In our main analysis, we exclude those armed groups
entirely. Nevertheless, it seems prudent to test if our coding of active groups is
sensitive to them.
4-C1 Active armed groups & potential active armed groups
In this section, we propose an alternative measure of active groups, which we call
“potential active groups”. We define a group as potentially active in all districts in
which it has ever been active (during our sample) if it commits at least one incident
in any district in the current year. The number of potentially active groups is then
simply the sum of all potential groups within a district. Note that this measure
will, by definition, always be greater or equal to the number of active groups within
a district, since being active in one district automatically assumes potential group
activity in any other district where the group has ever been active during our sample
period.
Table 4-C1 replicates Table 4-2 with the difference that the change of other
groups and the number of other groups in the upper and lower panel is replaced
by the change and number of potential active groups. Once more, our results are
remarkably stable. None of the coefficients is statistically different from the once
using the active number of groups instead of the potential one, either in changes or
levels.
Instead of counting a group as active in all districts in which it ever operates, we
can also define an area of operation in which we count a group as active whenever
it is active somewhere. We follow König et al. (2017) and define a group’s area
of operation as the convex hull drawn around its incidents over the sample period.
Specifically, we treat all districts as belonging to the group’s area of operation if the
48Groups could also have the goal to be unpredictable (Jaeger and Paserman, 2008).
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Table 4-C1 – Controlling for potential other groups
Incidents Fatalities Ln Incidents Ln Fatalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Balochi × Postt 2.2487 0.3628 1.6310 1.1495
(0.7815)*** (2.1562) (0.3555)*** (0.4063)***
∆ No. potential other groups 1.4739 5.7693 0.5294 0.4879
(0.2418)*** (1.3040)*** (0.1012)*** (0.1219)***
Adj. Within-R2 0.325 0.241 0.187 0.134
Potential other groups in levels
Balochi × Postt 3.6176 5.6771 2.1174 1.5930
(0.9699)*** (2.9068)* (0.3807)*** (0.4448)***
No. potential other groups 0.6692 1.9767 0.1643 0.0797
(0.1454)*** (1.2948) (0.0883)* (0.0840)
Adj. Within-R2 0.240 0.167 0.137 0.101
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 3144 3144 3144 3144
Notes: The controls include log of population and geographical characteristics interacted
with year dummies (see footnote 25). Standard errors clustered at the district level in
parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
convex hull of incidents intersects them. Figure 4-C1 below illustrates the area of
operations for the BLA based on this definition. Note that the convex hull is at the
opposite end of our standard measure of group presence. In the case of the BLA
three single attacks outside Baluchistan are enough to flag many districts outside of
Balochistan with a BLA presence.
Table 4-C2 replicates Table 4-C1 using the area of operations instead of the
districts in which a group ever operates to count the number of potential other
groups. As before, we cannot reject that the coefficients are the same. Note,
however, that the coefficient of the other group count is no longer statistically
significant, which is likely driven by the districts that fall within the convex hull
of a group but that never experience organized political violence perpetrated by
that group.
4-C2 Active armed groups: One-hit wonders
We now include “one-hit wonders” Blomberg et al. (2010) into our measure of
potential active groups. Note that one-hit wonders affect the measure of active
and potential active groups in the same way since, by definition, they only commit
one incident in one district in one year. Table 4-C3 reports the results of another
replication of Table 4-2, including the one-hit-wonders in the number of potential
groups. Columns 1 to 4 of Table 4-C3 show that our results are not sensitive to the
inclusion of one-hit wonders.
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Figure 4-C1 – Convex hull of BLA incidents
Notes: Depicts the convex hull of all BLA incidents (red line) and the incident locations of
the BLA (red dots). Districts intersected by the convex hull are colored and counted as the
area of operations for the BLA following this approach.
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Table 4-C2 – Controlling for potential other groups area of operation (convex hull)
Incidents Fatalities Ln Incidents Ln Fatalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Balochi × Postt 3.6119 4.9624 2.1067 1.5583
(0.9979)*** (2.7818)* (0.3831)*** (0.4444)***
∆ No. potential other groups 0.1099 -1.5900 0.0016 -0.0801
(0.1914) (1.1137) (0.0829) (0.0944)
Adj. Within-R2 0.234 0.165 0.135 0.101
Potential other groups in levels
Balochi × Postt 3.1656 5.0426 1.8002 1.4120
(0.7836)*** (2.3005)** (0.3816)*** (0.4380)***
No. potential other groups 0.1862 0.2288 0.1402 0.0805
(0.1561) (0.7824) (0.0640)** (0.0703)
Adj. Within-R2 0.236 0.164 0.140 0.102
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 3144 3144 3144 3144
Notes: The controls include log of population and geographical characteristics interacted
with year dummies (see footnote 25). Standard errors clustered at the district level in
parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4-C3 – Controlling for other groups: Counting one-hit wonders
Incidents Fatalities Ln Incidents Ln Fatalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Balochi × Postt 3.6128 5.6977 2.1590 1.6355
(0.9773)*** (2.9259)* (0.3865)*** (0.4460)***
∆ No. potential other groups 0.9368 3.5604 1.2074 1.0956
(0.2036)*** (0.5533)*** (0.1375)*** (0.1542)***
Adj. Within. R2 0.248 0.175 0.235 0.164
Potential other groups in levels
Balochi × Postt 2.2923 0.3220 1.2348 0.7108
(0.7544)*** (2.1246) (0.2839)*** (0.3166)**
No. potential other groups 2.6158 10.6708 1.7814 1.7923
(0.2472)*** (1.3799)*** (0.2395)*** (0.2664)***
Adj. Within. R2 0.374 0.294 0.421 0.324
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 0.248 0.175 0.235 0.164
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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4-12 Ethnopolitical representation
Could our effects be driven by differing ethno-political representations of the people
living across Pakistani districts (Bormann et al., 2019)? Given that the conflict in
Balochistan is historically a conflict between the tribes of a specific ethnicity (i.e.,
the Baluchi with the central government), it seems a plausible source for omitted
variable bias. We address this issue directly and control for the representation of
the ethnic groups within districts over time using the geocoded version of the Ethnic
Power Relations (GeoEPR) (Wucherpfennig et al., 2011; Vogt et al., 2015).
Figure 4-D1 – Politically relevant ethnic groups in Pakistan (GeoEPR)
Notes: Reports the intersect between our district shape and the GeoEPR shape.
The EPR tracks the political access of political relevant groups to the central
state. It codes the political power of groups with some exceptions on an ordinal scale.
The set of group power status are: “Monopoly”, “Dominance, “Senior Partner”,
“Junior Partner”, “Powerless”, “Discriminated”, “Self-exclusion” and “Irrelevant”
(see Vogt et al., 2015). The first two categories imply that a group has more or
less exclusive access to power, while the “partner” categories are assigned to groups
that share power in government. The remaining groups are (apart from the Self-
exclusion category) self-explanatory. In our sample, we only observe groups being
either junior or senior partner (the Punjabi for the entire period), discriminated
against (the Baluchi for most of the time), or powerless. Figure 4-D1 reports the
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ethnic groups across our districts.
Two issues arise when using the GeoEPR in our setting. First, the GeoEPR
measures access to political power for ethnic groups and not for districts. Hence,
we need to aggregate the representation of the groups living within a district to the
district level. Second, the GeoEPR’s time coverage only extends to 2017, and has
no data for several districts.49 Thus we do not include the GeoEPR variables in our
baseline specifications.
We aggregate group representation to the district level by creating a set of
dummies representing each power category in our sample and weight each group’s
power with its area share in the respective districts. Hence we have 3 variables
ranging between 0 and 1 as additional control variables for our specifications. Note
that the senior partner category is left out since it is time invariant. We are aware
that this procedure is not suitable to estimate the effect of political representation on
violence directly or provide meaningful estimates for specific ethnic power relations.
Yet, it should be sufficient to proxy for potentially unobserved changes in the
political representation across districts over time.
Table 4-D1 – Ethnopolitical representation across districts
Incidents Fatalities Ln Incidents Ln Fatalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Balochi × Postt 2.5522 3.9648 1.9981 1.4050
(0.8023)*** (2.4389) (0.3788)*** (0.4550)***
Area share discriminated 0.0970 -3.3771 0.2111 0.0634
(0.4437) (1.4641)** (0.3119) (0.3463)
Area share powerless -0.4502 -2.5694 -0.5743 -0.3272
(0.3596) (0.9233)*** (0.1725)*** (0.2018)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 2921 2921 2921 2921
Adj. within-R2 0.388 0.172 0.151 0.110
Notes: The controls include log of population and geographical characteristics interacted
with year dummies (see footnote 25). Standard errors clustered at the district level in
parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4-D1 replicates Table 4-1 adding the EPR-based variables. Note that we
use the junior partner status as the omitted category. The main results remain
stable. We refrain interpreting our power dummies. Interpretation of the power
dummies is not straight forward due to potentially opposing effects. Consider that
the share of discriminated increases. This might make the discriminated group more
likely to support an armed group within a districts. At the same time, it reduces
the share of the junior partner group which is a potential target, in turn suppressing
violence within a district. Hence, what we observe is a net correlation.
Given that our treatment group consists of all districts located within the Baloch
Province we can also weight the political representation of ethnic groups on the
49The white areas in Figure 4-D1.
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Province level (see Table 4-D2). Again, our coefficient of interest remains stable
throughout all specification.
Table 4-D2 – Ethnopolitical representation across provinces
Incidents Fatalities Ln Incidents Ln Fatalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Balochi × Postt 4.1426 3.6403 2.0263 1.5053
(0.9919)*** (2.0383)* (0.3789)*** (0.4455)***
Area share discriminated -0.4056 -3.2752 -0.2037 -0.3093
(0.6529) (2.2391) (0.3770) (0.4134)
Area share powerless -0.1994 -2.6305 -0.4414 -0.1108
(0.3921) (1.1759)** (0.1992)** (0.2175)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 2921 2921 2921 2921
Adj. Within-R2 0.243 0.172 0.146 0.109
Notes: The controls include log of population and geographical characteristics interacted
with year dummies (see footnote 25). Standard errors clustered at the district level in
parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In summary we confident that changing political representation of ethnic groups
across districts and provinces does not bias our estimates.
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4-13 Matching groups between GTD and GED




2 Abu Hafs Katibatul al-
Ghurba al-Mujahideen
Abu Hafs Katibatul al-Ghurba
al-Mujahideen
3 al-Intiqami al-Pakistani Al-Intiqami al-Pakistani





9 Al-Qaida Al-Qaida Al-Qaida
10 Al-Qaida in the Indian
Subcontinent
Al-Qaida
11 Al-Qa’ida in the Indian
Subcontinent
Al-Qaida
12 Amr Bil Maroof Wa Nahi
Anil Munkir
Amr Bil Maroof Wa Nahi Anil
Munkir
13 Ansaar ul-Islam Ansaar ul-Islam
14 Ansarul Islam (Pakistan) Ansaar ul-Islam
15 Ansar Al-Mujahideen Ansar Al-Mujahideen
16 Ansar al-Sharia Ansar al-Sharia
17 Ansar Wa Mohajir
18 Ansar Wa Mohajir
(Pakistan)
Ansar Wa Mohajir






21 Baba Ladla Gang Baba Ladla Gang
22 Baloch Ittehad Baloch Ittehad
23 Baloch Militant Defense
Army
Baloch Militant Defense Army






















32 Baloch Republican Army
(BRA)
BRA
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Appendix 4-E1 – continued from previous page
No. GTD Group Name GED Group Name Matched Group Name
36 Baloch Waja Liberation
Army (BWLA)
BWLA
37 Baloch Young Tigers
(BYT)
BYT
38 Fedayeen Islam Fedayeen Islam
39 Forces of Momin Afridi Forces of Momin Afridi
40 Forces of Shah Sahib Forces of Shah Sahib
41 Forces of Turkestan
Bhittani
Forces of Turkestan Bhittani
42 Free Balochistan Army
(FBA)




44 Government of India Government of India
45 Government of Iran Government of Iran
46 Government of Iraq Government of Iraq
47 Government of Pakistan Government of Pakistan
48 Government of United
States of America
Government of United States of
America
49 Hafeez Brohi Group Hafeez Brohi Group
50 Hafiz Gul Bahadur
Group
Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group
51 Halqa-e-Mehsud Halqa-e-Mehsud




















61 Khorasan Chapter of the
Islamic State
IS
62 Jaish al-Umar (JaU) Jaish al-Umar (JaU)
63 Jaish as-Saiyouf (Army
of Swords)
Jaish as-Saiyouf (Army of
Swords)






70 Jeay Sindh Qaumi
Mahaz (JSQM)
Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz
(JSQM)





74 Jundallah (Pakistan) Jondullah
Continued on next page
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90 Mujahideen Ansar Mujahideen Ansar
91 Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal
92 Afghans NA
93 Baloch Nationalists NA
94 Bandits NA
95 Bangesh NA
96 Bhittani tribe NA




101 Kachai sub-tribe of
Bangesh
NA
102 Kalpar Tribesmen NA
103 Kashmir insurgents NA
104 Lashkar of Akakhel tribe NA
105 Lashkar of Akakhel tribe NA
106 Lashkar of Kukikhel clan NA
107 Lashkar of Mohmand
tribe
NA
108 Lashkar of Orakzai tribe NA
109 Lashkar of Salarzai tribe NA
110 Lashkar of Zakakhel
tribe
NA
111 Lashkhar of Wazir tribe NA
112 Laskhar of Masozai
Qaumi tribe
NA






119 Muslim Extremists NA
120 Muslim extremists NA
121 Muslim Fundamentalists NA
122 Muslim Militants NA
Continued on next page
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Appendix 4-E1 – continued from previous page
No. GTD Group Name GED Group Name Matched Group Name









128 Shia Muslim extremists NA
129 Shiite Muslims NA
130 Sindhi NA
131 Sunni Muslim extremists NA
132 Sunni Muslims NA
133 Supporters of MQM NA
134 Supporters of PPP NA
135 Supporters of Yousaf Ali
Khan Magsi
NA
136 Supporters of Zulfikar
Ali Khan Magsi
NA




141 Pakistani People’s Party
(PPP)




143 Qari Kamran Group Qari Kamran Group




146 Sindhu Desh Liberation
Army (SDLA)















154 Tanzeem al-Islami al-
Furqan
Tanzeem al-Islami al-Furqan
155 Tawheed ul-Islam Tawheed ul-Islam
156 Tawheed ul-Islam Tawheed ul-Islam
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167 TTP - MR TTP-MR
168 TTP - MT TTP-MT
169 TTP-SM TTP-SM
170 TTP - TA TTP-TA
171 UBA UBA
172 United Baloch Army
(UBA)
UBA
173 Uzair Baloch Gang Uzair Baloch Gang
174 Zehri Youth Force (ZYF) Zehri Youth Force (ZYF)










Table 4-F1 – Observed groups splits and reasons to split







The UBA split from the BLA after the father of both group leaders died. The











Some sources claim that ISI [Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence] lost interest
in funding HuM after Khalil’s [founder of HuM] 1998 decision to join hands
with Bin Laden. ISI may have offered Azhar assistance and funding to establish












There was reportedly some pressure on the HuM after its proscription in
Pakistan in 2001 to merge with the Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen. This plan met
with stiff resistance from within the HuM and reportedly, the dissent led to a




















Ideology conflicts Former SiS [Sipah-i-Sahaba] militants Riaz Basra, Malik Ishaq, and Akram
Lahori founded LeJ in 1996 after breaking away from SiS, claiming that SiS










JA split from the TTP under the leadership of former TTP commander Omar
Khalid Khorasani. This separation was a result of growing tensions between
Khorasani and the then leader of the TTP, Maulana Fazlullah. The broadness
of the TTP’s coalition also presents challenges, however, and has threatened the
group’s cohesion. For instance, after the death of its former amir Hakimullah
Mehsud in a U.S. drone strike in November 2013, the jihadist leaders of several















When ISIS captured Mosul in July 2014, Jundullah was one of the first
organizations that pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Due to Jundullah’s strong ties to al-Qaeda, their decision to shift alliances
was probably a difficult one. However, because the group lost most of its core
leadership due to severe actions taken by Pakistani law enforcement, this move
indicates a policy of self-reinvigoration through ISIS. Jundallah is likely to be
partly comprised of cadres from banned sectarian Deobandi tafkiri groups like
LeJ or Ahle-Sunnat-Wal-Jamat (ASWJ), which consider Shi’a Muslims to be
kafirs[meaning: infidel or disbelievers], underlining that the group already had















Table 4-F2 – Observed groups mergers and reasons to merge












Media reports on January 5, 2011, indicated that five terrorist groups had
joined the TTP and were working under its umbrella TTP. With common aims
and enemies, LeJ, SSP, JeM, HuM and Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA) had ‘merged’
with TTP. TTP spokesman Azam Tariq declared, ‘We have not forced anyone
to join TTP, and the leaders and activists of the banned religious organisations
have united themselves under the umbrella of the TTP on their own choice.’
The sole objective of the Shura meeting was to unite the small militant fractions
under the leadership of TTP against NATO forces in Afghanistan and to wage



























The government’s commencement of the Zarb-e-Azb operation in North
Waziristan district, and supplementary operations in other districts of tribal
areas, served to soften the TTP’s differences over the leadership and to bind
these groups together against a common enemy.
In addition, Fazlullah carrying out the December 16, 2014 attack on the
Army Public School in Peshawar, in which 141 people (a large number of
them children) were killed, outclassed all other competing jihadist groups, and













Militant organisation Lashkar-i-Islam (LI) has merged with the TTP as part of
a re-organisation plan. The decision to unify the militant groups was taken at
a meeting attended by TTP leaders Mulla Fazlullah, Omar Khalid Khurasani
and LI leader Mangal Bagh. The militants announced the unification at a
time when security forces are making significant gains against them in military
operations in North Waziristan and Khyber Agency (government’s Operation
Khyber I), which were once considered their bastions.
Chapter 5
Development Aid and Conflict
China and the World Bank - How Contrasting
Development Approaches affect the Stability of African
States∗
5-1 Introduction
As part of what the Economist describes as the “The new scramble for Africa,”
emerging donors, in particular, China (Dreher and Fuchs, 2015; Dreher et al.,
2018), are challenging the predominance of traditional donors in affecting African
development. The big question is whether this time, as the magazine asks, African
countries will be the benefactors of foreign engagement? Africa is a central focus
of traditional donors as well as a key target region for China. While there was a
considerable drop in global poverty rates thanks to rapid growth, mostly in Asian
countries, many African states lag behind. In particular conflict-prone states plagued
by re-igniting battles pose a challenge, which is why those are also labeled as the
”new frontier of development.”1
While the literature on the growth effects of aid converges towards an on average
small, positive effect (Clemens et al., 2011; Dreher and Langlotz, 2019; Galiani et al.,
2017; Kilby, 2015), researchers are divided about the impact of aid on stability and
conflict (e.g., Bluhm et al., 2021; Child, 2018; Crost et al., 2014; Nunn and Qian,
2014). Some perceive Chinese aid as a crucial step forward that brings growth
and stability to Africa, while others regard it as a big risk that narrowly focuses on
Chinese self-interest, enriches elites (Dreher et al., 2019), fosters conflict, and exports
repression, along with surveillance tactics and autocratic norms (Kishi and Raleigh,
2016).2 We are shedding light on this crucial question by systematically contrasting
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Kai Gehring and Lennart Kaplan (Gehring et al.,
2019).
1See Economist (2019) and Economist (2017).
2See Washington Post (2015) and Council on Foreign Relations (2018) for the direct citation.
See Freedom House (2018) on East African states adapting Chinese internet censorship policies,
New York Times (2019) on exporting the surveillance state, and US News (2018) about China’s
web surveillance model, and Council on Foreign Relations (2018) about Zimbabwe using Chinese
large-scale facial recognition software in its capital Harare. See Economist (2018) about China




the Chinese approach to development with that of the World Bank (WB), one of
the most important traditional donors, and analyzing their effect on stability in
recipient regions.
Moving beyond the partly subjective public rhetoric, we argue that Chinese
foreign aid needs to be considered with all its nuances. China’s ”no strings attached”
approach to development differs sharply from the expert-driven, conditional
approach of traditional donors like the WB and many other Western DAC donors.
Both donors are interested in growth, but while the World Bank regards democracy,
transparency, and human rights as a critical part of prosperity, the Chinese model
highlights social and political stability as the key ingredient to development. To
comprehensively understand the impact of these approaches, requires a holistic
definition of stability. This chapter defines stability as a broad continuum ranging
from outright conflicts with at least a certain number of battle-related deaths, to
lower level-conflict events like citizen protests and government repression, as well as
attitudes related to stability.
Although the more economic growth and stability-oriented perspective of China
and the rule- and expert-based democratic perspective of the World Bank might be
seen as two ends of the spectrum of development policies, their impact on stability is
complex. Even if its motive would be mere self-interest, China also has an incentive
to protect its investments as well as its workers in Africa. One should not expect
China to turn a blind eye on recipient governments starting outright conflicts. Both
donors will try to stop recipient governments from engaging in conflicts that they
deem avoidable or unnecessary, and given their size have some leeway over recipient
governments.3 At the same time, when regarding stability more broadly than just
focusing on the outright conflicts, China is likely to build on its own domestic
development experience, which combines growth with an autocratic and stability-
oriented rule. Therefore, there are good reasons to believe that China would be
more willing to accept recipient governments’ use of autocratic policies and non-
lethal repression to enhance stability, while the WB emphasizes democracy and
humanitarian values more strongly. This chapter does not take a normative stance
which approach is ultimately superior from the perspective of a developing country.
But it carefully carves out the most important conceptual differences between the
two donors and their potential effect on state stability.
To then investigate the causal effects of the two donors on stability, we
precisely link new detailed geo-referenced datasets on development projects by China
(Strange, Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, and Tierney, 2017) and the WB (Dreher, Fuchs,
Parks, Strange, and Tierney, 2017) with geo-referenced measures of stability at
the sub-national level in Africa. Our dataset allows us to match the location of
aid projects and conflicts more precisely than earlier studies, and enables us to
flexibly eliminate potential biases arising from, for instance, unobserved conflict
trends, region-specific time-invariant factors, and country-level time-varying factors.
Moreover, our Bartik-type identification strategy adapts an established instrumental
variable (IV) approach by Nunn and Qian (2014). Our instrument is the interaction
3Based on the different approaches, the distribution of aid also differs. Chinese aid goes more
often directly to governments and the home regions of ethnic leaders (Dreher et al., 2019). Its
distribution is associated with more corruption (Isaksson and Kotsadam, 2018a) and weaker labor
unions (Isaksson and Kotsadam, 2018b). Still, its less bureaucratic approach was also found to
lead to more evenly distributed economic activity within countries (Bluhm, Dreher, Fuchs, Parks,
Strange, and Tierney, 2020).
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between exogenous temporal variation in the WB’s IDA liquidity (Dreher et al.,
2017) and in Chinese domestic (over-)production of commodities with the pre-
determined probability of a region to receive aid with (Dreher et al., 2017; Bluhm
et al., 2020).
Our results provide several important insights. First, a wide range of fixed
effects (FE) and IV specifications reject the idea that aid by either donor, on
average, fuels conflict at the sub-national level. In the FE specification, a one
standard deviation change in WB aid associates with about 1.6 percentage points
lower conflict likelihood. The effect remains negative and of similar magnitude,
but becomes statistically insignificant when using IV. When studying China, both
strategies yield negative and small, insignificant coefficients.
We move beyond this main IV effect by considering the actors involved in and
responsible for a conflict. Both WB and Chinese engagement consistently leads to
a reduction in lethal violence by governments against civilians. For both donors,
we also find no positive effect on protest events like demonstrations, riots, and
strikes. At the same time, there are crucial differences concerning how stability
is secured. Among the two, only Chinese aid is associated with more government
repression in recipient regions. Afrobarometer responses suggest that both donors
have different effects on measures of security, democratic norms and attitudes, as
well as on perceptions of government behavior. While WB aid is linked to higher
perceived security and stronger support for democratic values, Chinese aid tends to
result in a stronger emphasis on rule following behavior and a higher acceptance of
autocratic regimes.
This chapter contributes in several ways to better understand the role of donors
in influencing recipient country stability, as well as the channels and mechanisms
linking aid to various types of conflict. We combine the strengths of existing
approaches on the country level (e.g., Bluhm, Gassebner, Langlotz, and Schaudt,
2021; Nielsen, Findley, Davis, Candland, and Nielson, 2011; Nunn and Qian, 2014),
with the advantages of studies focusing on sub-national aid data in specific sectors
in selected countries (e.g., Berman, Shapiro, and Felter, 2011; Child, 2018; Crost,
Felter, and Johnston, 2016; Sexton, 2016; Van Weezel, 2015). The aim is to deliver
the best possible compromise between using micro-data with causal identification
strategies and estimating externally valid results for more than one country. Truly
randomly allocated aid projects in individual countries possess a higher internal
validity. Still, their findings could be driven by the particular country context or
the specific type of aid, and it is impossible to replicate them at large scale for a
full continent. We apply identification strategies that are well established in the
literature, consider a broad set of all aid-eligible countries, and our results can be
meaningfully interpreted beyond the context of an individual country.
Besides using new data and providing more precise estimates about the causal
effect of aid on more comprehensive measures of stability, we want to emphasize
three main contributions. First, the chapter adds to the scarce evidence on the
incentives for different actors and their choices created by development projects.
Crost et al. (2014), for instance, focus on how aid changes the incentives for rebel
groups.4 Our finding of a significant reduction in lethal violence enacted by recipient
4As a robustness test, we also show results on sectoral differences, which augment previous
results on intersectoral differences within specific countries (e.g., Child, 2018; Crost et al., 2016;
Berman et al., 2011).
Theoretical considerations and related literature 115
governments against civilians supports the idea of the “cost of shame” (Lebovic and
Voeten, 2009). The fear of losing aid money changes the incentives of recipient
notably.
Second, we shed some light on the hopes and fears associated with emerging
donors (Asmus, Fuchs, and Müller, 2017; Fuchs and Vadlamannati, 2013). In
particular, China’s increased global engagement, like the Belt and Road initiative
and the intense China-Africa Cooperation, is one of the crucial geopolitical changes
in the last two decades. These changes will continue to create tensions in the
future. Existing chapters have either focused on outright conflict, or the impact of,
for instance, Chinese aid in Latin America on attitudes towards China (Brückner,
Eichenauer, and Fuchs, 2018). Still, convincing causal evidence that provides a
comprehensive picture of the impact of Chinese aid on stability in a broad sense was
missing.
Third, by contrasting Chinese aid with the World Bank as a prototypical example
of a traditional, multilateral donor that involves development experts and accounts
for democracy and humanitarian values, we provide a useful reference point. Western
newspapers and NGOs have widely complained about the active export of Chinese
surveillance technology and policies, as well as about the potentially detrimental
impact that the apparent success of the Chinese approach to development has on
developing countries. Our results paint a more nuanced picture. China’s engagement
is not associated with an increase in outright conflict, and even with more stability
when considering less lethal conflicts by governments against civilians. Still, it comes
along with increased government repression and a higher prevalence of autocratic
norms. Hence, the approach makes a difference in some critical dimensions. How to
assess these differences depends on the normative perspective of the observer.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5-2 summarizes the existing literature
and how the two approaches are linked to different measures of stability. Section 5-3
explains the data and the corresponding sources and provides descriptive statistics.
Section 5-4 presents the specification and empirical strategy. Section 5-5 shows and
discusses the results, and Section 5-6 concludes.
5-2 Theoretical considerations and related
literature
This section first defines our concept of stability, and then contrasts the policies
by China and the WB, and how they may affect outright conflict as well as
individual dimensions of stability. To understand the impact of the two approaches
to development in a comprehensive way requires a holistic definition of stability.
More specifically, we think of outright conflict as a lethal fight that caused at
least a specific number of battle-related deaths. Besides the average effects on
conflict, we distinguish between the actors involved in a conflict, either government-
related or non-state actors like rebels. Each of those can be engaged in a two-sided
conflict with the respective other group, or start a one-sided conflict against civilians.
Besides these lethal conflict events, lower-level conflicts like citizens protests against
governments, and government policies against potential rebels or other minority
groups in the country also characterize stability. Finally, attitudes are both reflecting
the results of these other events, but are also themselves signs of stability, for
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instance, beliefs about the quality of democratic processes or rule-following behavior.
Outright conflict: Aid can lower conflict if it raises income and hence, the
opportunity costs of fighting. In that regard, the aid effectiveness literature
converges towards either a null effect (Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2009), or small
positive effects (Galiani et al., 2017) of aid on growth. Berman, Felter, Shapiro, and
Troland (2013) hypothesize that projects are more successful in reducing violence if
they require the integration of development experts. Minasyan, Nunnenkamp, and
Richert (2017) demonstrate the importance of donor quality. The WB built up vast
expertise over the decades since its foundation, which may increase the effectiveness
of its projects in raising income.
At the same time, traditional donors have also been criticized for lack of
“ownership” and underutilizing local knowledge in recipient countries. Scholars
writing about emerging donors like India (Fuchs and Vadlamannati, 2013) and China
(Humphrey and Michaelowa, 2018) also highlight less complicated, bureaucratic
processes with quicker implementation times. Hence, China’s flexibility and
emphasis on economic “mutual benefits” may boost growth even more than the
WB approach (Dreher et al., 2017). Thus, in these dimensions both donors could
reduce the incentives to engage in conflict by fostering growth in their own ways.5
Besides growth effects, the distribution of potential gains is vital as the literature
on resource-related income shocks highlights (e.g., Berman et al., 2017b; Dube and
Vargas, 2013; Gehring et al., 2018). Whether potential gains from aid are used
for short-term consumption, invested in fostering development, or end up in the
foreign bank accounts of government officials, affects the impact on conflict. If the
projects contribute to rising inequality, this could trigger conflicts. WB projects
were found to be less politically motivated than other types of aid (e.g., Dreher,
Sturm, and Vreeland, 2009). The Bank aims for aid allocation in line with conflict
prevention policies accounting for humanitarian aspects and security. In contrast,
Dreher et al. (2019) find that Chinese projects in Africa are more likely to benefit the
birth regions of the respective leader, corresponding to the literature on how leader
changes affect the bilateral allocation of aid (Rommel and Schaudt, 2020; Faye and
Niehaus, 2012).6 Isaksson and Kotsadam (2018a) suggest that Chinese engagement
is associated with higher local corruption, which could increase inequality and lower
trade union membership (Isaksson and Kotsadam, 2018b). Such effect could decrease
the labor share of profits. However, Chinese infrastructure projects are particularly
found to lead to an equal distribution of economic activity (Bluhm et al., 2020).
Hence, the theoretical predictions are, to some degree contradictory, leaving this an
empirical question.
5The literature also describes “aid as a price” that can be acquired as a result of winning a fight
or conflict. This “aid as a price” theory has both a direct goods-related and a political dimension.
Regarding goods, Nunn and Qian (2014) show that US food aid leads to more conflict, as it can
be looted. Expensive equipment associated with investments in healthcare and communication
infrastructure can also be sold on black markets. To remedy these issues, some traditional donors
like the WB seek to “conflict-proof” their aid by avoiding projects that provide lootable/fungible
resources over which warring parties may fight. They instead provide aid in a more discrete manner,
such as social programs (Berman et al., 2013; Crost et al., 2014; Imai et al., 2018). We investigate
aid in different sectors separately in a robustness test.
6There is evidence that, patronage networks are also an influential domestic phenomenon in
China (Jiang and Zhang, 2020).
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Finally, traditional Western donors often impose conditions and require specific
processes in aid-receiving countries. The WB often uses conditions regarding
governance, equality, anti-discrimination, among others. The Bank is also considered
to be a global leader in “conflict-sensitive programming” (Van der Windt and
Humphreys, 2016b; World Bank, 2011), based on the idea that conflict-management
can mitigate conflict (Gonzalez and Neary, 2008). This involves the identification
of conflict escalators using a detailed Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF) (Wam,
2006) to help WB staff to understand country-specific sources of conflicts. The WB’s
Operational Procedures instruct WB staff on how to act within a conflict-affected
country (World Bank, 2001; Bannon, 2010).
Officially, Chinese aid has fewer strings attached.7 Still, even for skeptical
observers who assume China is largely interested in securing resources and providing
employment for Chinese workers, it is implausible that China would welcome
recipient governments engaging in unprovoked, avoidable conflicts. This would
endanger existing investments and the health not only of African but also a large
number of Chinese workers in Africa (officially 227,407 by 2016). Moreover, stability
is a crucial part of the Chinese development model; in a speech at the 2008 central
party congress Hu Jintao mentioned the word stability alone 21 times (freedom did
not appear a single time).8
To sum up, while politicians, newspapers and some scholars raise concerns about
specific aspects of Chinese aid that could give rise to more conflict than the rule-
driven approach of the WB, we argue that the net impact on outright conflict is less
straightforward. There are reasons to expect WB aid could be more successful in
lowering the average risk of conflict. But based on its self-interest and emphasis on
stability, China has incentives to “unofficially” set conditions to avoid instability as
well.9
Actors and types of conflict: Two-sided conflicts between governments and
rebels could be affected differently by aid than one-sided conflicts against civilians.
Generally, neither donor should be interested in outright conflict. They can threaten
to withhold future aid payments to prevent recipients from engaging in conflicts they
deem harmful and unnecessary. Lebovic and Voeten (2009) label this the “cost of
shame.” We argue that this threat is less likely to matter for two-sided conflicts as
it is much easier for both sides to justify their actions as a necessary reaction to
the other side. One-sided conflict actions against civilians, in contrast, are harder
to justify. If governments use excessive violence against citizens, public pressure in
donor countries can stop in particular international organizations like the WB from
aid payments (Tir and Karreth, 2018). At the same time, China, as an autocratic
one-party state where decision-making is less constrained could be able to threaten
to cut aid payments more credibly. Generally, both donors have the incentives and
means to exert pressure on recipient governments to avoid unprovoked one-sided
conflicts, while their direct influence on rebel groups is limited.10
7Anthony Germain on CBC, “China in Africa: No strings attached,” last accessed 31.01.2019.
8Anthony Germain on BJ Review, last accessed 31.06.2019.
9The Guardian also postulates that “Chinese aid to Africa is going to come with all sorts of
strings attached, despite the ”no-conditionality”” rhetoric (The Guardian: “The west has no right
to criticise the China-Africa relationship” last accessed 31.01.2019.)
10Donors may also encourage rebels to fight an opposed regime as in the case of covert aid to
Angolan UNITA under president Reagan (Lagon, 1992). Our data cover almost exclusively projects
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Lower level conflict - Government policies and protests: Besides outright,
lethal conflict, we are also interested in lower-level types of conflict that are not
necessarily directly causing a significant number of casualties. The lower-level
conflict has two dimensions. Protest events like strikes, riots or demonstrations
can be understood as bottom-up actions by citizens against governments (see, e.g.,
Sangnier and Zylberberg, 2017). In contrast, government policies like repression
are top-down measures by governments to avoid conflicts and such protests. The
latter affects the costs of the former, and empirically, we are only able to observe
the equilibrium outcome of both dimensions.
WB and Chinese aid can affect the reasons as well as the costs of protest by
fostering state capacity. On the one hand side, infrastructure projects like highways,
bridges, railroads, and ports strengthen the capacity of the state by extending the
spatial reach of its monopoly. Agents of the state – e.g., police officers, judges, and
tax collectors – can use their increased capacity in different ways. If they wield
it to enforce the rule of law impartially, levy taxes, and deliver public services,
improvements in capacity and legitimacy may result in a “virtuous circle” of better
state capability (Levi, Sacks, and Tyler, 2009), conflict reduction (Berman et al.,
2011) and less reasons to protest. On the other hand, if state agents exploit their
increased capacity to enrich themselves, favor some groups over others, or weaken
political opponents (Wig and Tollefsen, 2016), this can trigger protests.11
The WB uses an independent “Inspection Panel” to investigate complaints about
human rights abuses or local conflict provoked by the WB (Zvogbo and Graham,
2018). It pursues an approach to actively build trust and social cohesion in post-
conflict and conflict-affected countries (Bannon, 2010). This approach includes, for
example, projects with a focus on community-driven development, and capacity
building with regards to accountability and public service delivery. The Kecamatan
Development program in Indonesia, for instance, attempted to reduce protests via
transparency through a particularly participatory approach (Gibson and Woolcock,
2005; Barron, Diprose, and Woolcock, 2011).12 To the best of our knowledge, China
does not have an analogous set of policies, institutions, or operational tools in place
to encourage conflict-sensitive development programming.13 Hence, all else equal,
Chinese projects could be related to more protests.
However, the equilibrium impact of both donors is more complex. Citizens
deciding whether to engage in protests also weigh the costs against the benefits
of these actions. WB policies that foster democratic participation and transparency
may be linked, all else equal, to a higher likelihood to protest. Better informed
citizens may be more willing to politically engage in more democratic states where
the political costs of opposing and the fears of its consequences are lower.
At the same time, Chinese aid could increase the costs of organizing protests, as
it decreases trade union membership (Isaksson and Kotsadam, 2018b). Moreover,
implemented in accordance with the government, so this aspect should be of lesser importance.
11For instance, insurgents may sabotage projects if they would not benefit sufficiently and
government success weakens their support in the population (Crost et al., 2014).
12This community-driven development approach inspired the National Solidarity Program - a
large scale development program, which was evaluated to increase governmental support in conflict-
ridden Afghanistan (Beath, Christia, Egorov, and Enikolopov, 2016).
13China only established its first specialized aid Agency CIDCA with a centralized evaluation
mandate in 2018. Heiner Janus on DIE, “Next Steps for China’s New Development Agency,” last
accessed 22.02.2019.
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the enhancement of state capacity also affects the ability to handle protests. China
emphasizes social stability as part of its growth model domestically, including the use
of force to constrain opposition forces or protesters. Such repression can incite anger
and unrest, but also enhance stability via a deterrence effect. An article, for instance,
describes how “Chinese officials use advances in facial recognition technology and
big data to identify potential troublemakers and reduce the risk of large-scale public
demonstrations.”14
The country is also accused of financially supporting repressive governments in
Africa and exporting such repression to recipient countries (Kishi and Raleigh, 2016).
For example, Uganda could turn to China after Western donors protested against
strict “anti-gay” laws in the country.15 Several reports describe how China exports
its approaches regarding surveillance and censorship. One describes how China
“propagate its model abroad by conducting large-scale training of foreign officials” of
36 mostly developing countries.16 Many of those like Angola, Ethiopia, The Gambia,
Kenya, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, Zambia, Zimbabwe
are in Africa. Another article describes how Uganda and Tanzania introduced
cybersecurity laws that are similar to Chinese law after attending training sessions.17
Freedom House emphasizes how Chinese support helps governments in Sub-Saharan
Africa to censor the internet and social media.18
China’s projects may thus provide more reasons to protest, but repressive
policies raise the cost of protests. WB policies may provoke fewer protests due
to the implemented safeguards, but stronger democratic standards and less fear of
expressing opinions in public make protests more likely. Hence, we expect an increase
in repressive government policies related to Chinese aid, but the equilibrium impact
of both donors regarding protests remains an empirical question.
Attitudes: The Chinese government regards stability as central for development,
and portrays itself as a “rock of stability.”19 However, it does not regard democracy,
democratic participation, or equal democratic rights as necessary to achieve stability,
or sometimes even sees them as an obstacle to that. Dagong, a Chinese rating
agency, writes that “centralized political power enabled [East-Asian countries] to
concentrate on solving the most urgent issues in the economic reform step by step,”
while “countries copying the western system encountered many political obstacles
in maintaining stability.”20 A Chinese scholar describes the common perception
that developing countries experiencing “chaotic” democratization “inevitably plunge
into a chaotic situation marked by soaring prices, shortage of essential supplies,
frequent violent conflicts and a precarious state of life and property.” This also
entails that “the ability to establish and maintain an effective internal order [...] is
14See Nikkei.com, last accessed 31.04.2019.
15Washington Post, “When China gives aid to African governments, they become more violent,”
last accessed 31.01.2019.
16See US News, last accessed 31.04.2019.
17See Nextgov.com, last accessed 31.04.2019.
18See Freedom House, accessed 31.04.2019. In addition to training, China reportedly exports
surveillance technology like cameras but also advanced artificial intelligence technology. For
instance, China signed an agreement with Zimbabwe, Angola, and Ethiopia to deploy a new facial
recognition software to monitor its population.
19The Economist, last accessed 31.01.2019.
20QZ.com, last accessed 31.01.2019.
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the most important of all national capacities” , with higher priority than “democratic
accountability in a country’s political development process.”21
China is keen on spreading its development model and emphasizing its
advantages. In exchange for financial support, Chinese development projects
sometimes require that partners broadcast Chinese radio or TV to win “African
hearts and minds.”22 For instance, a radio station set up in Kenya reserves a specified
amount of hours to promote Chinese culture and values, China supplies text books
for schools in Liberia, Ghana and Tanzania, and organizes cultural events in South
Africa. Cultural centers aim at spreading Chinese culture and values. Note that
this is not good or bad per se; Western donors and the WB are engaging in the same
efforts to spread the values and norms they want to propagate. The motivation to do
so may be mere self-interest or the honest conviction that the respective development
model is the best to raise developing countries out of poverty. Empirically, we
are interested whether WB projects are related to more positive perceptions of
democracy and governance, and if citizens in regions receiving Chinese aid are more
likely to accept autocratic, strong states and strict rules to achieve prosperity.
5-3 Data
5-3.1 Aid Data: World Bank and China
We consider all African countries with more than one million inhabitants on the
OECD’s DAC recipient list in 1995, the initial year of our sample period. We focus
on disbursements by IDA, the WB’s arm for development aid. For China, we use the
media-based data set on Chinese ODA-like commitments from Dreher et al. (2019),
geo-referenced by Strange et al. (2017).23 All financial flows are thus considered that
qualify as aid by having a significant concessionary component.24
Our unit of observation is the country-region-year, with regions as the unit of
analysis referring to the first level sub-national administrative division – ADM1:
“provinces,” “states,” or “regions” (data from Hijmans et al., 2010). This level is
the most suitable choice, as it allows us to distinguish between considerable sub-
national variation, while still capturing over 90% of the overall spending by China
and the WB (see Figure 5-1).25 Moreover, this administrative level is also highly
relevant for aid allocation. Many projects are assigned to specific regions, and the
regional governments can influence how, or where, to spend the funds.
Our approach to assigning aid projects to regions is the following. Precisely geo-
referenced projects, as well as projects where we possess information about the first
21CGTN, last accessed 31.01.2019.
22See LA Times, last accessed 30.07.2019.
23The data was compiled using the TUFF methodology, which covers a broad set of quality
and triangulation steps. Due to the reliance on media, politically controversial projects may be
under-reported in regimes with low press freedom (Kilby, 2017). This may induce a downward bias
when using conflict as the outcome and those projects would be more likely to lead to conflict.
24Other official finance (OOF) flows in China’s finance portfolio has less of a development
focus. The WB’s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) also provides
development finance in the form of loans with interest rates closer to market rates.
25Lower level administrative regions (ADM2) would only capture between 60 and 80%. Using
smaller grid cells would require solely relying on projects with exact data on latitude and longitude,
which is only about 50% for the WB and less than 50% for China.
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Figure 5-1 – Disbursement/Commitment Amounts by Precision Codes
and second-order subnational level, are assigned to the respective ADM1 region. To
cope with the fact that most projects have several project locations, we assume that
aid is distributed equally across locations, following Dreher and Lohmann (2015).
This means that for a project implemented in 10 locations, with four locations in
region A and six in region B, 40% of the project volume would be assigned to A
and 60% to B. This procedure ignores projects with lower precision, mostly direct
support for governments, but their average effect would be captured by country-year
fixed effects. The data appendix provides more details.26
Table 5-1 compares aid projects by the two donors that we can assign to the
ADM1 level. WB disbursements sum up to USD 29.4 billion, distributed over 1,472
projects in 25,041 locations in Africa. Since graduating from IDA eligibility in 1999
(Galiani et al., 2017), China’s overseas portfolio of grants, loans, and export credits
has also rapidly expanded as part of its ’Going Out’ strategy. In Africa, Chinese
aid amounts to USD 13.2 bn, from 333 projects in 1,308 locations. Hence, the WB
finances a larger number of projects than China, and each project tends to have
more project locations. China finances fewer projects, but spends almost twice as
much per project, and nearly ten times as much per project location. Even though
aid characteristics differ by donor, both have a comparable propensity in disbursing
and committing aid to regions with ongoing conflict events. It is also not the case
that Chinese aid is committed largely to autocratic states (based on Polity IV).
Finally, the set of recipient countries is similar, since about 76% of the recipient
countries receive aid from both donors
2623% of Chinese projects focus on one location, while 95% of WB projects have more than one





where p is the project, i is the country, j is the region, and t is the period for which we estimate
the allocation shares. For robustness, Tables A 5-B45 and 5-B46 display the main results using
population weights. For instance, if a project has project locations in two regions of a country,
two million inhabitants reside in region A, and three million reside in region B, 40% of project
funds are allocated to region A and 60% to region B. Here, the aid attribution formula is Aidpijt =
Aidpit∫
P opulationpi
∗ Populationpj . Population data are from the gridded population data provided by
the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) Columbia University
(2016). As a robustness test, we show results using the ADM2 regions and assign project locations
with less precise location information than ADM1 to the capital region.
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Table 5-1 – Donor Comparison: WB vs. China
WB Aid Chinese Aid
Total Disbursements/Commitments (USD): 29.4bn 13.2bn
Active in No. of Countries: 35 41
Number of Projects: 1,472 333
Number of Locations: 25,041 1,308
Mean Number of Locations per Project 17 4
Mean per Project (USD): 19.97m 39.63m
Mean per Location (USD): 1.17m 10.09m
Average number of locations per project: 41 9
Conflict occurrence in recipient region: 9.87% 9.09%
Share of aid to democracies: 19.8% 38.2%
Share of countries that receive aid from both donors: 76%
Notes: Aid is measured in constant 2011 USD.
5-3.2 Stability Measures
To measure outright conflict, we follow the literature and create a binary conflict
incidence measure based on the number of battle-related deaths (BRD). The
data is taken from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) geo-referenced
Event Dataset (GED) (Croicu and Sundberg, 2015). GED provides a reliable and
comprehensive source of geo-referenced conflict events based on media and NGO
reports, as well as secondary sources like field reports and books. The database also
includes information about the type of conflict and the groups that were involved.27
Table 5-2 shows descriptive statistics for all stability measures, with the incidence
measures scaled as either 0 or 100. Figure 5-2b shows a map with all conflict events
in our sample period, distinguishing between conflict with less than 5 BRD, with
between 5 and 25 BRD, and more than 25 BRD. Studies at the country level usually
use thresholds of 25 or 1000 to define a conflict. As our research is at the smaller first-
order sub-national level, we choose 5 BRD per country-region-year as the threshold
in our main specification. For robustness tests, we also use 25 BRD, as well as
the log of BRD as a continuous conflict intensity indicator. We also use GED to
code whether an outright conflict was a two-sided fight between government-related
groups and non-state actors (rebels), or a one-sided action by either of those sides
against civilians.
To examine protests and repression, we make use of the Social Conflict Analysis
Database – SCAD (Salehyan et al., 2012). It provides reliable and detailed geo-
referenced information for Africa. We also define a binary protests incidence
indicator. It takes the value one if there was at least one event in either of the
categories demonstrations, strikes or riots, as well as an indicator for government
repression. 28 Government repression includes, for instance, increased surveillance
27Alternatives are the ACLED and PRIO datasets, which rely on similar primary data as UCDP.
One issue with PRIO Gridded data is that neighboring cells in a 50km radius are also coded as
conflict-affected, which may lead to erroneous conflict coding of neighboring administrative and
ethnic regions (Tollefsen et al., 2012). ACLED is broader in coverage than UCDP data, but is
criticized for its partly ambiguous inclusion criteria and vague geo-coding (Eck, 2012).
28SCAD defines government repression as a “Distinct violent event waged primarily by
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activities like in Niger, where “after conducting one month of surveillance, the
government arrested 9 military officers said to be planning a coup.” Figure A5-A4
illustrates the spatial distribution of protests and repression across Africa. Finally,
we use selected questions from Afrobarometer Data (2018) to measure perceptions of
security, democratic norms and attitudes, as well as government responsiveness and
repression. The first round started in 12 African countries between 1999 and 2001,
while round 6 covers 36 countries between 2014 and 2015. Table A5-A7 provides
details.
5-3.3 Control Variables
Even though we will not decisively rely on control variables due to the bad control
problem, we provide specifications using the most important aspects highlighted in
the previous literature. Initial regional development is proxied using nighttime light
(Henderson et al., 2012). Regional population matters for aid allocation. Population
calculation is based on the Gridded Population of the World dataset (Center for
International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) Columbia University,
2016). From the PRIO Gridded data (Tollefsen et al., 2012), we use several natural
resource indicators including oil, gold, gemstones, and narcotics, as well as measures
on temperature and precipitation, that can be linked to conflict (Miguel et al., 2004).
To match the gridded data to the respective region-year, we intersect the PRIO-
Grid with the AMD1 shapefile and calculate area-weighted averages for each region.
Robustness tests use data from Cederman et al. (2014) and Wucherpfennig et al.
(2011) about the distribution of ethnic groups. Table A5-A4 in the data appendix
provides a more detailed overview of all variables used at any part of the chapter.
Table 5-2 provides summary statistics. The final sample comprises 728 ADM1
regions in 45 countries. WB aid is, on average, higher per region-year than Chinese
aid: USD 2.2 million versus USD 1.4 million, respectively. Figure 5-2a illustrates
that both donors are active in a large number of countries and regions. Figure 5-2b
reveals sufficient cross-sectional variation in conflict events across as well as within
countries to estimate a demanding FE model.
While the information for aid disbursements by the WB’s IDA is available from
1995 to 2012, information on Chinese aid commitments in Africa is constrained to
the years 2000 to 2012. Both the WB and China are active in most African countries
– the WB in 35 countries, and China in 41 countries. There is a significant overlap
in their presence between countries, but prior research found no evidence of one
donor systematically affecting the allocation choices of the other (Humphrey and
Michaelowa, 2018). Hence, we can run our regressions separately for each donor to
exploit the full sample period for which we have WB data, without fearing a strong
systematic bias in results.
government authorities, or by groups acting in explicit support of government authority, targeting
individual, or ”collective individual,” members of an alleged opposition group or movement.”
(Salehyan et al., 2012). The coded events include, for instance, “Police arrested a prominent
opposition lawyer,” “Police arrested four members of comedy group who make videos making fun
of the government” or “Militant youths allied with Malawi’s ruling party to attack a newspaper
photographer” (Salehyan et al., 2012). Repression is distinguished from government conflict against
civilians by being associated with less than 5 BRD.
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Table 5-2 – Descriptive statistics - ADM1 Region
Mean SD Min Max
World Bank Aid 2,240,340 8,991,909 0 488,643,178
ln(WB Aid) 6 9 -5 20
Chinese Aid 1,391,272 22,843,120 0 900,000,000
ln(Chinese Aid) -4 4 -5 21
Riots, Strikes, Demonstrations in Perc. 14 34 0 100
Repression Incidence in Perc. 1 11 0 100
Conflict Incidence in Perc. 12 32 0 100
Notes: Descriptive statistics for our main variables. ln(Aid) is based on aid +0.01USD.
(a) (b)
Figure 5-2a Chinese (2000-2012) and WB (1995-2012) development aid. Authors’ depiction based
on AidData (2017) and Dreher et al. (2019).
Figure 5-2b Conflict 1996-2014. Authors’ depiction based on Croicu and Sundberg (2015).
Category 1 (binary) = B+C, Category 2 (binary) = C, Category 3 (continuous) = {A, B, C}




Of course, the aid projects shown on the map above are not randomly allocated.
Donors may be more or less likely to select a region based on its conflict potential,
which causes concerns about endogenous selection. Over the long term, reverse
causality may also cause problems if regions formerly plagued by conflict receive
more aid afterward. Considering Figures 5-2a and 5-2b helps to understand our two
different approaches to identification. The first approach utilizes the sub-national
data and condition step-by-step on more and more observables and unobservables
through various fixed effects, time trends, and controls.
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First, precise coding helps to precisely link aid and stability. Angola, for
instance, receives more aid projects in regions that also experience more conflict. In
contrast, the regions in Sudan that often receive aid are not the ones that experience
conflict. Country-level studies, in contrast, would code both countries as cases
where a country received aid and also experienced conflict. Second, the correlation
between aid and conflict is affected by unobserved region-specific factors that can
make both receiving aid projects and conflict more likely. Region-fixed effects can
eliminate time-invariant differences that affect this joint likelihood of receiving aid
and experiencing conflict.
Third, country times year (from now on country-year) fixed effects eliminate
the effect of any spurious event at the country-year level that could affect conflict
and, by chance, coincides with changes in aid allocation, like a political regime
change. Very restrictive specifications may eliminate too much variation and falsely
conclude that there is no conflict-fueling effect of aid. For that reason, we eliminate
potentially biasing variation step-by-step for transparency. In the following,we assess
the direction of possibly remaining bias and propose an IV strategy for each donor.
5-5.1 Fixed effects, time trends and control variables
Our two baseline empirical specifications are
Ci,c,t = β1Ai,c,t−1/t−2 + δi + τt + ∆iT +X ′Exi,c,tβ2 + εi,c,t, (5-1)
Ci,c,t = β1Ai,c,t−1/t−2 + δi + τt + ∆iT +X ′Exi,c,tβ2 + κc,t + εi,c,t, (5-2)
where Ci,c,t is our conflict indicator of interest in region i, in country c and year
t. Ai,c,t−1/t−2 is log of per capita aid. Note, that we distinguish between World Bank
aid disbursements and Chinese aid commitments. We lag WB aid disbursements by
one year. For Chinese aid commitments, we use a lag of two years. On average,
Chinese aid is disbursed one year after financial commitments (following Dreher
et al., 2019, 2017). Thus, the assumed time lag from disbursements to conflict in
the next year is the same for both donors.29
Our specifications includes region, and time fixed effects, δi and τt. Furthermore,
we add regional linear time trends ∆iT to control for any differing linear conflict
trends across regions. Including country-year fixed effects κc,t asks a subtly different
question: conditional on whether the whole country is involved in a conflict or not
in a particular year, how did previous aid receipts affect the conditional likelihood
of a particular region to also be in conflict? For that reason, the following sections
always consider one specification without (eq. 1) and one with country-year fixed
effects (eq. 2).
We distinguish between three types of control variables. First, exogenous controls
such as climatic shocks. Second, we account for the effect of time-invariant controls
like elevation or ruggedness of terrain by interacting them with year dummies. These
first two sets are contained in XExi,c,t, as they are not at risk of being bad controls.
Third, we twice lag potentially “bad controls” like nighttime light (as a proxy for
economic activity), or population, XEndi,c,t−2, which can be affected directly by aid
29AidData cannot distinguish exactly how much money from the Chinese commitments is
disbursed in a particular year for all projects, but where the information exists one year fits the
data best (see also Dreher et al., 2017). An examination of further lags in Table A5-B2 suggests
that this timing is not driving the subsequently reported results.
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projects. Using “pre-determined” values solves the bad control issue only if we
assume sequential exogeneity. For that reason, those variables are tested but not
part of our preferred specifications. The error term is denoted as εir,t.
Standard errors are two-way clustered at both the country-year and the regional
level (Cameron et al., 2011). This allows for arbitrary correlation within a country
and year, which is important as conflicts often have a strong spatial component and
tend to spill over. Also allowing for correlation within a region over time is important
as conflict also tends to exhibit strong persistence over time. Tables A5-B41 and
A5-B42 show that the results are similar for other clustering options.
5-5.2 Instrumental Variable approach
Our IV strategies exploit the heterogeneous impact of a plausibly exogenous time-
series, which affects the amount of aid allocated, depending on a pre-determined
cross-sectional difference in the probability to receive aid. The probability is
computed by dividing the number of years a region i has received aid by the
number of years passed until year t − 1.3031As in any Difference-in-Difference
(DiD) setup, both regression stages control for the main constituting terms forming
the interaction; only the interaction term is used as the conditionally exogenous
instrument in the first stage. The identifying assumption is that, in the absence of
a change in the time series, there would be common trends in aid allocation in low
and high aid probability recipient regions. The IV for WB aid and Chinese aid use
the same idea but differ in the donor-specific probability and in the time-varying
factor Tt that induces variation over time.
Application to WB aid
Based on discussions with WB staff, as well as, recipient country personnel, the
mechanism we exploit and document for identification is the following. We exploit
the heterogeneous effect of yearly variation in the availability of additional “free”
IDA resources on regions with an initially lower or higher likelihood of receiving
aid.32 If there are more funds available, the Bank may exhaust the funds and allocate
them to recipient countries. Countries and regions already involved in projects may
receive a larger share of the additional funds, partly due to lower costs of information
screening and other preparation costs.33
30If beginning in 1995, and a region received aid in three out of five years, the aid probability
in 1999 would be 0.6. If aid receipts stop in 1999, the probability declines to 0.5 in 2000 as the
region received aid in three out of six years. Nizalova and Murtazashvili (2016) show that if the
heterogeneity of interest (here the probability to receive aid) is independent from the treatment
(here the donor’s global aid budget) the interaction of exogenous and endogenous variables can be
interpreted as exogenous when controlling for the endogenous factor (in this case the probability to
receive aid). Using initial or pre-determined values allows us to relax these assumptions, compared
to using a constant probability as in Nunn and Qian (2014) or (Bluhm et al., 2020).
31Nunn and Qian exploit temporal variation in US wheat production, interacted with a constant
probability to receive US food aid.
32The idea is based on Lang (2016) and Gehring and Lang (2018), who employ such a supply-
push identification approach using variation in the IMF’s liquidity.
33Galiani et al. (2017) use Gross National Income (GNI) as a threshold for IDA eligibility. We
prefer the liquidity over graduation for three reasons. First, the continuous liquidity treatment
covers a less specific LATE. Few countries only graduate and experience reductions in WB aid
afterward. Second, Kerner et al. (2017) suggest that countries have leeway to postpone graduation
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Variation in the funding position, defined as “the extent to which IDA can
commit to new financing of loans, grants, and guarantees given its financial position”
(World Bank, 2015), can be caused by internal adjustments, shareholders’ timing of
payments, and repayments by large borrowers like India. It should be exogenous to
stability in any individual sub-national African region, in particular, conditional on
country or even country-year fixed effects.34
The IDA funding position is obtained by Dreher et al. (2017) from 1995 to
2007 and the World Bank’s annual financial reports from 2008 onwards.35 This
is interacted with the region’s pre-determined probability to receive aid, pi,c,t−2,
to capture that higher probability regions should profit more from higher funding
positions. For simplicity, we do not display fixed effects, time trends, and control
variables here, so that the equation becomes
Aidi,c,t−1 = α1pi,c,t−2 + α2IDAt−1 + α3pi,c,t−2IDAt−1 + εi,c,t−1 (5-3)
(a) Problematic trends (fabricated) in
outcomes
(b) Actual trends in outcomes
Figure 5-2 – WB- IDA funding position and conflict outcomes for low and high
probability regions.
Note: Figure (a) displays the temporal variation we use in our interacted instrument, the IDA
Funding Position (solid line), along with fabricated trends in the conflict outcomes for low (long-
dashed line) and high probability (short-dashed line) recipient regions. The trends are fabricated
to illustrate potentially problematic trend differences that could induce a spurious correlation.
Figure (b) displays the IDA Funding Position (solid line), along with the actual trends in the
conflict outcomes for low (long-dashed line) and high probability (short-dashed line) recipient
regions. The displayed outcomes in (b) is the probability of experiencing regional conflict of more
or equal to five battle-related deaths per year.
by reporting lower GNI estimates. In our sample, we find that the threshold does not always imply
a strict reduction in IDA allocations.
34One worry is a correlation with the global level of conflict At the same time, a stronger
correlation with conflict in high than in low probability regions. Controlling for global conflict
levels interacted with the probability in Tables A5-B13 and A5-B14 does not affect the first or
second stage results.
35Because the WB’s fiscal year ends in June, the reported position in the fiscal years t and t-1
can both affect disbursements in t-1. Using only the position in t-1 is a viable alternative and also
works well in first stage estimations, which is demonstrated in Table A5-B7. Using both fiscal years
t and t-1 to compute the funding position appears more coherent and is applied subsequently.
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One potential problem associated with approaches like this is that, even if the
temporal variation is plausibly exogenous, trends in the time series may overlap
with differing trends in the outcome variable, leading to a spurious IV effect. This
risk is exacerbated if the time series is relatively short and dominated by long-
term trends (Christian and Barrett, 2017). The left-hand side of Figure 5-2 shows
how systematic differences in the long term conflict trends between low and high
probability regions could bias estimates. The right-hand side figure then shows that
the relevant variation in outright conflict exhibits no such trends. Despite a general
decline in the funding position, there is sufficient year-on-year variation.
Application to China
Regarding China, we make use of the fact that the economic structure and political
incentives frequently lead to excess domestic commodity production. To clear
markets and protect domestic companies from potential losses, China commits to
more aid projects abroad (Dreher et al., 2017; Bluhm et al., 2020). This pattern is
not entirely unknown from European agricultural overproduction. These additional
projects are often large-scale infrastructure projects that directly use overproduced
commodities as inputs (Bräutigam, 2011), but Bluhm et al. (2020) show that
commodity (over-)production also induces variation in other sectors like education
or health. It thus captures a local average treatment effect, but seems to trigger
variation in the sectors that are overall representative of Chinese aid.
Chinese “mega-deals” (Strange et al., 2017) cannot easily be duplicated or
scaled within regions, and the country tries to strongly expand its influence during
our sample period. Thus, additional projects are more often implemented in low
probability regions that had initially no or very few projects.
We follow Bluhm et al. (2020) and use principal component analysis to construct
a time series on Chinese domestic commodity over-production, Ti,c,t. The time-
varying variable is interacted with the region’s pre-determined probability to receive
aid, pi,c,t−3. This captures that lower probability regions should profit more from
Chinese commodity overproduction. The first stage equation is
Aidi,c,t−2 = α1pi,c,t−3 +α2Commodityt−3 +α3pi,c,t−3Commodityt−3 +XExi,c,tα4 +εi,c,t−2
(5-4)
The left-hand side of Figure 5-3 illustrates differing long-term conflict trends
in low and high probability regions, which would lead to biased estimates. The
commodity time series variable is inverse U-shaped. The IV results may be spurious
if conflict trends in either low or high probability regions would, for other reasons,
also follow such a pattern. The right-hand side graph, however, assures us that this
is not the case.
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(a) Problematic trends (fabricated) in
outcomes
(b) Actual trends in outcomes
Figure 5-3 – China: Chinese commodities production and conflict outcomes for low
and high probability regions.
Notes: Figure (a) displays the temporal variation we use in our interacted instrument, the Chinese
Commodities Production (solid line), along with fabricated trends in the conflict outcomes for low
(long-dashed line) and high probability (short-dashed line) recipient regions. The fabricated trends
illustrate potentially problematic trend differences that could induce a spurious correlation. Figure
(b) displays the Chinese commodity (over-)production (solid line), along with the actual trends in
the conflict outcomes for low (long-dashed line) and high probability (short-dashed line) recipient
regions. The displayed outcomes in (b) is the probability of experiencing regional conflict of more
or equal to five battle-related deaths per year.
5-6 Results
5-6.1 Outright conflict – OLS, fixed effects and time trends
To allow readers to evaluate a potential trade-off between eliminating bias and over-
controlling, we begin by showing simple correlations. We then add fixed effects,
time trends, and different categories of control variables step-by-step. Beginning
with WB aid in Table 5-3, we find that the raw correlation with conflict incidence is
negative. Adding country and year fixed effects shifts the coefficient upward (column
2); adding country-specific linear and quadratic trends to capture country-specific
conflict dynamics moves the coefficient slightly downward to -0.05 (column 3). When
adding region fixed effects, which capture region-specific, time-invariant attributes,
that can explain heterogeneity within countries, the point estimate nearly quadruples
in size to -0.21 and becomes statistically significant at the 1%-level (column 4).
Adding exogenous controls, and time-invariant region characteristics, interacted
with year dummies to capture their potentially time-varying influence (column 5), as
well as adding region-specific linear time trends, changes the coefficient only slightly
(column 6). Column 8 goes one step further by controlling for country-year fixed
effects. The remaining variation then is only due to differences in aid across regions
within country-years, conditional on whether the country as a whole experience
a conflict. Despite the restrictive specification, the robust negative relationship
between WB aid and conflict does not disappear and remains significant at the 5%-
level. The coefficient of -0.1772 suggests that a one standard deviation change in log
WB aid is associated with a decrease in the conflict likelihood of 9×0.1772 ≈ 1.59
percentage points. To put this into perspective, the average of conflict incidence
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with our threshold of five battle-related deaths (BRD) is 12 percent; accordingly,
this is small, however, it is a non-trivial change. The coefficient becomes insignificant
when controlling for lagged values of factors that are potentially endogenous controls
(columns 7 and 9), but remains negative. Although these are only conditional
correlations, the fact that 8 out of 9 coefficients are negative suggests that there is
no conflict-fueling effect of WB aid, on average.
Turning to China, our theoretical prior was that certain arguments suggest a
positive relationship with conflict to be more likely when involved with Chinese aid.
Nonetheless, the raw correlation with conflict is also negative. The coefficient drops
drastically in size when adding country and time fixed effects, as well as country-
specific time trends (columns 2 and 3), but loses significance. Overall, the coefficients
are much smaller and closer to zero than those for the WB. Remarkably, however,
there is not a single positive coefficient, also suggesting no signs of a conflict-inducing
effect of Chinese aid. Our preferred specifications in columns 6 and 8 indicate that
increasing log Chinese aid by one standard deviation is associated with a decrease
in the conflict likelihood by 4×0.0654 ≈ 0.26 percentage points.
Table 5-3 reveals the degrees of freedom researchers possess in selecting their
preferred specification in such a setting. We find it reassuring that throughout these
different specifications, there is no sign of a conflict-inducing effect for either WB
or Chinese projects. Relating to the ideas about assessing coefficient changes when
moving towards more restrictive specifications in Altonji et al. (2005), we see that
the effect of adding additional FE, trends, and covariates neither suggests a strong
systematic upward, nor a downward bias.
The confidence interval comprises negative, zero, and some positive effects. Still,
considering the rich set of specifications we examined, it seems highly unlikely that
other unobserved factors would push the average effect towards an economically
meaningful and statistically significant conflict-fueling effect. Even if there were
substantial changes in Chinese aid, they would not fuel conflict by much compared
to the average likelihood of conflict of 12 percent. The following uses our preferred
specifications in columns 6 and 8.
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Table 5-3 – OLS results - Aid and conflict likelihood
Panel A: WB Aid (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.1918∗ 0.0010 -0.0496 -0.2129∗∗∗ -0.2057∗∗∗ -0.1608∗∗ -0.1314 -0.1772∗∗ -0.1756∗∗
(0.0989) (0.0776) (0.0683) (0.0659) (0.0651) (0.0717) (0.0831) (0.0816) (0.0894)
N 13104 13104 13104 13104 13050 13050 11699 13050 11699
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -0.1753∗∗ -0.0233 -0.0026 -0.1090∗ -0.0663 -0.0654 -0.0682 -0.0347 -0.0441
(0.0865) (0.0705) (0.0642) (0.0572) (0.0644) (0.0726) (0.0725) (0.0883) (0.0917)
N 9464 9464 9464 9464 8700 8700 8254 8700 8254
Country FE No Yes Yes – – – – – –
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes – –
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country ×Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD¡5). The sample includes first order subnational regions in
African countries for the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and
regional level. Conflicts are considered for the WB from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to the lag structure. Time Trends include
linear and squared country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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5-6.2 Outright conflict – Instrumental Variables
Table 5-4 shows the IV results with and without country-year fixed effects. Overall,
the first stage works better for the WB (F= 99/86) than for China (F=36/31); all
F-statistics, however, are well above the critical value of 10. The interaction term
between the prior probability to receive aid with the IDA position, respectively
Chinese commodity production, is highly significant in the first stage, and the signs
of the coefficients align with our priors. Regions with a higher pre-determined
probability profit more from a higher WB liquidity, regions with an initially lower
probability profit more from an expansion of the Chinese aid budget. Table A5-B3
and A5-B4 indicate that the WB first stage effect works both through the extensive
and intensive margin. High probability regions have a higher likelihood to profit
by receiving aid in a particular year, and conditional on receiving aid in a given
year, the size of the disbursements also becomes larger. For China, Table A5-B3
reveals that as expected the first stage relationship is mainly driven by the extensive
margin, e.g., the likelihood of having at least one active project in a specific region-
year. Regions without pre-existing projects are more likely to receive a project as
the Chinese development budget expands.
The second stage results largely confirm the OLS results. Both specifications
yield negative coefficients for the WB and China. The coefficients for the WB are
somehow smaller (larger) in the specification without (with) country-year FE, and
become statistically insignificant. The coefficients for China become much more
negative, however, they remain insignificant. There is again no evidence for a
conflict-fueling effect of aid projects for either of the two donors. While being
insignificant, the coefficient would imply that increasing log WB aid by one standard
deviation decreases the conflict likelihood by about 9×0.2252 ≈ 2.03 percentage
points. Similarly, raising log Chinese aid by one standard deviation would decrease
conflict by 4×0.1886 ≈ 0.75 percentage points.
By definition, IV estimates are identified using a particular kind of variation in
the variable of interest that is caused by the excluded instrument (local average
treatment effect (LATE)). Comparing the IV point estimates with OLS shows no
difference with regard to the direction of the effects, but minor variations in size.
To check whether the direction of the changes is plausible, Table A5-B2 shows OLS
specifications with three lags, the contemporaneous value, and a lead term of the
treatment variable. For the WB, there are no clear indications of a pre-trend that
would signal selection bias, in line with the IV estimate being very close to the
OLS estimate. For China, the lead term is positive, indicating that it is more likely
to select into regions that will experience conflict in the future.36 This potential
selection effect would suggests an upward bias in China OLS coefficients. The fact
that the IV coefficients for China are more negative suggests that the IV helps to
address this concern.
36Any concerns that the effect for China would be biased as it generally tends to go into countries
which are transitioning towards autocracy are addressed in the specifications with country-year
fixed effects.
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Table 5-4 – IV results - Aid and conflict likelihood at the ADM1 level
Panel A: World Bank Aid (1) (2)
IV Second Stage: World Bank
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.1014 -0.2252
(0.3752) (0.4192)
N 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.639 86.724
IV First stage: World Bank
IDAPosition t-1×Cum. Prob t-2 70.9363∗∗∗ 80.8832∗∗∗
(7.1065) (8.6854)
N 12325 12325
Panel B: Chinese Aid (1) (2)
IV Second Stage: China
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -0.2582 -0.1886
(0.4282) (0.5256)
N 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 36.578 31.190
IV First stage: China
ChineseCommodity t-3×Cum. Prob t-3 -14.0193∗∗∗ -12.6964∗∗∗
(2.3180) (2.2734)
N 7975 7975
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0
if BRD¡5). The sample includes first order subnational regions in African countries for
the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses,
two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. Specification is identical to
identical to Table 3, column 8. Probability is included but the coeffcient not displayed
to save space (full results in Table A 5-B5. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
5-6.3 Results - Types of Conflict and Actors
Table 5-5 shows the results using these distinctions with and without country-year
FE. The coefficients for two-sided conflict action by government or rebels against
each other (column 1 and 2), or between different rebel groups (column 3 and 4)
are partly of an economically significant size, but are all far from being statistically
significant for both donors. In accordance with our theoretical priors, we find that in
a region that receives more WB or Chinese aid, there are, however, significantly less
conflicts with at least five battle-related deaths (BRD) by the government against
civilians (column 5 and 6). A one standard deviation change in log WB aid decreases
the likelihood of violence against civilians with at least 5 BRD by 9×0.2939 ≈ 2.61
percentage points. This is plausible as the WB is known to punish human rights
violations by governments. For instance, suspending aid payments in Indonesia to
push the government towards finding peaceful bargaining solutions in Timor (Tir
and Karreth, 2018).
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Although Tir and Karreth (2018) focus their arguments on international
organizations like the WB, which impose strong conditionality. The fact that we
also find the same significant effect, even larger in size, for China, validates our
prior that China also informally has the incentives and ability to stop recipient
governments from engaging in conflicts that may be deemed undesirable from the
donors perspective. Changing log Chinese aid by one standard deviation decreases
the likelihood of this type of conflict substantially by 4×0.5673 ≈ 2.27 percentage
points. The value China attributes to social stability, business interests and the
widespread presence of Chinese workers may be reasons to convince recipient
governments to abstain from engaging in actions that cause civilian casualties and
endanger stability. Tir and Karreth (2018) argue that the prospect of gaining access
to aid could also constrain rebels. But we find no equivalent significant reduction
in rebel violence against civilians (column 7 and 8).
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Table 5-5 – Aid and conflict types by actors
Panel A: World Bank Aid - IV (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State vs. N-State N-State vs. N-State State vs. Civilians N-State vs. Civilians
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.4177 -0.4319 0.1252 0.1488 -0.3579∗ -0.2939∗ -0.0961 -0.1417
(0.3174) (0.2630) (0.2096) (0.2447) (0.1885) (0.1739) (0.2072) (0.2704)
N 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-
value
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-
statistic
99.639 86.724 99.639 86.724 99.639 86.724 99.639 86.724
Panel B: Chinese Aid - IV
State vs. N-State N-State vs. N-State State vs. Civilians N-State vs. Civilians
ln(ChineseAid t-2) 0.2749 0.2200 0.2462 0.4178 -0.5336∗∗ -0.5673∗∗ -0.3273 -0.3553
(0.2104) (0.2280) (0.1924) (0.2637) (0.2300) (0.2877) (0.2520) (0.3066)
N 7975 7975 7975 7975 7975 7975 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-
value
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-
statistic
36.578 31.190 36.578 31.190 36.578 31.190 36.578 31.190
Country-Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD¡5). The sample includes first order subnational regions in
African countries for the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Specification is identical to identical to Table 3, column 8. ”State vs. N-State”
refers to state-based violence against non-government actors, ”N-State vs. N-State” refers to non-government violence against the other organized non-state
groups, and ”State vs. Civilians” refers to one-sided violence versus civilians by the government and ”N-State vs. Civilians” refers to one-sided violence versus
civilians by non-state actors. The categories are mutually exclusive. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Table A5-B25 depicts corresponding OLS results.
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5-6.4 Results - Protest and government repression
Panel A of table 5-6 shows the results for our two main specifications, but now,
replacing the outcome variable with an indicator, measuring whether at least one
demonstration, riot, or strike took place.37 For the WB, both specifications yield
a negative coefficient but remain statistically insignificant. Regarding China, we
observe negative coefficients, which are of modest size (100% more aid increase the
likelihood of riots by 0.07%) and remain statistically insignificant. Accordingly,
despite reports indicating increasing protests against the presence of Chinese
business (Wegenast et al., 2017), we find no clear relationship between Chinese
aid and citizen protests over our sample period.38
Recipient governments may achieve this absence of protests and outright conflict
by intensifying non-lethal repression. Panel B of table 5-6 tests whether aid is related
to more reports of non-lethal government repression. In the underlying SCAD
data events range from the repression of opposition lawyers to constraining anti-
government artists in Egypt and media restrictions in Malawi (Salehyan et al., 2012).
39 The results indicate neither a positive nor significantly negative relationship for
the WB. The results for China contrast our previous findings and establish that
repression intensifies in regions where China is present. A 100% increase in Chinese
aid increases the likelihood of experiencing repression by about 0.77%, which is
significant, considering an average of 2.26%.
37Table A5-B27 depicts corresponding OLS results. Tables A5-B19, A5-B20 and A5-B21
show OLS regressions separately for demonstrations, riots and strikes; Table A5-B22 separate
IV estimates. None of them turns out significant once region FE are included.
38See, for instance, The Telegraph, last accessed 02.02.2019.
39Table A5-B24 reports results for a count variable of non-lethal pro-government violence events,
which are robust to this change in the outcome variable. Table A5-B23 verifies that this is driven
by events recorded in SCAD that are distinct from the UCDP events, by coding only those region-
years as a one that did not experience lethal government violence against civilians according to
UCDP.
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Table 5-6 – Protests and non-lethal government repression [SCAD]
Panel A: Riots, demonstrations or strikes (1) (2)
IV Second Stage: World Bank
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.3854 -0.2032
(0.3092) (0.3362)
N 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.639 86.724
IV Second Stage: China
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -0.1599 -0.0742
(0.3964) (0.4452)
N 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 36.578 31.190
Panel B: Non-lethal Government Repression
IV Second Stage: World Bank
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) 0.1543 0.0885
(0.1042) (0.1177)
N 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.639 86.724
IV Second Stage: China
ln(ChineseAid t-2) 0.6103∗∗ 0.7696∗∗
(0.2873) (0.3439)
N 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 36.578 31.190
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The dependent variables are binary protest and government repression
incidence indicators, taking on the value 1 if there was at least one event in the
respective category. The sample includes first order subnational regions in African
countries for the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China).Specification is
identical to identical to Table 3, column 8. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way
clustered at the country-year and regional level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
5-6.5 Results - Attitudes
Examining the associated mechanisms for all effects is beyond the scope of this
chapter. Still, we can present some correlational evidence using geo-referenced
Afrobarometer data to investigate the plausibility of some of our results. To do
so, we match data, from all Afrobarometer waves to the regions and years in our
sample, and compute the region-year level average of each question we use. Details
are provided in Appendix Table A5-A6. Note that the survey covers varying subsets
of all African countries in selective years so that the resulting dataset comprises an
unbalanced panel with gaps. The temporal variation is not sufficient for a strong
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first stage using the IV. We can only use less restrictive sets of fixed effects than
in our main specifications. Figure 5-4, thus, plots the coefficients from individual
OLS regressions of selected relevant questions on WB and Chinese aid: model 1 uses
country and time FE, model 2 region and time FE.
Figure 5-4 – OLS regressions on mechanisms using Afrobarometer for WB and China
Security facilities: Police station present within walking distance? 
Security forces: Any policemen or police vehicles?
Security forces: Any soldiers or army vehicles?
Frequency of things stolen in the past year?
Frequency of physically attacks in the past year?
 Democracy: How democratic is your country today
Democracy: Did you perceive last elections as free and fair?
Governance: Reject one-party rule
Governance: Reject military rule
Governance: Reject one-man rule
Reject government banning organizations that go against its policies
Frequency of contact to government official to express your view
Fear of political intimidation or violence during campaigns
How often do people have to be careful about what they say in politics?
Rule of Law: People must obey the law
Frequency of joining others to request government action
Panel A: Security
Panel B: Democratic norms and attitudes
 Panel C: Government responsiveness and repression 
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
State and year fixed effects





-.1 -.05 0 .05 .1
State and year fixed effects
State, year and region fixed effects
China
Notes: The figure shows coefficient plots along with 90% confidence intervals of individual OLS
regressions of log WB and log Chinese aid on the respective questions from Afrobarometer. All
outcome question responses were standardized with mean zero. Respondents were matched to
the ADM1 regions using the provided geocoordinates. Table A5-B37 provides the full regression
results. Afrobarometer surveys were conducted in the years 1999-2015 for a varying number of 12
to 36 countries, resulting in an unbalanced panel with uneven gaps between years.
The results are grouped into three categories. Panel A refers to questions
signaling the presence of state security forces as a measure for state capacity within
the area, and the ability to maintain a monopoly of violence. Moreover, we use two
questions asking whether respondents or their families were the victims of robbery
or physical attacks in the past year. The results suggest that the WB engagement
is associated with an increase in security forces and a reduction in crimes. There
is no such increase for China. However, one needs to keep in mind that these are
conditional correlations, and China may select into regions more likely to experience
conflict and a deterioration in state capacity.
Panel B examines democratic norms and attitudes. The results are not
necessarily causal, but differences stand out that reflect the differential approaches
of both donors. There are indications that the perception of democracy, and the
fairness of elections, deteriorate in regions with Chinese aid projects. The WB
seems to have a consistently positive impact on democratic norms and a neutral
to a positive effect on stability. Respondents are more likely to reject one-party
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rule, military rule, and one-man rule, which is not the case for China. With the
coefficients being consistently significant in both models regarding one-man rule,
respondents are less likely to reject these authoritarian governance forms. This
could indicate that China helps some authoritarian regimes to stay in power. In a
more detailed examination, Isaksson and Kotsadam (2018a) also find deterioration
in norms, and an increase in local corruption, associated with Chinese projects.
Panel C examines questions indicating the way the government interacts with its
citizens and its use of repression. In regions with more WB aid, people report being
more apt to contact their government officials and express their views frequently.
There is no such effect for China. In regions with WB aid, the fear of political
intimidation or violence is lower, while it is higher in regions with Chinese aid
activities. At the same time, there is no apparent difference in whether people think
they have to be careful what they say privately about politics. Finally, two results
stand out. In regions with more Chinese aid, respondents state much more clearly
that people must always obey the law. Moreover, there is a negative correlation
between Chinese aid and the willingness to join others to request government action.
These correlations correspond to the different norms and conditions of the WB and
China that we described above.
Importantly, all of these results on mechanisms need to be interpreted cautiously
and do not necessarily signal causality. Still, they underline that the different
approaches taken by the two donors matter. It is important to reconsider that aid
by both donors is, if anything, leading to less conflict. The results on mechanisms
suggest that, WB aid goes with improved democratic norms and security provision
by the government. For China, one interpretation is that the country is exporting
stability which results in a reduction in the likelihood of certain types of conflict.
Still, this increase of stability seems to come at the cost of increased government
repression in addition to a weakening of democratic processes.
5-6.6 Sensitivity
Modifiable area unit problem - different aggregation levels: First, we
aggregate at the country level. This allows us to see the aggregate impact of potential
spill-overs to other regions and enables us to compare our main results to studies at
the country level. We show results both with and without controlling for the share
of aid projects that could not be assigned to a particular ADM1 region. These are,
to a large extent, projects where money flows directly to the central government.
The coefficients are also negative for both donors in both specifications. Thus, our
results at the local level do not seem to be driven by choosing a particular spatial
unit.40
In Table A5-B33 (A5-B34), we move towards OLS (IV) regressions at a lower
level of aggregation, the ADM2 level. Note that we are capturing a smaller share
of all projects at this level due to the precision level in the georeferencing. The
OLS results for the WB and China are both similar to the ones at the ADM1
40Point estimates for the less precisely coded aid can be found in Table A5-B36. Although
the coefficient for non-geocoded WB aid at the country level turns positive it remains small and
insignificant. This supports that there is also a null effect at the country level. OLS and IV
point estimates for geo-coded aid aggregated at the country level are shown in Table A5-B35. The
coefficients remain small and insignificant, as well.
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level. All coefficients are insignificant, and the majority are negative, especially,
when conditioning on more restrictive fixed effects. The IV point estimates differ
somehow but never become statistically significant.
Choice of conflict indicator: As we discuss in the data section, there is no
“correct” coding of the dependent variable, just more and less plausible choices.
Table A5-B15 (A5-B16) presents alternative regression results with a higher conflict
threshold of at least 25 BRD per region-year using the OLS (IV) specifications.
Table A5-B17 (Table A5-B18) considers the log of battle-related deaths (+0.01) as
a continuous measure of conflict intensity instead of looking at a binary indicator of
conflict incidence using OLS (IV). We find largely negative OLS coefficients for the
WB and slightly positive ones for China. However, with IV, both coefficients turn
negative, in line with previous results.
Instrumental variable: We conduct the majority of robustness tests with regard
to our IV strategy. As outlined, we take the concern serious that our instrumental
variable may intersect with a spurious trend as suggested by Christian and Barrett
(2017). In this regard, when taking non-stationarity (Table A5-B8) of the time series
into account by taking first differences of conflict, aid and our liquidity indicator.
The second stage results in Table A5-B9 remain clearly indistinguishable from zero.
While it is arguably unlikely that conflict in a specific sub-national region determines
our global liquidity indicators, we also assess the robustness of the instrumental
variables by controlling for global conflict levels in Tables A5-B13 and A5-B14. The
strength of the instruments remains virtually unaffected and the point estimates
remain negative and statistically insignificant.
The second component of the IV, the probability term, may be computed in
different ways. We test various plausible options. The cumulative probability is
advantageous, as it only uses pre-determined values; yet, it could create problems if
the probability in the first year(s) is not sufficiently informative. Table A5-B10 drops
the first year of the corresponding panel (starting at 1998 for the WB’s IDA, and 2003
for Chinese Commodity Production). Thus, the first probability is based on at least
two observations. Table A5-B11 uses a constant probability from the third year of
the respective sample onwards. Table A5-B12 drops the 10 highest leverage region-
year observations. Figures A5-B1 and A5-B2 display the IV estimates dropping
country-by-country, to avoid the possibility of the relationship being driven by one
particular state. Both first and second stage results are robust to all these choices
and specifications.
Moreover, Table A5-B6 reports reduced-form estimates. Table A5-B1 uses a lead
of aid as a placebo treatment in the first stage, which always shows up as statistically
insignificantly. Table A5-B5 reports the first stage, including the coefficient for the
probability.
Political Systems: Development aid may have differential impacts across
political systems due to different allocation decisions and distributional aspects.
As a further sensitivity exercise, we consider heterogenous effects across democratic
and autocratic systems based on the distinction due to the Polity IV data (Marshall
et al., 2014). The WB disburses 20% of its aid to democratic countries, where 38% of
Chinese commitments go to regions of democratic states.41 Considering the results
41On a first view this allocation patterns may seem surprising. Yet, a selection mechanism may
prevail, where both donors give more to the opposed political system, e.g., to foster regime change
(Aidt et al., 2018).
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in Tables A5-B31 and A5-B32 , we find that effects across democratic and autocratic
subsamples are similar in sign and statistical significance as average effects. While
the effects for the WB are insignificant, repression significantly increases in regions
that receive Chinese aid both in autocracies and democracies. Thus, we do not find
evidence for heterogenous effects across regimes.42
Both donors in same specification: One trade-off was whether to show both
donors over the same period and in the same equation. This should not be
decisive, as China is only active in 6% of the region-years that also feature
WB projects. Moreover, Humphrey and Michaelowa (2018) find no systematic
relationship between the selection of locations by the two donors at the country-
level. Still, accounting for aid from one donor as a potential omitted variable in
the other donor’s equation is a potential issue. Table A5-B47 (Table A5-B48) shows
that the OLS (IV) results also suggest no conflict-fueling effects when including both
donors jointly. In joint IV specifications for both donors, the K-P F-statistics for
the WB becomes smaller than 10 (Table A5-B48), giving rise to concerns about a
weak IV. Still, the table shows that both instruments capture distinct variation: the
interaction instrument for the WB is still significant in explaining variation in WB
aid, and the IV for China is still significant in explaining variation in Chinese aid.
With the caveat of a weak IV in mind, the table still indicates no conflict-fueling
effects for both donors.
Non-linear estimators: In line with Berman et al. (2017b), we also run a Poisson
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimation in Table A5-B38, which is suitable for
binary outcomes with a large fraction of zeros. Moreover, we implement a negative
binomial estimation in Table 5-B39. The results are generally in line with the main
findings in terms of coefficient signs. However, note that the models only converge
when restricting us to the use of year fixed effects.
Temporal dependence: As conflict may be highly persistent over time, we
include a lagged dependent variable in Table A5-B40. The results are very similar,
with mostly negative and partly significant coefficients for the WB and China.
5-7 Conclusion
China constantly increases its range of development projects in Africa. This raises
both hopes and rejections among political and academic observers. The big question
is whether African countries will benefit or suffer from this foreign engagement? To
answer this question, we compare the effect of Chinese aid on state stability to a
donor that represents a strongly contrasting approach to development -- the World
Bank (WB). China is the major emerging donor, emphasizing mutual economic
benefits without official economic or political conditions for recipient governments
and has no specific guidelines to manage potential conflict risks (Asmus et al., 2017;
Hernandez, 2017). In contrast, the WB is a traditional, multilateral donor that
emphasizes human right conditions, expert knowledge, and engages explicitly in
conflict-sensitive programming. Without taking a normative stance, we compare the
effects of those different development approaches on a comprehensive set of stability
measures. The chapter contributes to the literature by providing, as we hope, the
42We also try to capture changes in the aid approach by traditional donors like the WB by
splitting the sample in two periods. The results in Table A5-B43 support the main finding that
aid on average does not effect outright conflict in either sample.
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most comprehensive analysis of the causal effect of development aid projects on
a comprehensive set of stability measures in a multi-country analysis at the sub-
national level this far.
Our results using aid projects and outright conflict in the same region show no
signs of a conflict-fueling effect. The WB tends to have a conflict-reducing effect
in some fixed effects specifications, but when using instrumental variable strategies,
estimates for both donors are negative and insignificant, on average. Looking at
heterogeneity with regard to actors and types of conflict, we find that the threat
of losing out on future aid payments leads to a reduction in lethal violence by
governments against civilians related to both Chinese and WB projects.
In contrast to a substantial amount of media reports, we also find no net effect
of Chinese aid projects on civilian unrest and protests in Africa. At the same time,
we do, however, observe that in regions in which China is engaged the likelihood
of government repression against targeted individuals or groups increases. Thus we
cannot say with certainty whether the non-significant result on protest reflects the
higher costs of protesting due to repression or that there is no reason to protest.
WB aid has neither a significant net effect on protests or government repression.
Nonetheless, when considering attitudes from Afrobarometer surveys, our results
suggest that WB aid has positive effects on perceived safety, democratic norms, and
democratic values. Chinese aid is associated with attitudes related to stability like a
higher adherence to the rule of law, but also with a higher acceptance of autocratic
approaches. The results suggest a rationale where China is eager to export stability
and avoid violent conflict that endangers its workers and investment. China may
also be more supportive of repression and autocratic rule than traditional Western-




Table 5-A1 lists descriptions and sources of our independent, dependent and control
variables.
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Table 5-A1 – Data Sources
Variable Name Variable Description Time Period Variable Source
WB Aid log of WB Aid disbursements
per region-year
1995-2012 Strandow et al.
(2011)
Chinese Aid log of Chinese Aid
commitments per region-year
2000-2012 Dreher et al. (2017)
Strikes, Riots,
Demonstrations
Binary indicator (100;0) if any
violent event of this type in a
given region-year took place
1995-2012 Salehyan et al. (2012)
Intensity 1/2 Binary indicator (100;0) 1 if
¿=5/¿=25 persons were killed
in a given region-year
1995-2014 Croicu and Sundberg
(2015)





SPI value of drought severity
of the region’s rainy season




SPI value of drought severity
during the first month of the
region’s rainy season
1995-2014 Tollefsen et al. (2012);
Guttman (1999)
Temperature Mean temperature (in degrees
Celsius) per region-year
1995-2014 Tollefsen et al.
(2012); Fan and
Van den Dool (2008)
Precipitation Total amount of precipitation
(in millimeter) per region-year








1999-2013 Dreher et al. (2017);




portfolio & its non-negotiable,
non-interest-bearing demand
obligations (on account of
members‘ subscriptions and
contributions)” divided by




1995-2012 Dreher et al. (2017)
Elevation Standard deviation of regional
elevation as an indicator of
ruggedness of terrain





Binary indicator of region’s
presence of rivers, lakes or
ocean
Constant Natural Earth, from
Natural Earth.com
Landarea Area of a given region Constant Hijmans et al. (2010)
Travel Time
(Mean)
Gives the mean regional
estimate of the travel time to
the nearest major city
Constant Tollefsen et al.
(2012); Uchida and
Nelson (2009)






5-A2 Independent Variables (Development Aid)
WB’s IDA & IBRD disbursements
For our analysis, we draw on the “WB IBRD-IDA, Level 1, Version 1.4.1” provided
by the AidData consortium, which covers approved loans under the IBRD-IDA
lending line between 1995 and 2014.43 These data correspond to project aid
disbursed from 5,684 projects in 61,243 locations. The data builds on the information
provided by the WB, including the disbursement dates, project sectors, and
disbursed values. These values are deflated to 2011 values. In an effort to allow
for more fine-grained analysis of aid projects, AidData’s coders filtered the location
names from aid project documentation and assigned these to specific locations. Some
projects include exact locations on latitude and longitude. Other projects, which
had a more policy or regulation oriented purpose, could only be assigned to an
administrative level (e.g., the first level of sub-national regions (provinces) or the
second level (districts). To include as many disbursements as possible, but to be also
able to grasp the advantages of geo-referenced data, we focus our analysis on these
administrative levels. For our administrative boundaries, we build on the GADM
dataset constructed by Hijmans et al. (2010). One difficulty with this data is that
for some countries, including more populous nations like Armenia, more fine-grained
administrative distinctions are missing. As the size of administrative regions is not
fixed by size across countries, we assume in these cases that our ADM1 regions
would be ADM2 regions.
Figure 5-A1 displays the development finance locations coded by donor,
distinguishing all projects (precision 1-8), projects coded at least at the first
administrative level (precision 1-4), projects coded at least at the second
administrative level (precision 1-3) and projects coded more precise (precision 1-
2).
(a)
Figure 5-A1 – No. of Project Locations by Precision Codes
One challenge arises in projects with a multitude of locations, where it is not
possible to derive a distinct value of disbursements. In this regard, we suggest two
solutions.
43As the number of documented projects declines steeply after 2012, we focus on the 1995-2012
period.
146 Chapter 5. Development Aid and Conflict
First, we allocate disbursements by the number of locations. In line with previous
research by Dreher and Lohmann (2015), we assume that aid is distributed equally
across locations and allocate aid proportionally to the locations per region. For
instance, for a project with 10 locations, where 4 locations are in region A and 6
locations are in region B, 40% of project disbursements would be accounted in region
A and 60% in region B.
Second, we calculate population-weighted disbursements. Here, we assume
that aid is allocated based on the regional population shares. For instance, if
a project would have project locations in two regions of a country, where two
million inhabitants would reside in region A and three million would reside in
region B, 40% of project disbursements would be accounted in region A and 60%
in region B. Here, the aid attribution formula would write as follows: Aidpijt =
Aidpit∫
P opulationpi
∗ Populationpj, where p is the project, i is the country, j is the region
and t is the period for which we estimate the allocation shares.
Finally, our dataset comprises development finance from IBRD and IDA.
However, only IDA disbursements classify as Official Development Assistance. For
this purpose, disbursements are disentangled into IDA (development aid) and IBRD
(development finance) disbursements.
Allocation scheme (more detailed)
Location weighting
The WB geocoded data release comes in the format of projects and several
corresponding locations. For instance, a typical project report would mention the
transaction amounts, the project purpose as well as different project locations. The
latter can be classified in different degrees of precision (e.g., precision codes smaller
than 4 correspond to locations that refer to an ADM2 region or even more precise,
while precision code 4 corresponds to locations at the ADM1 level). When allocating
the development aid across locations on the ADM1 and ADM2 level, we make the
following assumptions based on a three-step procedure.44 First, we subtract the
share of development aid, which corresponds to locations, which are coded less
precise than ADM1 (e.g., large geographic regions or aid at the country level). For
example, if three out of 10 locations in a project are coded less precise than ADM1,
further analysis focuses on the remaining 70% of development aid. Second, we then
allocate all aid with precision codes 1-3 to the corresponding ADM2 regions. This
is done by taking the location share (either by equal or population weights) of the
transaction amount per location. A certain ADM2 region may have several locations
per project or even several projects; we collapse our data by ADM2 region. Third,
we then allocate all aid with precision code 4 to the corresponding ADM1 regions.
This is done by taking the location share (either by equal or population weights)
of the transaction amount per location. A certain ADM1 region may have several
locations per project or even several projects, we collapse our data by ADM1 region.
To allow for inference on the ADM2 level, we assume that transactions coded with
precision 4 are attributable equally to all corresponding ADM2 regions. In practice,
this is done by merging the ADM1 regions with all corresponding ADM2 regions
44Throughout the chapter, we allocate the aid either assuming equal weights per location or
weighting each location by population.
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and then splitting the aid with location or population weights. Finally, data with
precision codes 1-3 and precision code 4 can be simply added upon the ADM2 level
yielding our treatment variable of interest. For inference on the ADM1 level, totals
of ADM2 level development assistance are created on the geounit-year level.
Population weighting
Analogous to the location weighted aid, we also distribute aid with population
weights. Our population data are from the Center for International Earth Science
Information Network (CIESIN) Columbia University (2016). However, some
projects only consist of locations without population estimates (e.g., deserts). In this
case, we assume a population of one citizen per location to be able to distribute those
aid disbursements. We then consequently attribute the population of an ADM1
regions to project locations, which are coded at the ADM1 level (precision 4), and
ADM2 populations to project locations, which are coded at least as precise as the
ADM2 level (precision 1-3).
Similar to the location-weighing, we construct the total population of each
project-year popproject. For the projects coded with precision 4, we then attribute
disbursements via the regional share in population popADM1. This is then divided
by popproject and multiplied with the project disbursements TransactionV alueproj
in each year: ADM1Precision4 = popADM1popproj ∗ TransactionV alueproj. As there may
be several active projects per ADM1 region, we aggregate the disbursements on the
ADM1 level. In order to break those numbers down to the ADM2 level, we merge all
corresponding ADM2 regions to the ADM1 regions. We then divide the population
in each ADM2 region by the population in each ADM1 region and multiply this
share with the yearly disbursements per region, ADM2Precision4 = popADM2popADM1 ∗
ADM1Precision4. For the precision codes 1-3 (at least coded as precise as the
ADM2 level), we then attribute disbursements via the regional share in population
divided by popproject. This is then multiplied with the project disbursements in
each year: ADM2Precision123 = popADM2popproj ∗ TransactionV alueproj. As there may
be several active projects per ADM2 region, we aggregate the disbursements on the
ADM2 level. Finally, we merge the precision code 1-3 and 4 data on the ADM2 level
to obtain our variables of interest. Those can then be aggregated on the ADM1 level.
Chinese Aid (ODA-like and OOF flows)
To create our data on the ADM2 and ADM1 level, we make use of the feature that
aid can be defined on the ADM2 level and then aggregated to the ADM1 level. One
challenge with the data is, however, that we lack information on the ADM2 regions
for some countries (as there are no ADM2 regions in small countries). Therefore,
we create two spatial joins of ADM1 and ADM2 regions from the GADM dataset
with Chinese aid point features. This yields matches of the specific project locations
with the administrative regions as depicted in Figure 5-A2.
To create our data, we first load our ADM2 data into Stata and drop the ADM0
and ADM1 identifiers to be later able to rely on the identifiers from the ADM1-Aid
spatial join. The next step involves merging the ADM2-Aid spatial join with the
ADM1-Aid spatial join by the target-fid, which uniquely identifies the points from
the Dataset “aiddata china 1 1 1.xlsx” by (Dreher et al., 2019) and Strange et al.
(2017). Based on this data, we create unique identifiers for all ADM1 and ADM2
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Notes: The figure depicts the locations of Chinese aid projects
(stars) within administrative boundaries. Both information
can then be spatially matched. Graphical depiction based on
Quantum GIS.
Figure 5-A2 – Chinese Aid ADM1 Spatial Join
regions, whereby we treat ADM1 regions as ADM2 regions in cases that ADM2
regions are missing (e.g., in Cape Verde). This assumption can be made as sizes of
administrative regions are somewhat arbitrary and several ADM2 regions are larger
than other countries’ ADM1 regions. After getting the regional identifiers right, we
can merge (a) the spatial joins of ADM regions & Chinese aid locations with (b)
data on flows of Chinese aid. In a first step, we clean these data from entries that
only relate to pledges of Chinese aid (information is from the variable status254).
Although the data on Chinese finance to Africa also contain information on official
investment, the focus of this chapter is on development aid. Thus, we focus on
flows, which correspond to ”ODA-like” funds as those would compare closest to
development aid (following individual correspondence with the authors of Strange
et al. (2017)). The data are then merged with population data from the gridded
population of the world data to allocate financial flows with population weights
in case one project had commitment locations in different administrative regions.
Yet, one further challenge has to be resolved before allocating the commitments
to regions. The Chinese aid commitments are coded like WB disbursements with
different precision (e.g., some are coded only for geographic features. Such aid
involve several administrative regions or are funds which go to central ministries or
the government). For our commitment allocation, we only consider those projects,
which are at least coded at the ADM1 level. This means that we proportionally
exclude commitments, which provide information on the central level and sub-
regional levels as indicated before. We furthermore distinguish between projects,
which are coded only at the ADM1 level and ones that provide information on
the ADM2 level (or more precise). The former are proportionally split over the
underlying ADM2 regions. Although the latter can be precisely traced back to the
ADM2 region, projects may have commitments in several ADM2 regions. In this
case, we also split the commitments proportionally by locations or population, as
indicated earlier.
To exploit sectoral variation in development finance both for the WB and China,
we make use of the information provided by Strange et al. (2017) on Chinese aid’s
sectoral allocation using the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) codes. To
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achieve comparability with the broad sectors indicated for the WB, we assign
sectors as follows: “Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry” (CRS-310:“Agriculture,
Forestry and Fishing”), “Public Administration, Law and Justice” (CRS-150),
“Information and communication” (CRS-220: “Communications”), “Education”
(CRS-110: “Education”), “Finance” (CRS-240: “Banking and Financial Services”),
“Health and other social services”(CRS-120: “Health,” CRS-160: “Other Social
infrastructure and services”), “Energy and mining” (CRS-230: “Energy Generation
and Supply”), “Transportation” (CRS-210: “Transport and Storage”), “Water,
sanitation and flood protection”(CRS-140: “Water Supply and Sanitation”),
“Industry and Trade” (CRS-330: “Trade and Tourism,” CRS-320: “Industry,
Mining, Construction”).
Sectoral distribution of aid disbursements
We use additional information on the financier for each disbursement for each
project. Based on this information, we can construct sectoral distributions of aid
flows. While both donors are investing heavily in transportation across Africa,
further priorities differ. The WB supports Health and Social Services strongly,
whereas China commits a large share of its funds to Industry & Trade.
(a) (b)
Figure 5-A3 – Sectoral Distribution of Aid: (a) WB’s IDA; (b) China
5-A3 Dependent Variables (Conflict data)
Table 5-A4 provides an overview about the different conflict outcomes considered in
this chapter. The construction of the data and sources are described in more detail
in the subsequent paragraphs.
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Table 5-A3 – Aid Allocation Formula Example
Example of Weighted Aid Allocation
ID Year Aid Loc. ADM1 ADM2 Prec. ADM1 Prec.4 Aid Prec. 1–3 Total
Value ID ID ID Code Weight to ADM2 Aid
1995 100 2 1 1 1 1/7 14.29 14.29
1 1995 100 3 1 2 2 1/7 14.29 14.29
1 1995 100 4 2 1 4 1/7 14.29 14.29
1 1995 100 5 3 1 3 1/7 14.29 14.29
1 1995 100 6 3 2 1 1/7 14.29 14.29
1 1995 100 6 3 3 4 (1/7)*(1/3) 4.76 4.76
1 1995 100 6 3 1 4 (1/7)*(1/3) 4.76 4.76
1 1995 100 7 3 2 4 (1/7)*(1/3) 4.76 4.76
1 1995 100 8 4 1 4 1/7 14.29 14.29
Totals: 42.86 57.14 100.00
Table 5-A4 – Descriptive statistics - ADM1 Region
Mean SD Min Max
Conflict Incidence 11.65 32.08 0 100
State Based Conflict 7.01 25.54 0 100
Non-State Based Conflict 3.74 18.97 0 100
State Violence vs Civilians 1.83 13.39 0 100
Non-State Violence vs Civilians 3.41 18.14 0 100
Riots, Strikes & Demonstrations 13.59 34.27 0 100
Riots 8.08 27.26 0 100
Strikes 7.53 26.40 0 100
Demonstrations 2.92 16.83 0 100
Non-lethal Pro-GVMT Violence 1.16 10.71 0 100
Notes: Descriptive statistics for our main outcome variables. The
sample period is 1995-2014 in order to account for the different lag
structures. Click here to go back to section 5-3.2.
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UCDP Data
AidData and UCDP use the same coding framework, so we can use similar coding
rules and restrict us to events coded at least at the ADM1 level (precision codes
1-4). For the more precise data (precision codes 1 and 2), we again use a point to
polygon analysis on the ADM level. As one conflict event is always coded in one
discernible location (Croicu and Sundberg, 2015), we do not need to make additional
distributional assumptions by location number or population size for conflict data,
because we do not face issues of multiple project locations, which we had in the aid
data. Yet, for conflict observations on the ADM1 level (precision code 4), we do not
distribute battle-related deaths by population weights across ADM2 regions.
A useful feature of the UCDP data is the possibility to discern three different
types of violence. Those are the government against organized groups (type 1),
organized non-governmental groups versus the government (or against another non-
governmental group) (type 2), and one-sided violence by the government against
civilians (type 3 governmental) and by non-governmental groups against civilians
(type 3 non-governmental).45 UCDP data can be considered as comprehensive for
our 1995 to 2012 sample. Hence, all missing values are treated as zeros. For Syria,
information on battle-related deaths are not reported and is not part of our analysis.
SCAD data
UCDP data focus on organized violence with lethal outcomes. However, along with
the different theories, it could be hypothesized that discontent and aid appropriation
do not necessarily need to be linked to full-fledged conflict. What is more, recent
empirical work by Bluhm et al. (2021) underscores the role of aid in conflict
dynamics. Thus, we also consider social conflict as a further outcome, in terms
of demonstrations and repressions, based on the Social Conflict Analysis Database
(Salehyan et al., 2012). SCAD involves demonstrations, riots, strikes, coups, pro-
, anti- and extra-government violence, which can, but do not necessarily have to
involve casualties. In this way, SCAD complements the UCDP data.46 SCAD
mainly builds on data compiled by the Lexis-Nexis services from searches of Agence
France Presse and Associated Press. Based on the available information, data are
geo-referenced by web searches of the locations mentioned in the event reports.
Analogous to UCDP data, precision codes are provided, which are used to allocate
events similarly.
Matching EPR to GREG
To measure ethnic homelands, we use the GREG dataset (Weidmann et al., 2010).
It is a geo-referenced version of the initial locations of ethnic homelands based on
the Soviet Atlas Narodov Mira. The information about the power status comes
from the time-variant Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Vogt et al., 2015).
Wherever possible, we match the group power status from EPR in a particular year
to one of the time-invariant GREG group homelands. The original dataset assigns
45For a more detailed description of the different types of violence, please consult Croicu and
Sundberg (2015).
46Prior to 2014 armed conflict was not included in SCAD data and is now also distinguished
from “social disturbances.”
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Figure 5-A4 – SCAD Data for precision codes 1-4
eight different power statuses to groups. The differences are sometimes marginal
and hard to interpret. To minimize measurement error we only use the more precise
information on whether a group was part of the governing coalition or not. We
then intersect the ethnic group polygons with the administrative regions to classify
regions as one of the three categories.
5-A4 World Bank Aid in the Financial Sector
A more profound classification exercise on the World Bank’s financial sector aid
reveals that sectoral reforms may play a crucial part in mitigating conflict. To
classify IDA projects targeted at the financial sector, we select projects with at
least 10% disbursements in the recipient’s financial sector. Moreover, we restrict
the classification to projects with traceable money flow to ADM1 regions. Finally,
we obtain the reports for each project and develop a classification of IDA aid in the
financial sector based on the project goals and descriptions.
Table 5-A5 shows that 50% of all financial sector aid are aimed at sectoral
reforms. These projects support existing government reforms and development but
mainly include new projects launched outside the government’s initiative.
5-A5 Afrobarometer
Measures on people’s norms about democracy are taken from Afrobarometer Data
(2018). The geo-coded individual responses are matched with the administrative
region and the response values to the respective questions are averaged on the first
administrative level to allow a matching with regional aid flows.
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Class. Classification Name Share of
Projects
Description
I. Support services to
enterprises
15% Financial and non-financial support to (selected)
enterprises or enterprise sectors
II. Support services to
NGOs
2.5% Financial and non-financial support to NGOs or
welfare organisations
III. Support services to
individuals or groups
15% Financial and non-financial support to individuals,
socio-economic or geographical groups
IV. Capacity building 10% Capacity building in socio-economic or geographical
groups or supporting other capacity building
projects
V. Sectoral reforms 50% New projects or support of existing government




2.5% Projects aimed at protecting or improving the
environment or wildlife
VII. Emergency support 2.5% Projects providing emergency support
VIII. Research support 2.5% Research or evaluation focused projects
Specific project examples





Increase performance and employment levels of micro, small
and medium enterprises in selected non-oil industry
sub-sectors + 3 targeted states of the country through i.)
Improving access to financial services, ii.) Developing the
market for business development services, iii.) Development






Improve income and living standards of low-income Malagasy
by i.) Establishing appropriate legal, regulatory and
supervisory framework for microfinance, ii.) Expanding









i.) Restructuring and privatizing the National Bank of
Commerce and restructuring the smaller People’s Bank of
Zanzibar for competition and efficiency in the banking sector,
ii.) Continuation of strengthening of Bank Supervision
Directorate, iii.) Improving payments system, iv.) Creating a
private credit information bureau, v.) Developing the
insurance industry and capital markets.
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/899741468311395554/pdf/
multi-page.pdf










Table 5-A6 – Afrobarometer - Labels, questions and sources
Variable Name Variable Description Availability Code
Panel A: Security
Security facilities: Police station present within walking
distance?
Are the following facilities present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration
area, or within easy walking distance: Police station?
2008-2009, 2011-2014 ea-fac-c
Security forces: Any policemen or police vehicles? Are the following facilities present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration
area, or within easy walking distance: Police station?
2008-2009, 2011-2014 ea-sec-a
Security forces: Any soldiers or army vehicles? In the PSU/EA, did you (or any of your colleagues) see: Any soldiers or army
vehicles?
2008-2009, 2011-2014 ea-sec-b
Frequency of things stolen in the past year? During the past year, have you or anyone in your family: Had something









Panel B: Democratic norms and attitudes
Democracy: How democratic is your country today? In your opinion how much of a democracy is your country today? 1999-2006, 2008-2009, 2011-
2014
q40
Democracy: Did you perceive last elections as free and fair? On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national




Governance: Reject one-party rule There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve
of the following alternatives: Only one political party is allowed to stand for




Governance: Reject military rule There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve




Governance: Reject one-man rule There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve
of the following alternatives: Elections and Parliament are abolished so that




Reject government banning organizations that go against its
policies
Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement
1 or Statement 2. Statement 1: Government should be able to ban any
organization that goes against its policies. Statement 2: We should be able




Panel C: Government responsiveness and repression
Frequency of contact to government official to express your view During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following
persons about some important problem or to give them your views: An official




Fear of political intimidation or violence during campaigns During election campaigns in this country, how much do you personally fear
becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence?
2008-2009, 2011-2014 q49-x
How often do people have to be careful about what they say in
politics?
In your opinion, how often, in this country: do people have to be careful of




Rule of Law: People must obey the law For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you disagree or




Frequency of joining others to request government action Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens when they
are dissatisfied with government performance. For each of these, please tell
me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past
year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Joined others in your





Motivation of Instrumental Variable
To reduce the risk of the instrument being subject to spurious trends and
correlations, we need to understand the underlying mechanisms. This section is
dedicated to providing a more detailed description. In a first step, Table 5-B2
shows OLS correlations of our conflict measure with one lead term and three lag
terms of aid. The second lead of Chinese aid is correlated with conflict, suggesting
China selects into post-conflict settings. This correlation may also correspond to
a geographically more selective allocation of Chinese funds as described in Figure
5-2a. We also test more formally if the instrument is suitable to tackle the selection
bias, by regressing conflict on an instrumented lead term and find no significant
relationship in Table 5-B1. The instrumental variable approach is, thus, warranted
to reduce selection bias.
Table 5-B3 suggest that the instrumental variables for both donors affect the
extensive margin (e.g., the probability to have at least one active aid project in
a given region-year). Table 5-B4, in turn, indicates that for the WB the intensive
margin matters as well (e.g., provided that at least one active aid project, how much
funds does a region receive?).
Table 5-B6 depicts the reduced form estimates. In line with the main results,
both interacted instruments are not significantly correlated with lethal conflict
outcomes at the regional level.47 For transparency, Table 5-B5 displays the first stage
including the constituent probability term, which, however, is not an instrument
itself as we control for it in the second stage (see Section 4).
47While the constituent probability term enters significantly, it is not part of the instrument,
and we control for it in the second stage.
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Table 5-A7 – Afrobarometer - Questionnaire rounds and countries
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6
Algeria – – – – 2013 2015
Benin – – 2005 2008 2011 2014
Botswana 1999 2003 2005 2008 2012 2014
BurkinaFaso – – – 2008 2012 2015
Burundi – – – – 2012 2014
Cameroon – – – – 2013 2015
Cape Verde – 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014
Cote d’Ivoire – – – – 2013 2014
Egypt – – – – 2013 2015
Ethiopia – – – – 2013 –
Gabon – – – – – 2015
Ghana 1999 2002 2005 2008 2012 2014
Guinea – – – – 2013 2015
Kenya – 2003 2005 2008 2011 2014
Lesotho 2000 2003 2005 2008 2012 2014
Liberia – – – 2008 2012 2015
Madagascar – – 2005 2008 2013 2015
Malawi 1999 2003 2005 2008 2012 2014
Mali 2001 2002 2005 2008 2013 2014
Mauritius – – – – 2012 2014
Morocco – – – – 2013 2015
Mozambique – 2002 2005 2008 2012 2015
Namibia 1999 2003 2006 2008 2012 2014
Niger – – – – 2013 2015
Nigeria 2000 2003 2005 2008 2013 2015
Sao Tome/
Principe
– – – – – 2015
Senegal – 2002 2005 2008 2013 2014
Sierra Leone – – – – 2012 2015
South Africa 2000 2002 2006 2008 2011 2015
Sudan – – – – 2013 2015
Swaziland – – – – 2013 2015
Tanzania 2001 2003 2005 2008 2012 2014
Togo – – – – 2012 2014
Tunisia – – – – 2013 2015
Uganda 2000 2002 2005 2008 2012 2015
Zambia 1999 2003 2005 2009 2013 2014
Zimbabwe 1999 2004 2005 2009 2012 2014
Source: Afrobarometer Data (2018)
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Table 5-B1 – ADM1 - Absence of Pre-Trends with IV. Regression with Instrumented
Lead of Aid
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
Placebo (Lead): World Bank
ln(WorldBank Aid t+1) 0.2299 0.2332
(0.3586) (0.3704)
N 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.481 86.444
Panel B: Chinese Aid
Placebo (Lead): China
ln(ChineseAid t+1) 0.0396 -0.3753
(0.2888) (0.3351)
N 8700 8700
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 34.263 29.941
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country × Year FE No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator (100 if
BRD≥5, 0 if BRD¡5). The sample includes first order subnational regions in
African countries for the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China).
Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and
regional level. Both regressions include year and region fixed effects as well
as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time
trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to go back to section
5-6.6.
Interpretation: The lead terms indicate that our instrumental variable method
suceeds in addressing the identified selection bias of Table 5-B2.
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Table 5-B2 – ADM1 - Leads and further Lags
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
Leads and Lags: World Bank
ln(WorldBank Aid t+1) -0.0059 0.1559
(0.1236) (0.1124)
ln(WorldBank Aid t) -0.1089 -0.2128∗∗
(0.1047) (0.0984)
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) 0.0214 -0.0933
(0.0893) (0.0900)
ln(WorldBank Aid t-2) 0.0516 0.1424
(0.0876) (0.1015)
ln(WorldBank Aid t-3) -0.0811 -0.0535
(0.0878) (0.1000)
N 10150 10150
Panel B: Chinese Aid
Lead and Lag: China
ln(ChineseAid t+1) 0.1681 0.2083∗
(0.1239) (0.1239)
ln(ChineseAid t) -0.0127 0.0231
(0.1263) (0.1367)
ln(ChineseAid t-1) -0.0086 -0.0481
(0.1518) (0.1562)
ln(ChineseAid t-2) 0.0121 -0.0506
(0.1156) (0.1285)
ln(ChineseAid t-3) 0.0572 -0.0308
(0.0978) (0.1117)
N 6525 6525
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country × Year FE No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence
indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD¡5). The sample includes
first order subnational regions in African countries for the
1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard
errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year
and regional level. Conflicts are considered for the WB from
1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to the
lag structure. Both regressions include year and region fixed
effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and
squared country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01 Click here to go back to section 5-6.2.
Interpretation: The lead terms of the table indicate that World
Bank aid does not exhibit a selection effect, while China seem
to select into regions more likely to experience conflict in the
future. Table 5-B1 indicates that our instrumental variable
approach succeeds in reducing this selection bias.
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Table 5-B3 – ADM1 IV (First Stage - Extensive Margin (Likelihood of at least one
active project))
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV FS Extensive Margin: IDA Position
IDAPosition t-1×Cum. Prob t-2 4.0782∗∗∗ 4.8249∗∗∗
(0.4140) (0.5238)
N 12325 12325
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV FS Extensive Margin: Chinese Commodity
ChineseCommodity t-3×Cum. Prob t-3 -0.7267∗∗∗ -0.6591∗∗∗
(0.1205) (0.1163)
N 7975 7975
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients the first stage of the IV regression,
when instead of the aid amount a binary indicator of aid receipts is used. The
sample includes first order subnational regions in African countries for the 1995-
2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses,
two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. Both regressions include
year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear
and squared country-specific time trends. The constituent term of the probability
is depicted in the appendix. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to go
back to section 5-5.2.
Interpretation: The table shows differences in how both donor allocate aid to
regions. An increase in the IDA position increases a region’s probability to receive
more aid projects if the region already received had a WB project in the past.
On the contrary, an increase in Chinese overall aid linked to commodity (over-
)production increases the region’s probability to receive aid more for regions that
did not receive aid in the past. This is in line with China’s strategic aim of
expanding to new regions.
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Table 5-B4 – ADM1 IV (First Stage - Intensive Margin)
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IDA Positiont-1× Cum. Probt-2 4.4155 8.5243∗∗
(3.3348) (3.7926)
N 7091 7081
Country-Year FE No Yes
Regional Time Trend Yes Yes
Country Time Trend: Yes Yes
CountryT imeTrend2: Yes Yes
Panel B: Chinese Aid:
Chinese Commodityt-3× Cum. Probt-3 -0.6974 0.0592
(1.5012) (2.3391)
N 232 232
Country-Time Trends No Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients the first stage of the IV
regression, when constraining the sample only on recipient regions. The
sample includes first order subnational regions in African countries for the
1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in
parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. All
regressions include exogenous controls, region fixed effects and year fixed
effects. Country-Year fixed effects and more rigid time trends are not
included for Chinese Aid due to the more limited variation. The constituent
term of the probability is depicted in the appendix. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01 Click here to go back to section 5-5.2.
Interpretation: For the World Bank, the first stage effect seems partly also
related to the intensive margin, i.e. the expansion of existing projects.
That is, regions that already received aid in the past are likely to larger
amounts of aid if more additional funds are available. For China, there is
no evidence in favor of a change at the intensive margin. The first stage
effect seems to be driven by extensive margin changes.
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Table 5-B5 – ADM1 IV (First Stage with probability constituent term)
Panel A: WB Aid (1) (2)
IV First stage: World Bank
IDAPosition t-1×Cum. Prob t-2 70.9363∗∗∗ 80.8832∗∗∗
(7.1065) (8.6854)
Cum.Prob t-2 -72.7723∗∗∗ -82.0994∗∗∗
(7.7291) (9.2698)
N 12325 12325
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV First stage: China
ChineseCommodity t-3×Cum. Prob t-3 -14.0193∗∗∗ -12.6964∗∗∗
(2.3180) (2.2734)
Cum.Prob t-3 -43.8804∗∗∗ -39.5225∗∗∗
(4.7041) (4.4175)
N 7975 7975
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients the first stage of the IV
regression, displaying additionally the constituent term of the probability,
which was not shown in Table 5-4. This table display the constituent term
for completeness. The sample includes first order subnational regions in
African countries for the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China).
Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and
regional level. Both regressions include year and region fixed effects as well
as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time
trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to go back to section
5-6.6.
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Table 5-B6 – ADM1 Reduced Form
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
Reduced Form: IDA Position
Cum.Prob t-2 10.8281 19.2994
(27.3795) (33.4583)
IDAPosition t-1×Cum. Prob t-2 -7.1921 -18.2132
(26.5498) (33.5818)
N 12325 12325
Panel B: Chinese Aid
Reduced Form: Chinese Commodity
Cum.Prob t-3 -8.1658 -14.3840
(9.7637) (10.2361)
Commodity, factor1×Cum. Prob t-3 6.6166 5.1407
(6.6138) (7.1640)
N 7250 7250
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country × Year FE No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator
(100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD¡5). The sample includes first order
subnational regions in African countries for the 1995-2012 (WB) and
the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses, two-
way clustered at the country-year and regional level. Both regressions
include year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time
Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to go back to section
5-6.6.
Interpretation: Both interacted instruments are not significantly
correlated with the conflict outcome and are in line with the main
results in Table 5-4.
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Robustness of Instrumental Variable
The main specification uses the rolling average of the WB’s IDA position (e.g.,
averaging across t and t−1) because the Bank’s fiscal year ends already in June. For
robustness, Table 5-B7 depicts instrumental variable results using only the variation
in t− 1. The results are largely unchanged.
Moreover, there are several degrees of freedom regarding the definition of the
interacted probability term. We indicate the robustness of an insignificant conflict-
aid link when dropping the first year of the respective panel (starting at 1998 for the
WB’s IDA, and 2003 for Chinese Commodity Production) Table 5-B10 or using an
interacted instrument based on an initial probability from the first three sampling
years (1995 to 1997 for the WB’s IDA; 2000 to 2002 for Chinese Commodities) in
Table 5-B11.
Finally, first stage results may be susceptible to a small share of very influential
observations. Table 5-B12 indicates that results are qualitatively unchanged if we
exclude the ten high leverage region-years from the sample. Figures 5-B1 and 5-B2
display the first stage relationship leaving out single countries, suggesting that there
are no individual states driving the relationship.
A (non-)linear trend in our outcome, treatment and instrumental variable may
render the panels non-stationary and lead to spurious findings. The Hadri test
assesses the null hypothesis ”All Panels are (trend) stationary”. Table 5-B8 indicates
that there are at least some panels being non-stationary and may include a trend.
For this reason, we correct for the non-stationarity and take first differences of
outcome, treatment and instrumental variables. Results in Table 5-B9 remain robust
and support the main findings.
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Table 5-B7 – ADM1 IV (IDA-Positiont−1)
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV Second Stage: World Bank (t-1)
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.1294 -0.0251
(0.3976) (0.3868)
IV FS: IDA Position (t-1)
IDAPosition t-1×Cum. Prob t-2 51.3655∗∗∗ 65.1984∗∗∗
(5.6627) (6.9103)
N 12325 12325
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator
(100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD¡5). The sample includes first order
subnational regions in African countries for the 1995-2012 (WB) and
the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses, two-
way clustered at the country-year and regional level. Both regressions
include year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time
Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. Instead
of a running sum of IDA funding position in ”t” and ”t-1” only the
variation in ”t-1” is used. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click
here to go back to section 5-5.2.
Interpretation: The instrumental variable is nearly unaltered even if
changing the sample: Here, probabilities are not based on a rolling
average but based on the last year’s IDA position, t− 1.
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Table 5-B8 – Test for (Trend) Stationarity - Hadri type
(1) (2)
ln(World Bank Aidt) 125.8488*** 89.4980***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
ln(Chinese Aidt) 2.9868*** 1.1684
(0.0014) (0.1213)
IDA Positiont-1× Cum. Probt-2 145.3093*** 121.1980***
(0.0000) (0.0000)




Linear Trend No Yes
Notes: Conflict refers to category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD¡5). Hadri
type test coefficient estimates for the five variables indicated in rows. p-values in columns refer
to the null hypothesis ”All panels are (trend) stationary.” * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Click here to go back to section 5-6.6.
Interpretation: The test shows that (trend) stationarity is rejected, hence robustness tests
under a weak dependence assumption is conducted in Table 5-B9.
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Table 5-B9 – ADM1 IV (First Difference WB & Chinese aid)
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid




Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 64.200 35.064
IV First stage: World Bank
IDAPosition (t-1)-(t-2)×Cum. Prob t-2 18.7864∗∗∗ 29.3949∗∗∗
(2.3424) (4.9589)
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV First stage: China
L2.d1lnaid c -0.3690 -0.5025
(0.4856) (0.6253)
N 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 20.972 13.774
First Stage: Chinese Commodity
Commodity, (t-3)-(t-4)×Cum. Prob t-3 -13.5621∗∗∗ -10.5846∗∗∗
(2.9568) (2.8471)
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0
if BRD¡5). The sample includes first order subnational regions in African countries for
the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses,
two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. Both regressions include year
and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared
country-specific time trends. The constituent term of the probability is depicted in the
appendix. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to go back to section 5-5.2 or
section 5-6.6.
Interpretation: The Hadri test in Table 5-B8 shows that despite a certain degree of time
persistence, the results of the first stages using first differences are nearly unchanged
under the assumption of weakly dependent time series.
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Table 5-B10 – ADM1 IV (Without first year )
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV Second Stage: World Bank ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.2904 -0.2681
(0.4172) (0.3975)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000




Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: China
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -0.5634 -0.5104
(0.5786) (0.7241)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 22.620 16.927




Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if
BRD¡5). The sample includes first order subnational regions in African countries for the
1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way
clustered at the country-year and regional level. Both regressions include year and region fixed
effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time
trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The constituent term of the probability is
depicted in the appendix. Click here to go back to section 5-6.6.
Interpretation: The instrumental variable is nearly unchanged when dropping the first year.
This accounts for a potentially overly high leverage of the first year in influencing the cross-
sectional probability terms.
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Table 5-B11 – ADM1 IV (Initial Probability)
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV Second Stage: World Bank
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) 0.2253 -0.3389
(0.7469) (0.6206)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 27.090 26.027
IV First stage: World Bank
IDAPosition t-1×Con. Prob 98 43.4391∗∗∗ 61.1537∗∗∗
(8.3419) (11.9769)
N 11600 11600
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: China
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -1.4689 -1.2846
(1.3446) (1.4723)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.001 0.002
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 13.035 9.925
IV First stage: China
ChineseCommodity t-3×Con. Prob 03 -5.8046∗∗∗ -5.7207∗∗∗
(1.6061) (1.8130)
N 7250 7250
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator (100 if
BRD≥5, 0 if BRD¡5). The sample includes first order subnational regions in African
countries for the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard
errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. Both
regressions include year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends
include linear and squared country-specific time trends. The probability is based on
the third year in the corresponding sample (1998 for the WB’s IDA; 2003 for Chinese
Commodities) and held thereafter constant. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Click here to go back to section 5-6.6.
Interpretation: An alternative to our cumulative, updated probability is a constant
probability. Computing this over the whole sample period is potentially problematic,
but we can exclude the first third of the sample to compute a constant, but pre-
determined probability. When doing this, the signs of the instrumental variable in
the first stage remain unchanged, they are only smaller in magnitude.
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Table 5-B12 – ADM1 IV (Without high leverage region)
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV Second Stage: World Bank
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.0990 -0.2268
(0.3761) (0.4197)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.363 86.752
IV First stage: World Bank
IDAPosition t-1×Cum. Prob t-2 70.8414∗∗∗ 80.8936∗∗∗
(7.1068) (8.6851)
N 12317 12291
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: China
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -0.2592 -0.1934
(0.4281) (0.5251)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 36.571 31.181
IV First stage: China
ChineseCommodity t-3×Cum. Prob t-3 -14.0197∗∗∗ -12.6973∗∗∗
(2.3183) (2.2739)
N 7974 7974
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0
if BRD¡5). The sample includes first order subnational regions in African countries for
the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses,
two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. Both regressions include year
and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared
country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to go back
to section 5-6.6.
Interpretation: One concern is that the predictive power of the instrumental variables
is driven by a few regions that received a lot of aid in the past. The table shows that
when dropping the 10 region-year observations receiving most aid our results still hold.
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(a) Leave one out (i) (b) Leave one out (ii)
(c) Leave one out (iii) (d) Leave one out (iv)
Figure 5-B1 – Robustness of first stage for World Bank Aid - Leaving one country
out
Note: Results depict coefficients of the instrumental variable probabilityi,c,t−2 × IDAPositiont−1
for different regressions leaving one country out from the estimation. Labels in the graph refer to
ISO codes of recipients. Click here to go back to section 5-6.6.
Interpretation: To rule out that one particular country drives the results, we run a series of
regressions, each leaving out one country. The graph shows that the results are not affected when
doing that for any particular country.
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(a) Leave one out (i) (b) Leave one out (ii)
(c) Leave one out (iii) (d) Leave one out (iv)
Figure 5-B2 – Robustness of first stage for Chinese Aid - Leaving one country out
Note: Results depict coefficients of the instrumental variable probabilityi,c,t−3 ×
ln(Chinese Commodityt−3) for different regressions leaving one country out from the estimation.
Labels in the graph refer to ISO codes of recipients. Click here to go back to section 5-6.6.
Interpretation: To rule out that one particular country drives the results, we run a series of
regressions, each leaving out one country. The graph shows that the results are not affected when
doing that for any particular country.
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Table 5-B13 – ADM1 IV (WB - Global Time Series)
Glob. Conflict Glob. Conflict
Panel A: WB Second Stage
ln(World Bank Aidt-1) -0.1484 -0.0605
(0.3637) (0.3788)
N 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap under-ID p-val. 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak ID F-stat 99.771 99.659
Panel B: WB First Stage
IDA Positiont-1× Cum. Probt-2 76.5677∗∗∗ 95.7504∗∗∗
(7.6586) (9.5846)
ln(Global BRDt-1)×Cum. Probt-2 -0.9489 -2.9929∗∗∗
(0.5929) (1.0281)
N 12325 12325
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if
BRD¡5). The sample includes first order subnational regions in African countries for the
1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way
clustered at the country-year and regional level. All regressions include year and region fixed
effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time
trends. Click here to go back to section 5-6.6. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Interpretation: One potential concern is that the time-varying WB liquidity and overall amount
of WB aid react to overall global conflicts in a way that affects low and high probability regions
differently. The table shows that controling for an interaction of global battle-related deaths
with the probability to receive aid neither changes the first nor second stage coefficients to a
noticeable degree.
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Table 5-B14 – ADM1 IV (China - Global Time Series)
Glob. Conflict Glob. Conflict
Panel A: China Second Stage
ln(Chinese Commodityt-2) -0.2070 -0.1037
(0.4766) (0.5948)
N 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap under-ID p-val. 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak ID F-stat 31.432 26.756
Panel B: China First Stage
Chinese Commodityt-3× Cum. Probt-3 -13.0574∗∗∗ -11.8020∗∗∗
(2.3254) (2.2784)
ln(Global BRDt-3)× Cum. Probt-3 2.6516 2.1932
(2.3520) (2.3782)
N 7975 7975
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if
BRD¡5). The sample includes first order subnational regions in African countries for the
1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way
clustered at the country-year and regional level. All regressions include year and region fixed
effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time
trends. Click here to go back to section 5-6.6. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Interpretation: One potential concern is that the time-varying commodity (over-)production
and overall amount of Chinese aid react to overall global conflicts in a way that affects low
and high probability regions differently. The table shows that controling for an interaction of
global battle-related deaths with the probability to receive aid neither changes the first nor
second stage coefficients to a noticeable degree.
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5-B2 Alternative Outcome Variables
Robustness of results on lethal violence (UCDP measures)
As thresholds of five battle-related deaths or one incidence per region-year are
arbitrary, we depict for robustness also other intensity thresholds. First, aid could
matter for rather more intense conflicts in line with the evidence on conflict dynamics
made by (Bluhm et al., 2020). Tables 5-B15 (OLS) and 5-B16 (IV) indicate for a
higher threshold of 25 battle-related deaths mainly insignificant coefficients, which
also remain negative for the few significant OLS results. While the IV specifications
indicate medium-sized negative for the WB and small positive coefficients for China,
both stay insignificant. Second, this also holds in Tables 5-B17 (OLS) and 5-B18
(IV) when using a continuous measure of logarithmized battle-related deaths.
Robustness of results on non-lethal violence (SCAD)
The measurement of conflict is non-trivial and in this respect, we display in the main
part beyond lethal violence measures of social conflict based on (Salehyan et al.,
2012). Both anecdotal evidence and research studies alike suggest increased social
conflict linked to Chinese investment activities. We take these concerns seriously
by disentangling the results from Table 5-6 from the main part. We consider the
effects on demonstrations, riots and strikes separately with OLS in Tables 5-B19
,5-B20 and 5-B21 as well as using IV in Table 5-B22. Results do not correspond
to a statistically significant positive effect of aid on neither riots, demonstrations,
and strikes. An explanation could be that these accounts mostly cover commercial
investment activities, which are not conflict sensitively programmed (Wegenast
et al., 2017; Christensen, 2017).
Additionally, we consider the robustness of the main results relating to repression
fueling effects of Chinese aid. First, to separate clearly between regions with lethal
pro-government and non-lethal pro-government activities, we constrain the sample
on regions, which did not encounter any one-sided violence by the government
registered in the UCDP dataset. Results in Table 5-B23 support a robust link
between Chinese aid and repression. Second, when using instead of a dichotomous
repression measure from SCAD a continuous indicator, a consistently positive effect
of Chinese aid on repression is suggested by the IV estimates of Table 5-B24.
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Table 5-B15 – ADM1 OLS results (Intensity 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: WB Aid
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.1061 -0.0440 -0.0703 -0.1810∗∗∗ -0.1522∗∗∗ -0.1528∗∗ -0.1156∗ -0.1386∗∗ -0.1513∗∗
(0.0659) (0.0551) (0.0536) (0.0528) (0.0532) (0.0596) (0.0656) (0.0673) (0.0708)
N 13104 13104 13104 13104 13050 13050 11699 13050 11699
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -0.0917 -0.0209 0.0184 -0.0285 -0.0140 0.0059 -0.0021 -0.0022 -0.0096
(0.0614) (0.0504) (0.0378) (0.0446) (0.0510) (0.0521) (0.0531) (0.0566) (0.0605)
N 9464 9464 9464 9464 8700 8700 8254 8700 8254
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country × Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator (100 if BRD≥25, 0 if BRD¡25). The sample includes first order subnational regions
in African countries for the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year
and regional level. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to go back to
section 5-6.6.
Interpretation: To address concerns that the results hold only for a conflict measure of at least 5 battle-related deaths, the table shows that the results
are nearly unchanged compared to Table 5-3 if considering a conflict threshold of at least 25 battle-related deaths. In addition, the coefficients for our
preferred specification (8) becomes insignificant in the IV setting of Table 5-B16.
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Table 5-B16 – IV (Intensity 2)
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV Second Stage: World Bank
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.1437 -0.4581
(0.3075) (0.3301)
IV First stage: World Bank
IDAPosition t-1×Cum. Prob t-2 70.9363∗∗∗ 80.8832∗∗∗
(7.1065) (8.6854)
N 12325 12325
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: China
ln(ChineseAid t-2) 0.1289 0.1652
(0.2757) (0.3140)
N 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 36.578 31.190
IV First stage: China
ChineseCommodity t-3×Cum. Prob t-3 -14.0193∗∗∗ -12.6964∗∗∗
(2.3180) (2.2734)
N 7975 7975
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator (100 if BRD≥25, 0
if BRD¡25). The sample includes first order subnational regions in African countries for
the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses,
two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. Both regressions include year
and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared
country-specific time trends. The constituent term of the probability is depicted in the
appendix.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to go back to section 5-6.6.
Interpretation: To address concerns that the results hold only for a conflict measure of
at least 5 battle-related deaths, the table shows that the results are nearly unchanged




Table 5-B17 – OLS results (Battle-related Deaths)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: WB Aid
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.0164∗ -0.0014 -0.0025 -0.0174∗∗∗ -0.0165∗∗∗ -0.0142∗∗ -0.0106 -0.0142∗ -0.0131
(0.0092) (0.0071) (0.0065) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0065) (0.0077) (0.0074) (0.0082)
N 13104 13104 13104 13104 13050 13050 11699 13050 11699
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -0.0119 0.0034 0.0068 -0.0055 -0.0008 0.0004 0.0001 0.0034 0.0025
(0.0087) (0.0065) (0.0054) (0.0048) (0.0055) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0063) (0.0064)
N 9464 9464 9464 9464 8700 8700 8254 8700 8254
Country FE No Yes Yes – – – – – –
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes – –
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country ×Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients with the log of battle-related deaths + 0.01 as dependent variable (category 3). Standard errors in
parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for
the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click
here to go back to section 5-6.6.
Interpretation: To address concerns that the results hold only for a dichotomous conflict measure, the table shows that the results are nearly unchanged
compared to Table 5-3 if considering log of battle-related deaths as the dependent variable. In addition, the coefficients for our preferred specification
(8) become insignificant in the IV setting of Table 5-B18.
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Table 5-B18 – IV (Battle-Related Deaths)
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV Second Stage: World Bank
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.0179 -0.0340
(0.0340) (0.0358)
N 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.639 86.724
IV First stage: World Bank
IDAPosition t-1×Cum. Prob t-2 70.9363∗∗∗ 80.8832∗∗∗
(7.1065) (8.6854)
N 12325 12325
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: China
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -0.0312 -0.0180
(0.0337) (0.0419)
N 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 36.578 31.190
IV First stage: China
ChineseCommodity t-3×Cum. Prob t-3 -14.0193∗∗∗ -12.6964∗∗∗
(2.3180) (2.2734)
N 7975 7975
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients for the log of battle-related deaths
+0.01 as dependent variable (category 3). The sample includes first order subnational
regions in African countries for the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China).
Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional
level. Both regressions include year and region fixed effects as well as time trends.
Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. The constituent
term of the probability is depicted in the appendix.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to go back to section 5-6.6.
Interpretation: To address concerns that the results hold only for a dichotomous conflict
measure, the table shows that the results are nearly unchanged compared to Table 5-4
if considering log of battle-related deaths as the dependent variable.
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Table 5-B19 – OLS results (Demonstrations)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: WB Aid
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) 0.0578 0.1247∗ 0.3399∗∗∗ 0.0514 0.0414 0.0491 0.0272 0.0390 0.0260
(0.0684) (0.0708) (0.0705) (0.0472) (0.0454) (0.0569) (0.0640) (0.0633) (0.0700)
N 13104 13104 13104 13104 13050 13050 11699 13050 11699
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(ChineseAid t-2) 0.7830∗∗∗ 0.8995∗∗∗ 0.9203∗∗∗ -0.1090 -0.0865 -0.0781 -0.0711 -0.1094 -0.0955
(0.1899) (0.1649) (0.1700) (0.0766) (0.0864) (0.0964) (0.0983) (0.1188) (0.1213)
N 9464 9464 9464 9464 8700 8700 8254 8700 8254
Country FE No Yes Yes – – – – – –
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes – –
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country ×Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients with a binary indicator for demonstrations as dependent variable. The sample includes first order
subnational regions in African countries for the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered
at the country-year and regional level. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click
here to go back to section 5-6.4.
Interpretation: To address concerns that our non-finding for the OLS results on protests in Table 5-B27 is driven by the aggregation of riots,
demonstrations, and strikes, we consider each protest type by itself. The table shows that our preferred specifications (6) and (8) still exhibit no










Table 5-B20 – OLS results (Riots)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: WB Aid
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) 0.0920 0.0037 0.2350∗∗∗ 0.0129 -0.0060 -0.0060 -0.0203 -0.0853 -0.0864
(0.0620) (0.0856) (0.0617) (0.0533) (0.0510) (0.0584) (0.0635) (0.0710) (0.0771)
N 13104 13104 13104 13104 13050 13050 11699 13050 11699
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(ChineseAid t-2) 0.4258∗∗∗ 0.5248∗∗∗ 0.5289∗∗∗ 0.0006 0.0399 0.0316 0.0411 0.0424 0.0524
(0.1482) (0.1261) (0.1292) (0.0814) (0.0933) (0.0985) (0.0995) (0.1175) (0.1195)
N 9464 9464 9464 9464 8700 8700 8254 8700 8254
Country FE No Yes Yes – – – – – –
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes – –
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country ×Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients with a binary indicator for riots as dependent variable. The sample includes first order subnational
regions in African countries for the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the
country-year and regional level. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here
to go back to section 5-6.4.
Interpretation: To address concerns that our non-finding for the OLS results on protests in Table 5-B27 is driven by the aggregation of riots,
demonstrations, and strikes, we consider each protest type by itself. The table shows that our preferred specifications (6) and (8) still exhibit no
statistically significant relationship between riots and aid.
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Table 5-B21 – OLS results (Strikes)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: WB Aid
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) 0.0020 0.0302 0.1288∗∗∗ -0.0197 -0.0252 -0.0377 -0.0374 -0.0717 -0.0704
(0.0310) (0.0391) (0.0377) (0.0309) (0.0333) (0.0415) (0.0454) (0.0503) (0.0555)
N 13104 13104 13104 13104 13050 13050 11699 13050 11699
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(ChineseAid t-2) 0.1611∗ 0.1832∗∗ 0.1931∗∗ -0.1785∗∗ -0.2042∗∗ -0.1845∗∗ -0.1817∗ -0.1620 -0.1654
(0.0847) (0.0810) (0.0846) (0.0712) (0.0804) (0.0938) (0.0959) (0.1046) (0.1114)
N 9464 9464 9464 9464 8700 8700 8254 8700 8254
Country FE No Yes Yes – – – – – –
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes – –
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country ×Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients with a binary indicator for strikes as dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered
at the country-year and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese
Aid. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to go back to section 5-6.4.
Interpretation: To address concerns that our non-finding for the OLS results on protests in Table 5-B27 is driven by the aggregation of riots, demonstrations,
and strikes, we consider each protest type by itself. The table shows that our preferred specifications (6) and (8) still exhibit no statistically significant










Table 5-B22 – IV (Riots, Demonstrations & Strikes [SCAD])
Panel A: WB Aid (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV Second Stage: World Bank
Demonstr. Demonstr. Riots Riots Strikes Strikes
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.2232 -0.1458 0.0106 -0.1950 0.0289 -0.0184
(0.2514) (0.2808) (0.2543) (0.2294) (0.1793) (0.1463)
N 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.639 86.724 99.639 86.724 99.639 86.724
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: China
Demonstr. Demonstr. Riots Riots Strikes Strikes
ln(ChineseAid t-2) 0.0498 0.0686 -0.0629 0.0424 -0.1489 -0.0776
(0.4018) (0.4707) (0.3622) (0.4312) (0.4183) (0.5076)
N 7975 7975 7975 7975 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 36.578 31.190 36.578 31.190 36.578 31.190
Country-Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients for any violence of these three types as dependent variable. The sample includes first
order subnational regions in African countries for the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses,
two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. Both regressions include year and region fixed effects as well as time trends.
Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. OLS results are depicted in the appendix. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01 Click here to go back to section 5-6.4
Interpretation: The table shows the intrumental variables results for specification (6) and (8) of Tables 5-B19, 5-B20, and 5-B21. There
is no evidence that aid by either donor is statistically significantly affecting demonstrations, riots, and strikes individually in Africa
during our sample period.
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Table 5-B23 – ADM1 IV (Repression (non-lethal) - Regions with UCDP violence
against civilians coded as zero)
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV: IDA Position - Actors
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) 0.1543 0.0885
(0.1042) (0.1177)
N 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.639 86.724
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV: Chinese Commodity - Actors
ln(ChineseAid t-2) 0.6103∗∗ 0.7696∗∗
(0.2873) (0.3439)
N 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 36.578 31.190
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients for a binary pro-governmental
violence indicator as dependent variable. The sample includes first order
subnational regions in African countries for the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-
2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the
country-year and regional level. Both regressions include year and region fixed
effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-
specific time trends. The constituent term of the probability is depicted in the
appendix. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to go back to section
5-6.4.
Interpretation: One concern is that our findings in Table 5-6, based on the
SCAD repression data are somehow affected by repression overlapping with
lethal conflicts recorded in the UCDP-GED data. To test the robustness of
the repression results, this table shows that theynearly unchanged even if the
repression indicator ignores cases that also feature recorded UCDP violence
against civilians. Repression is thus distinct from large scale conflict against
civilians events.
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Table 5-B24 – Non-lethal Repression [SCAD] - Continuous measure
Panel A: WB Aid (1) (2)
IV Second Stage: World Bank
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) 0.0011 0.0012
(0.0014) (0.0013)
N 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.639 86.724
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: China
ln(ChineseAid t-2) 0.0072∗∗ 0.0092∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0045)
N 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 36.578 31.190
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients for a continuous measure of non-
lethal pro-government violence as dependent variable. The sample includes first
order subnational regions in African countries for the 1995-2012 (WB) and the
2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at
the country-year and regional level. Both regressions include year and region
fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared
country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to
go back to section 5-6.4.
Interpretation: The table addresses the concern that the results of Table 5-6 only
hold for the binary dependent variable of non-lethal government repression. The
relationship of Chinese aid on non-lethal government repression remains positive
and statistically significant.
Comparison with OLS estimates
To test if results substantially change when using OLS, we consider the results
corresponding to the IV estimates on actors (Table 5-5) and the aggregated outcome
for riots, demonstrations, and strikes (Table 5-6). Table 5-B25 suggests mostly
neutral effects, while significantly negatively coefficients of WB aid occur for state-
based and non-state violence. Regarding riots, demonstrations, and strikes, Table
5-B27 shows that the different actors’ results become insignificant once we condition
on regional level fixed effects.
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Table 5-B25 – Actors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: WB Aid - OLS
State vs. N-State N-State vs. N-State State vs. Civilans N-State vs. Civilians
OLS: WB - Actors ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.1229∗∗ -0.1365∗∗ -0.0348 -0.0784 -0.0596 -0.0372 -0.1040∗∗ -0.0979∗∗
(0.0580) (0.0615) (0.0417) (0.0526) (0.0373) (0.0384) (0.0427) (0.0473)
N 13050 13050 13050 13050 13050 13050 13050 13050
Panel B: Chinese Aid - OLS
State vs. N-State N-State vs. N-State State vs. Civilans N-State vs. Civilians
OLS: China - Actors ln(ChineseAid t-2) -0.0009 0.0122 -0.0162 0.0016 -0.0702 -0.0625 -0.0338 -0.0334
(0.0491) (0.0591) (0.0529) (0.0659) (0.0427) (0.0454) (0.0292) (0.0373)
N 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700
Country-Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD¡5). The sample includes first order subnational regions in
African countries for the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and
regional level. Conflicts are considered for the WB from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to the lag structure. Exogenous (time-varying)
controls are included in all regressions. Time Trends included, consist of linear and squared country-specific time trends as well as linear regional time trends.
”State vs N-State” refers to state-based violence against non-government actors, ”N-State vs N-State” refers to non-government violence against the other
organized non-state groups, and ”State vs Civilians” refers to one-sided violence versus civilians by the government and ”N-State vs. Civilians” refers to
one-sided violence versus civilians by non-government (NG) actors. The categories are mutually exclusive. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to
go back to Table 5-5.











Table 5-B26 – OLS results (Protests: Riots, Demonstrations & Strikes [SCAD])
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: WB Aid
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) 0.1194 0.1291 0.4360∗∗∗ 0.0106 -0.0140 -0.0035 -0.0443 -0.0092 -0.0270
(0.0912) (0.1028) (0.0885) (0.0641) (0.0635) (0.0779) (0.0845) (0.0897) (0.0993)
N 13104 13104 13104 13104 13050 13050 11699 13050 11699
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(ChineseAid t-2) 0.8761∗∗∗ 1.0301∗∗∗ 1.0445∗∗∗ -0.1026 -0.0468 -0.0182 -0.0041 0.0141 0.0330
(0.2247) (0.1888) (0.1939) (0.0880) (0.0973) (0.1005) (0.1022) (0.1265) (0.1296)
N 9464 9464 9464 9464 8700 8700 8254 8700 8254
Country FE No Yes Yes – – – – – –
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes – –
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country ×Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients with a binary indicator for any violence of these three types as dependent variable. The sample
includes first order subnational regions in African countries for the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses,
two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01 Click here to go back to section 5-6.4.
Interpretation: The table display the corresponding OLS results of Table 5-6. The results are in line with the instrumental variable estimates since
they are mostly negative, but statistically insignificant.
AnalyticalAppendix
187
Table 5-B27 – OLS results (Non-lethal Government Repression)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: WB Aid
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) 0.0406∗∗ 0.0645∗∗∗ 0.0955∗∗∗ 0.0474∗∗ 0.0301 0.0327 0.0200 0.0139 -0.0022
(0.0177) (0.0217) (0.0231) (0.0193) (0.0191) (0.0209) (0.0232) (0.0289) (0.0287)
N 13104 13104 13104 13104 13050 13050 11699 13050 11699
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(ChineseAid t-2) 0.2144∗∗∗ 0.2116∗∗∗ 0.2248∗∗∗ 0.0279 0.0185 0.0126 0.0151 0.0079 0.0116
(0.0814) (0.0702) (0.0712) (0.0476) (0.0521) (0.0552) (0.0564) (0.0660) (0.0674)
N 9464 9464 9464 9464 8700 8700 8254 8700 8254
Country FE No Yes Yes – – – – – –
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes – –
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country ×Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients with a binary indicator for non-lethal government repression as dependent variable. The sample
includes first order subnational regions in African countries for the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses,
two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01 Click here to go back to section 5-6.4.
Interpretation: The table display the corresponding OLS results of Table 5-6. The results are in line with the IV estimates in Table 5-6. The estimate
for China is positive and significant.
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5-B3 Channels - Aid Sectors
Aid in different sectors could be more or less likely to fuel or calm down a conflict.
We examine aid projects in eight subcategories with and without country-year FE.
For the WB, the IV strategy works well using sector-specific probabilities. For
China, we only show OLS resultsdue to severe weak IV problems caused by limited
observations in certain sectors.
Aid in different sectors exhibit different effects on conflict. Table 5-B28 shows
that there are positive coefficients of WB (Chinese) aid in a few categories, though,
statistically insignificant. The insignificant negative average effects in previous
tables seem to be driven by significant conflict-reducing effects for the sectors
”finance” (WB only) and ”transportation” (WB and China). A 100% increase in
WB finance aid is associated with a 1.59 percentage point reduction in the conflict
likelihood – relative to the baseline likelihood of 12 percent. Examining a sample of
the 1,361 finance projects shows that they typically support both existing and new
projects to induce structural or sectoral reforms. These projects provide technical
assistance and consulting, in topics of regulation and finance, or business services.48
As monetary disbursements are rather small, the main impact must stem from the
knowledge transfer and technical support to modernize and develop capital markets,
banks and insurances, as well as technical assistance to enhance transparency and
regulation.
Regarding the transportation sector, a 100% increase in WB (Chinese) aid is
associated with a 6.7 (3.4) percentage points reduction in the conflict likelihood.
This sector has many large-scale infrastructure projects with large disbursements
in dollar terms. The negative effect suggests that high transportation costs
were significant obstacles for exchange, consumption, public goods provision, and
eventually economic growth (see also ??). This seems to dominate both potentially
negative effects on corruption (Isaksson and Kotsadam, 2018a), and disputes over
land usage. It is in line with (Bluhm et al., 2020), who show that Chinese
infrastructure projects reduce economic inequality and, hence, potential reasons for
conflict.49
Overall, the heterogeneities across aid categories are a first explanation for the
relatively broad confidence interval when studying the average effect of WB and
Chinese aid. We find no significant conflict-fueling effect on any aid sector for
neither donor. The overall negative relationship does not seem to mask strong
conflict-fueling effects in certain sectors.50
48Out of 40 projects, 26 were in one of those categories. Appendix section 5-A4 documents how
we retrieve detailed information on World Bank aid in the finance sector.
49Improvements in transportation infrastructure are likely linked to higher accessibility for
the media and correlate with mobile phone coverage. This would induce an upward bias to our
estimates (Weidmann, 2016; Von Borzyskowski and Wahman, 2019).
50Table A5-B44 presents WB OLS and ChineseIV results. The results differ slightly, but there is
no significant positive effect in any sector. One caveat of these regressions is that high collinearity




Table 5-B28 – Aid sectors and conflict
World Bank Aid Sectors - IV (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: No Country-Year FE AX BX CX EX FX JX LX TX WX YX
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) 0.2179 -0.2102 0.3423 0.5525 -1.6744∗∗ 0.2773 -0.1658 -0.7843∗∗ 0.5021 -0.4463
(0.3572) (0.4195) (0.3016) (0.4572) (0.7877) (0.4321) (0.2858) (0.3323) (0.5593) (0.3647)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 58.309 80.342 39.353 50.568 16.781 73.307 33.666 64.555 40.026 31.887
Panel B: Country-Year FE
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) 0.4793 -0.4087 0.2652 0.2253 -1.5963∗ 0.2952 -0.1206 -0.6667∗ -0.2726 -0.3717
(0.3152) (0.4445) (0.2709) (0.4771) (0.9361) (0.4020) (0.2764) (0.3570) (0.6850) (0.3299)
N 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 59.949 61.188 56.632 31.111 12.238 73.686 36.219 28.587 23.180 33.957
Chinese Aid Sectors - OLS
Panel C: No Country-Year FE AX BX CX EX FX JX LX TX WX YX
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -0.3165 -0.2123 0.1770 -0.0830 -0.0168 0.3516 -0.2780∗ -0.2974 0.8388
(0.2001) (0.1446) (0.1321) (0.1584) (0.1604) (0.2681) (0.1633) (0.1842) (0.8914)
Panel D:Country-Year FE
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -0.1946 -0.1881 0.1281 -0.0484 0.0287 0.3241 -0.3378∗ 0.0377 0.7787
(0.2307) (0.1405) (0.1252) (0.1635) (0.1533) (0.2792) (0.1946) (0.2148) (0.7926)
N 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD¡5). The sample includes first order subnational regions in African countries for the
1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. Conflicts are considered for the WB
from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to the lag structure. Regressions account for (time-varying) exogenous controls and time trends. Time Trends include
linear and squared country-specific time trends as well as a linear regional trend. AX - ”Agriculture, fishing, and forestry” BX - ”Public Administration, Law, and Justice” CX
- ”Information and communications” EX - ”Education” FX - ”Finance” JX - ”Health and other social services” LX - ”Energy and mining” TX - ”Transportation” WX - ”Water,
sanitation and flood protection” YX - ”Industry and Trade” Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
Interpretation: One may be concerned about the existence of a certain conflict-increasing type of aid that is masked in our overall aid measure. To address this concern, we find
that aid in any sectors is, if anything, significantly negatively related to conflict. However, there is a fair bit of heterogeneity. This also highlights that some types of aid may have a
different effect in the short and in the long run. Generally, this suggests ample room for future research to explore these results in more detail.
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5-B4 Channels - Ethnic groups and governing coalition
Conflicts are not only driven by economic considerations but often strongly
influenced by existing cleavages between groups. Ethnic identities are among the
most salient traits and ethnicities constitute a very important reference group in
most African countries. To measure ethnic homelands, we use the GREG dataset
(Weidmann et al., 2010). This dataset is a geo-referenced version of the initial
locations of ethnic homelands based on the Soviet Atlas Narodov Mira. These
locations were determined before our sample, and, even though immigration becomes
more important over time, prior studies suggest that a large share of Africans still
live in their ethnic home region (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011). This makes those
group polygons a noisy, but still informative measure.
The first important question is whether the effect of aid projects differs between
more and less ethnically fractionalized regions. Theoretically, one may expect
more potential for dissatisfaction about an unequal allocation of projects or the
distribution of the associated benefits in ethnically fractionalized regions. We
compute standard fractionalization measures in line with the literature (Alesina and
Ferrara, 2005; Fearon and Laitin, 2003b), and split the sample between countries
in regions with fractionalization above or below the median. Appendix Table 5-
B30 shows no large differences. When including country-year FE, the negative
relationship between aid and conflict becomes even a bit stronger, but the difference
is small. Even in the more fractionalized regions, it does not turn positive. 51
More important than considering ethnic cleavages, in general, is to define which
ethnic groups are allies and form a joint coalition and which groups are outside that
coalition. To classify administrative regions, our unit of analysis, we distinguish
whether all groups (Coalition), at least one group (Mixed), or no group (N-Coalition)
in a region is part of the governing coalition in a particular year. The information
about the power status comes from the time-variant Ethnic Power Relations (EPR)
dataset (Vogt et al., 2015). Wherever possible, we match the group power status
from EPR in a particular year to one of the time-invarying GREG group homelands.
The original dataset assigns eight different power statuses to groups. The difference
is sometimes marginal and hard to interpret, which is why we only use the more
precise information on whether a group was part of the governing coalition or not.
We then intersect the ethnic group polygons with the administrative regions to
classify regions as one of the three categories.
This distinction aims at testing the plausibility of the existing results, and at
uncovering heterogeneous effects that may be hidden in the averages. For instance, it
may be that there is no conflict-inducing effect on average. However, assuming that
aid project benefit governing groups more often, existing tensions and conflict may
be fueled especially in mixed districts where other groups observe these distributional
differences. In contrast, rapacity theory would predict that governing coalition
regions with large aid inflows become more attractive for rebels to capture.
We find several interesting differences in Table 5-B29. The results for the
WB always change signs depending on the inclusion of country-year fixed effects.
Nonetheless, there is again never a significant conflict-inducing effect. For China,
51Note that for individual aid sectors, the IV does not perform sufficiently well for China when
splitting the samples. Therefore, we show the OLS specifications for all the sample splits for
China. We intend to conduct a more in-depth analysis of aid inequality and ethnic groups in an
accompanying chapter.
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both coefficients for mixed regions are positive. However, all coefficients are
statistically insignificant. Even when considering governing coalition structures, on
average Chinese aid does not increase conflicts with at least 5 BRDs.52 Moreover, we
control in all regressions for fractionalization, which we define in this case as 1−∑ s2,
where s is the ethnic groups area share in the administrative region. To account
for the important role that ethnic fractionalization takes in the politico-economic
literature (e.g., Alesina et al., 2003), we consider also a sample split at the median of
ethnic fractionalization in Table 5-B30. In the subsample the instrumental variable
retains strength. Although coefficients change signs, when considering the more
fractionalized regions, results support robustness of the neutral effects.
52This finding is robust to defining the coalition only as the more powerful senior, dominant











Table 5-B29 – ADM1 results (Power status - Member of Coalition Group)
Panel A: WB - IV (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conflict in region belonging to ... N-Coalition N-Coalition Coalition Coalition Mixed Mixed
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.7052 0.2016 0.0686 -0.6372 0.1552 -0.3712
(0.9362) (1.3680) (0.4500) (0.4716) (0.5181) (0.5339)
N 2144 2075 3750 3651 4569 4537
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 35.086 18.726 41.902 26.417 63.396 66.952
Panel B: China- IV:
Conflict in region belonging to ... N-Coalition N-Coalition Coalition Coalition Mixed Mixed
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -0.6513 0.7011 -0.7345 -1.2272 0.6919 1.1403
(1.0808) (3.4968) (0.5935) (0.7612) (0.6681) (0.9162)
N 1335 1285 2487 2420 2944 2924
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.033 0.055 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 15.575 3.709 59.921 46.322 22.702 19.653
Country ×Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control for Fractionalization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD¡5). The sample includes first order subnational
regions in African countries for the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered
at the country-year and regional level. Conflicts are considered for the WB from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due
to the lag structure. Both regressions include (time-varying) exogenous controls, year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time
Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends as well as linear regional time trends. Columns (1) & (2) refer to all regions
without members of the governing coalition, whereas columns (3) & (4) to mixed regions with some groups in and out of the coalition, and
columns (5) & (6) to regions that contain groups exclusively from the coalition. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Interpretation: The table addresses concerns that our analysis masked a conflict-increasing effect of aid flowing to regions with different levels
of political power. There is no evidence of such an effect of aid.
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Table 5-B30 – Sample-split: Median Fractionalization
Panel A: WB Aid - IV:
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.2585 -0.6189 0.1471 -0.0455
(0.4163) (0.4904) (0.5688) (0.7054)
N 5474 5474 4998 4998
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification
test p-value
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-
statistic
71.721 49.454 75.067 65.391
Panel B: Chinese Aid - IV:
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -0.4831 -0.5251 0.0510 0.7714
(0.5695) (0.7265) (0.6113) (0.7163)
N 3542 3542 3234 3234
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification
test p-value
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-
statistic
51.569 38.166 23.501 20.763
Country ×Year FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if
BRD¡5). The sample includes first order subnational regions in African countries for the
1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way
clustered at the country-year and regional level. The sample is split in regions, which are
below the country level median/mean of ethnic fractionalization (0) [columns (1) & (2)] or
above the median/mean (1) [columns (3) & (4)]. Ethnic fractionalization is based on 1−
∑
s2,
where s is the ethnic groups area share in the administrative region. Conflicts are considered
for the WB from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to the lag structure.
Both regressions include (time-varying) exogenous cont+rols, year and region fixed effects as
well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends as
well as linear regional time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Interpretation: Does aid increase the conflict likelihood if a region is highly fractionalized due
to ethnic tensions? The table shows that there is no evidence for such an effect.
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5-B5 Regime Types
Development aid may have differential impacts across political systems due to
different allocation decisions and distributional aspects. As a further sensitivity
check, we consider heterogeneous effects across regime types. Based on the Polity
IV data by Marshall et al. (2014), we distinguish democracies (Polity Score geq +7)
and autocracies (Polity Score ¡+7). Results are depicted for outright conflict in
Table 5-B31 and for repression in Table 5-B32.
Table 5-B31 – IV results - Aid and conflict across regime types
Panel A: World Bank Aid (1) (2) (3) (4)
Autocracy Democracy
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1)
-0.3335 -0.3267 4.0175 1.0187
(0.4762) (0.5092) (5.0638) (2.0015)
N 10411 10411 1914 1914
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification
test p-value
0.000 0.000 0.255 0.103
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-
statistic
71.845 66.353 1.238 2.867
Panel B: Chinese Aid (1) (2) (3) (4)
Autocracy Democracy
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -0.3292 -0.4861 0.1872 0.2647
(0.6014) (0.7091) (0.4943) (0.9213)
N 6409 5521 1556 1311
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification
test p-value
0.000 0.000 0.017 0.044
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-
statistic
42.309 33.295 3.960 19.005
Country-Year FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if
BRD¡5). The sample includes first order subnational regions in African countries for the
1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way
clustered at the country-year and regional level. Both regressions include exogenous (time-
varying) controls. Year and region fixed effects as well as time trends are included in all
regressions. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends and a linear
regional trend. Click here to go back to section 5-6.6. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Interpretation: One may be concerned that not differentiating between regime types may
have masked an aid-conflict relationship. After all, there is the tendency that accountability
principles are weaker and power concentration higher in autocratic countries. The table does
not provide evidence that aid in autocratic or democratic countries has a significant relationship
with conflict.
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Table 5-B32 – IV results - Aid and repression across regime types
Panel A: World Bank Aid (1) (2) (3) (4)
Autocracy Democracy
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1)
0.0936 0.0338 2.1565 0.6255
(0.1160) (0.1293) (2.3762) (0.6082)
N 10411 10411 1914 1914
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification
test p-value
0.000 0.000 0.255 0.103
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification
F-statistic
71.845 66.353 1.238 2.867
Panel B: Chinese Aid (1) (2) (3) (4)
Autocracy Democracy
ln(ChineseAid t-2) 0.6312 0.8240∗ 0.7814∗∗ 1.0828∗∗∗
(0.4112) (0.4851) (0.3267) (0.3016)
N 6409 5521 1556 1311
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification
test p-value
0.000 0.000 0.017 0.044
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification
F-statistic
42.309 33.295 3.960 19.005
Country-Year FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator on occurrence of non-lethal repression (pro-
government violence). The sample includes first order subnational regions in African countries
for the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses,
two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. Both regressions include exogenous
(time-varying) controls. Year and region fixed effects as well as time trends are included in all
regressions. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends and a linear
regional trend. Click here to go back to section 5-6.6. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Interpretation: One may be concerned that not differentiating between regime types may have
masked a potential relationship between government repression and aid. In line with Table
5-6, only Chinese Aid does correlate with higher government repression incidences. This result
holds for autocratic and democratic countries, although the relationship seems to be stronger
in democratic countries.
5-B6 Spatial Dimension (Spill Overs and Aggregation
Levels)
Aggregation levels
Despite the many advantages of geospatial analysis (e.g., precision, geographical
control variables), robustness is subject to the modifiable area unit problem
(MAUP). More specifically, other conflict mechanisms can be at play when
considering different levels of aggregation. Testing robustness on different spatial
levels, hence, reduces the risk of ecological fallacy (Maystadt et al., 2014). This is
specifically relevant in the aid-conflict nexus where different political entities may
appropriate funds to engage in violent or peace-building activity. For this reason,
we consider conflict and aid in the subordinate ADM2 regions both with OLS (IV)
in Table 5-B33 (5-B34). Results are generally consistent with the main finding of a
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neutral effect of aid on conflict. Although the IV estimates for China turn positive,
they do not attain statistical significance at any conventional level.
Additionally, we turn to an analysis on the country level as conflict may not
manifest on the regional level, but spill over to other localities. Also on the country-
level Table 5-B35 does provide neither for the WB nor for China any evidence of a
significant link between aid and conflict. All OLS and IV estimates in Table 5-B35
are negative and for China even statistically significant using OLS method. Thus,
the analysis on the country level is in line with the results on the regional level. The
negative and non-significant effects, which are not in line with previous literature
on the country level (for instance, Collier and Hoeffler, 2004b), may be due to our
focus on aid flows, which are geocoded (see Section 5-3.1). To address concerns that
our analysis misses non-geocoded aid flows of the two donors, we make use of the
feature that we can include those flows on a country-level. Consistently, results in
Table 5-B36 indicate significantly negative to neutral effects.53 Hence, even when
accounting for non-geocoded aid the main conclusion holds that there is no evidence
that aid is positively related to conflict.
53Ideally, we would have liked to consider results in Table 5-B36 also via an instrumental variable
approach, which was not possible due to weak IV concerns in the first stage.
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Table 5-B33 – ADM2 level OLS results (Intensity 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: WB Aid
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) 0.0288 0.0188 0.0068 -0.0740∗∗∗ -0.0674∗∗∗ -0.0580∗∗ -0.0354 -0.0627∗∗ -0.0535∗∗
(0.0209) (0.0196) (0.0219) (0.0245) (0.0228) (0.0231) (0.0256) (0.0246) (0.0263)
N 105354 105354 105354 105354 105214 105214 91333 105214 91333
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(ChineseAid t-2) 0.0105 0.0104 0.0579∗ -0.0392 -0.0499 -0.0410 -0.0455 -0.0501 -0.0500
(0.0407) (0.0402) (0.0331) (0.0318) (0.0388) (0.0319) (0.0327) (0.0438) (0.0454)
N 76089 76089 76089 76089 70132 70132 64482 70132 64482
Country FE No Yes Yes – – – – – –
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes – –
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country ×Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD¡5). The sample includes second order subnational regions
in African countries for the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year
and regional level. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to go back to
section 5-6.6.
Interpretation: One concern may be that the results in Table 5-3 only hold for the aggregated data at the first sub-national administrative level, but there
may be conflict-fueling effects at lower levels. We address this concern by validating the ADM1 results with an alternative lower-level of aggregation, the
second-order administrative sub-divisions (ADM2). The table shows that once region fixed effects are included all coefficient signs are unchanged and the
magnitude becomes stronger, on average.
198 Chapter 5. Development Aid and Conflict
Table 5-B34 – ADM2-level IV (Intensity 1)
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV Second Stage: World Bank
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) 0.2599 0.1522
(0.1644) (0.1171)
N 99367 99367
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 82.851 67.210
IV First stage: World Bank
IDAPosition t-1×Cum. Prob t-2 62.4924∗∗∗ 69.9580∗∗∗
(6.8656) (8.5333)
N 99367 99367
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: China
ln(ChineseAid t-2) 0.0517 0.0496
(0.2007) (0.2748)
N 64285 64285
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.001 0.001
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 12.896 13.020
IV First stage: China
Commodity t-3×Cum. Prob t-3 -14.2846∗∗∗ -12.8430∗∗∗
(3.9779) (3.5593)
N 64285 64285
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0
if BRD¡5). The sample includes second order subnational regions in African countries for
the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses,
two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. Both regressions include year
and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared
country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to go back
to section 5-6.6.
Interpretation: One concern may be that the results in Table 5-3 only hold for the
aggregated data at the first sub-national administrative level, but there may be conflict-
fueling effects at lower levels. We address this concern by validating the ADM1 results
with an alternative lower-level of aggregation, the second-order administrative sub-
divisions (ADM2). The table shows that while the first stage results are nearly identical,
the coefficients in the second stage remain small and statistically insignificant. We test
the consequences of higher levels of aggregation in Table 5-B35 and 5-B36.
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Table 5-B35 – Country level aggregation with OLS and IV
Cross-Country Analysis
ln(WBAid t-1) -0.2157 -2.4586
(0.2638) (3.9577)
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -0.2056∗ -1.0947
(0.1041) (0.7621)




Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-
statistic
2.743 22.130
Estimation method: OLS IV OLS IV
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥25, 0 if BRD¡25).
Columns (1) and (2) depict OLS/IV coefficients for WB geocoded aid aggregated at the country
level. Columns (3) and (4) depict OLS/IV coefficients for Chinese geocoded aid aggregated
at the country level. This includes aid, which is coded at least at the ADM1 level (refer to
Figure 5-1). The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for
the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Conflicts are considered for the WB from 1996 to
2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to the lag structure. All regressions include
year and country fixed effects, as well as a linear country-trend. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the level of the country. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to go
back to section 5-6.6.
Interpretation: To test if a higher levels of data aggregation leads to a different conclusion
about the effect of aid on conflict, the estimates refer to the country level, where aid and
battle-related deaths were aggregated at the country level. The coefficients are very small
and statistically insignificant. Even though the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is well below the
critical value of 10 for the World Bank estimations, the other results indicate that there is no
evidence that aid fuels conflict also when aggregating our date on the country level.
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Table 5-B36 – Country level aggregation with inclusion of non-geocoded projects
Panel A: WB Aid Geocoded only Non-Geocoded aid incld.
WB Aidt-1 -0.2157 -0.1491
(0.2638) (0.3263)




Panel B: Chinese Aid
Chinese Aidt-2 -0.2056∗ -0.2016∗
(0.1041) (0.1075)




Notes: Dependent variable: Category 2 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥25, 0 if BRD¡25).
Estimates refer to the country level, where aid and battle-related deaths were aggregated at the
country level. The first column depicts coefficients for geocoded aid aggregated at the country
level. The second column controlls for non-geocoded aid, which is aid coded less precise than
the ADM1 level (refer to Figure 5-1). The sample includes African countries for the 1995-
2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). The regression includes country and year fixed
effects, as well as a linear country-trend. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
level of the country. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to go back to section 5-6.6.
Interpretation: One potential issues is that the aid measures in Table 5-B35 ignore projects
that were not geo-coded or at least assigned to an ADM1 regions. This table shows that the
main coefficients remain negative and do not change much when controlling for non-geocoded
aid at the country level. Hence, omitting non-geocoded aid does not bias our results.
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5-B7 Mechanisms - Afrobarometer
Table 5-B37 – Mechanisms - Afrobarometer
WB WB China China
Panel A: Security
Security facilities: Police station present within walking distance? 0.001 0.008∗ 0.002 -
0.004∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Security forces: Any policemen or police vehicles? 0.002 0.004 0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Security forces: Any soldiers or army vehicles? 0.002∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.003
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Frequency of things stolen in past year? -0.001 -
0.006∗∗
0.004∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Frequency of phsysical attacks in the past year? -0.000 -
0.003∗∗∗
0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Panel B: Democratic norms and attitudes
Democracy: How democratic is your country today? -0.002 0.003 -0.005∗ -0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Democracy: Did you perceive last elections as free and fair? -0.003 -0.003 -
0.012∗∗
-0.012
(0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008)
Governance: Reject one-party rule 0.003 0.013∗ -0.006 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Governance: Reject military rule 0.006∗ 0.008∗ -0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Governance: Reject one-man rule 0.004∗ 0.006∗ -0.005∗ -
0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Reject government banning organizations that go against its policies 0.005∗ 0.014∗∗ -0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Panel C: Government responsiveness and repression
Frequency of contact to government official to express your view 0.003∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Fear of political intimidation or violence during campaigns -0.001 -
0.008∗∗∗
0.003 0.011∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
How often do people have to be careful about what they say in politics? 0.000 -0.005 0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Rule of Law: People must obey the law -0.004∗ -0.001 0.004∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Frequency of joining others to request government action -
0.006∗∗
(0.002)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Click here to go back to section 5-6.5.
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5-B8 Estimations - Miscellaneous
Estimation approach
Data sets with many zero outcome observations can ask for different estimation
approaches (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Therefore, we also consider a Poisson
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator in Table 5-B38. In line with
the main findings results are mostly non-significant and have a negative sign if
turning statistically significant.54 Due to the persistent nature of conflicts, the use
of lagged dependent variables is a recurring topic in the conflict literature (e.g.,
Bazzi and Blattman, 2014). Table 5-B40, thus, presents the results including a
lagged dependent variable, extending the main model by a lagged conflict indicator:
Ci,c,t = β1Ai,c,t−1/t−2 + β2Ci,c,t−1 + λc + τt + δi + λcT + λcT 2 +XExi,c,tβ2
+δiT +XEni,c,t−2β3 + κc,t + εi,c,t
(5-B1)
None of the coefficients in Table 5-B40 are positive, stressing the robustness of
our main findings.
Although less often considered, the choice of standard error clustering can affect
results substantially. Tables 5-B41 and 5-B42, thus, depart from our use of two-way
clustering on the country-year and regional level, but only cluster on the region.
Despite this adaptation, the results assure us that the insignificant findings are not
driven by our choice of standard error clustering.
54A clear caveat is that we can only use year fixed effects with PPML in our setting due to
convergence issues. Thus, as results do not differ substantially, we rely in the main part on OLS
and instrumental variable estimators.
Analytical Appendix 203
Table 5-B38 – PPML
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: WB Aid
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.0005 0.0178 -0.0171
(0.0063) (0.0149) (0.0173)
N 6246 1476 7344
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -0.0128∗ 0.0023 -0.0328∗
(0.0076) (0.0131) (0.0189)
N 3783 962 4589
Notes: Dependent variables- In column (1) a binary conflict
indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD¡5), in column (2) a binary
indicator if any event of non-lethal pro-government violence
took place, in column (3) a continuous measure of logged battle-
related deaths. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at
the regional level. The sample includes African countries for
the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012
for Chinese Aid. All regressions include year fixed effects. *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to go back to
section 5-6.6.
Interpretation: To address concerns that OLS regression is
not an optimal method for binary dependent variables and
dependent variables with many zeros we verify our results
with Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation (Silva
and Tenreyro, 2011). The results are in line with our main
specification since the majority of the coefficients are not
statistically significant or statistically significant but negative.
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Table 5-B39 – Negative Binomial
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
Intensity 1 (Dummy) Non-lethal repression (Dummy)




Panel B: Chinese Aid
Intensity 1 (Dummy) Non-lethal repression (Dummy)




Notes: Dependent variables- In column (1) a binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if
BRD¡5) and in column (2) a binary indicator if any event of non-lethal pro-government violence
took place. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the regional level. The sample includes
African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese
Aid. All regressions include year fixed effects. Due to convergence issues standard control
variables are not included. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to go back to
section 5-6.6.
Interpretation: To address concerns that OLS regression is not an optimal method for binary
dependent variables, we verify our results with a negative binomial estimator. IRR coefficients




Table 5-B40 – OLS results: Lagged dependent variable
Panel A: WB Aid (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.0844 -0.0069 -0.0173 -0.1659∗∗∗ -0.1575∗∗∗ -0.1406∗∗ -0.1149 -0.1647∗∗ -0.1652∗
(0.0520) (0.0551) (0.0458) (0.0585) (0.0586) (0.0680) (0.0795) (0.0780) (0.0862)
N 13104 13104 13104 13104 13050 13050 11699 13050 11699
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -0.0965∗ -0.0300 -0.0082 -0.0983∗ -0.0634 -0.0661 -0.0686 -0.0345 -0.0437
(0.0563) (0.0589) (0.0588) (0.0589) (0.0660) (0.0725) (0.0721) (0.0889) (0.0925)
N 9464 9464 9464 9464 8700 8700 8254 8700 8254
Country FE No Yes Yes – – – – – –
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes – –
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country ×Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD¡5). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-
year and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Applying
the lag structure of our regression equation, this means that conflicts are considered for the WB from 1996 to 2013 and for China from 2002 to 2014.
Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to go back to section 5-6.6.
Interpretation: To address concerns of conflict persistence, these regressions control for the first lag of the binary indicator. The coefficients are nearly










Table 5-B41 – ADM1 OLS results (Clustering at regional level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: WB Aid
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.1918∗∗∗ 0.0010 -0.0496 -0.2129∗∗∗ -0.2057∗∗∗ -0.1608∗∗ -0.1314∗ -0.1772∗∗ -0.1756∗
(0.0709) (0.0643) (0.0666) (0.0611) (0.0624) (0.0672) (0.0771) (0.0799) (0.0895)
N 13104 13104 13104 13104 13050 13050 11699 13050 11699
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -0.1753∗∗ -0.0233 -0.0026 -0.1090∗∗ -0.0663 -0.0654 -0.0682 -0.0347 -0.0441
(0.0761) (0.0664) (0.0676) (0.0540) (0.0605) (0.0680) (0.0687) (0.0743) (0.0757)
N 9464 9464 9464 9464 8700 8700 8254 8700 8254
Country FE No Yes Yes – – – – – –
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes – –
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country ×Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients with low Intensity Conflict (¿5 battle-related deaths) as dependent variable. The sample includes African
countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time
trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to go back to section 5-5.1.
Interpretation: One may be concerned that our null finding is based on too conservative clustering of our standard errors. To address this, the standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the regional level. As expected, the standard errors become slightly smaller which increases the statistical significance
of the negative coefficients.
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Table 5-B42 – ADM1 IV (Clustering at Regional Level)
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV Second Stage: World Bank
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.1014 -0.2252
(0.3276) (0.3899)
N 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 237.269 132.466
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: China
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -0.2582 -0.1886
(0.4169) (0.5231)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 55.897 41.160
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if
BRD¡5). The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-
2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions include year
and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and
squared country-specific time trends. The constituent term of the probability is
depicted in the appendix.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to go back to section 5-5.1.
Interpretation: One may be concerned that our null finding is based on a
clustering of our standard errors that is too conservative. To address this,
the standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the regional level. The
standard errors even become slightly smaller, but the negative coefficients remain
statistically insignificant.
Time Contingency
Policy changes over time may affect the conflict implications of foreign aid, e.g., via
conditionality or choice of different projects. This could, for instance, be a change
in Western or US policy paradigms that also affected WB strategies and decisions.
To allow for heterogeneity over time, we split the sample in an early period (for the
WB 1995-2003 and for China 2000-2005) and a late period (for the WB 2004-2012
and for China 2006-2012). Coefficients remain insignificant, which provides further
evidence that neutral effects on average are not driven by a specific time period.
Definition of aid (Sectors and weighting scheme )
Table 5-B44 reports the OLS/IV estimates corresponding to sectoral aid in Table
5-B28. Although significance is affected the negative signs in the transport and
finance sectors are retained.
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Populations weighting is an alternative allocation assumption, as opposed to
location distribution. Tables 5-B45 and 5-B46 indicate that results are not driven
by this assumption.
Table 5-B43 – ADM1 IV (WB Aid - Time Split)
Panel A: WB Aid
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) ¡=2003 0.7770 0.2329
(0.6407) (0.6338)
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) ¿2003 -1.1608 -0.8405
(0.9499) (1.0267)
N 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underid. test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak id. F-statistic 19.628 10.073
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(ChineseAid t-2¡=2005) -0.1320 0.0335
(0.6197) (0.5777)
ln(ChineseAid t-2¿2005) -0.2266 -0.1853
(0.7862) (0.9107)
N 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.022 0.026
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 7.204 6.972
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator (100 if BRD≥5,
0 if BRD¡5). The sample includes first order subnational regions in African countries.
The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for
the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way
clustered at the country-year and regional level. Both regressions include year and
region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared
country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to go
back to section 5-6.6.
Interpretation: Are our results driven by different policy regimes over time? To
address this concern, the table splits the sample into different time periods, which
does not alter our main conclusion.
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Table 5-B44 – ADM1 - Aid Subtypes
WB Aid Subtypes - OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: No Country-Year FE AX BX CX EX FX JX LX TX WX YX
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) 0.0293 -0.1873∗∗ 0.1229 0.0215 -0.0958 -0.1575∗∗ 0.0236 -0.1479∗∗ -0.0339 -0.1125
(0.0734) (0.0832) (0.1526) (0.0759) (0.0886) (0.0688) (0.0855) (0.0689) (0.0816) (0.0933)
Panel B: Country-Year FE
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.0617 -0.2672∗∗∗ 0.0048 -0.0209 -0.0912 -0.1667∗ -0.0317 -0.1137 0.0013 -0.2080∗
(0.0872) (0.0953) (0.1737) (0.0990) (0.1352) (0.0896) (0.0935) (0.0898) (0.1010) (0.1067)
N 13050 13050 13050 13050 13050 13050 13050 13050 13050 13050
Chinese Aid Subtypes - IV
Panel C: No Country-Year FE AX BX CX EX JX LX TX WX YX
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -1.4578∗∗ -2.5352 -0.5066 0.7578 -0.1554 1.0265∗∗ -0.4216 0.1977 -7.0545
(0.7314) (1.6254) (0.3691) (0.6847) (0.3838) (0.4776) (0.3463) (0.5326) (102.9015)
Kleibergen-Paap underid. test p-value 0.176 0.015 0.472 0.120 0.062 0.214 0.028 0.554 0.101
Kleibergen-Paap weak id. F-statistic 1.712 11.768 0.484 3.225 4.727 1.718 6.006 0.318 7.075
Panel D: Country-Year FE
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -1.0048 -2.2549 -0.3010 0.8156 0.1259 0.9374∗ -0.4798 0.5000 1.3334
(0.8080) (1.8415) (0.3837) (0.7330) (0.4240) (0.5226) (0.4277) (0.6383) (2.8884)
N 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.232 0.011 0.674 0.095 0.064 0.530 0.043 0.626 0.173
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 1.107 10.909 0.156 2.936 4.322 0.369 4.282 0.212 2.467
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD¡5). The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and
2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Conflicts are considered for the WB from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to the lag structure. Regressions account for (time-varying)
exogenous controls and time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends as well as a linear regional trend. AX - ”Agriculture, fishing, and forestry” BX -
”Public Administration, Law, and Justice” CX - ”Information and communications” EX - ”Education” FX - ”Finance” JX - ”Health and other social services” LX - ”Energy and mining”
TX - ”Transportation” WX - ”Water, sanitation and flood protection” YX - ”Industry and Trade” Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional
level: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to go back to section 5-B3.











Table 5-B45 – OLS results: Population Weighted Aid Allocation
Panel A: WB Aid (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.1898∗ 0.0062 -0.0440 -0.2217∗∗∗ -0.2153∗∗∗ -0.1664∗∗ -0.1357 -0.1867∗∗ -0.1829∗∗
(0.1005) (0.0788) (0.0692) (0.0667) (0.0663) (0.0732) (0.0840) (0.0833) (0.0909)
N 13104 13104 13104 13104 13050 13050 11699 13050 11699
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -0.1776∗∗ -0.0246 -0.0037 -0.1137∗∗ -0.0718 -0.0696 -0.0723 -0.0390 -0.0482
(0.0865) (0.0704) (0.0648) (0.0576) (0.0648) (0.0728) (0.0726) (0.0891) (0.0925)
N 9464 9464 9464 9464 8700 8700 8254 8700 8254
Country FE No Yes Yes – – – – – –
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes – –
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country ×Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD¡5). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year
and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Conflicts
are considered for the WB from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to the lag structure. Time Trends include linear and squared
country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to go back to section 5-3.1.
Interpretation: To assign aid projects to each ADM1 region we assumed equal aid distribution across project localities in Table 5-3. This table shows that a
weighting scheme based on the region’s population size does not alter the coefficient significantly. Thus, the results are not based on specific aid allocation
assumptions.
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Table 5-B46 – ADM1 IV: Population Weighted Aid Allocation
Panel A: WB Aid (1) (2)
IV Second Stage: World Bank
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.1026 -0.2286
(0.3798) (0.4256)
N 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 100.841 88.424
Panel B: Chinese Aid (1) (2)
IV Second Stage: China
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -0.2613 -0.1903
(0.4332) (0.5305)
N 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 36.887 31.502
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if
BRD¡5). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year
and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period
of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions include
exogenous (time-varying) controls. Year and region fixed effects as well as time
trends are included in all regressions. Time Trends include linear and squared
country-specific time trends and a linear regional trend. The constituent term of
the probability is depicted in the appendix. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Click here to go back to section 5-3.1.
Interpretation: To assign aid projects to each ADM1 region we assumed equal
aid distribution across project localities in Table 5-3. This table shows that
a weighting scheme based on the region’s population size does not alter the
coefficient significantly. Thus, the results are not based on specific aid allocation
assumptions.
Both donors
Comparing both donors jointly comes at the disadvantage of losing five years of
observations for the WB and - linked to this - a reduction of IV strength. Although
the coefficients remain largely negative or insignificant in Tables 5-B47 (OLS) and
5-B48 (IV), the effects for the WB becomes less negative. Tables 5-B47 (OLS) and 5-
B48 (IV) indicate that this is mostly driven by the different sampling years, rather
than attributable to strong interactions between the two donors. It is important
to see in Table 5-B48 that the respective first stages for both donors become
weaker when trying to estimate them simultaneously, but the exogenous instruments
remains significant for the respective donor (column 2). This further supports that
the interaction terms capture a specific variation linked to the allocation process of
the two donors, instead of general trends or conflict patterns in the receiving regions.
Still, the K-P F-statistics of 3.5 in our preferred specification with country-year FE
underlines why we chose to estimate both first stages separately.
Table A5-B49 and Table A5-B50 show that the OLS and IV results also hold










Table 5-B47 – OLS results - Both Donors
WB & Chinese Aid (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.1460 0.0571 0.0808 -0.0603 -0.0973 0.0661 0.0674 -0.0793 -0.0948
(0.1194) (0.0951) (0.0913) (0.0864) (0.0859) (0.0866) (0.0887) (0.0884) (0.0925)
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -0.1278 -0.0291 0.0070 -0.1060∗ -0.0660 -0.0656 -0.0644 -0.0345 -0.0367
(0.0854) (0.0700) (0.0590) (0.0595) (0.0644) (0.0727) (0.0735) (0.0884) (0.0898)
N 8736 8736 8736 8736 8700 8700 8261 8700 8261
Country FE No Yes Yes – – – – – –
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes – –
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country ×Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD¡5). The sample includes first order subnational
regions in African countries for the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the
country-year and regional level. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click
here to go back to section 5-6.1.
Interpretation: The table shows the results when simultaneously including WB aid and Chinese aid in the regression equation. The coefficient
for the WB aid remain negative, but are somehow smaller compared to Table 5-3 and lose statistical significance. The coefficients for Chinese aid
remain largely unchanged. Table 5-B49 shows that the change for the WB is mainly driven to reducing the sample period by 5 years.
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Table 5-B48 – ADM1 IV - Both Donors (Intensity 1)
(1) (2)
IV Second Stage: World Bank
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.7029 -2.3839
(1.0780) (1.6965)
ln(ChineseAid t-1) -0.2482 -0.1655
(0.4319) (0.5415)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.005
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 11.573 3.489
IV First stage: World Bank
IDAPosition t-1×Cum. Prob t-2 57.3235∗∗∗ 63.8053∗∗∗
(12.0425) (24.1932)
ChineseCommodity t-3×Cum. Prob t-3 -0.2181 -0.1051
(0.6571) (0.6166)
N 7975 7975
IV First stage: China
IDAPosition t-1×Cum. Prob t-2 -17.9057∗ -10.1067
(9.3878) (13.2890)
ChineseCommodity t-3×Cum. Prob t-3 -13.9921∗∗∗ -12.7060∗∗∗
(2.3178) (2.2742)
N 7975 7975
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0
if BRD¡5). The sample includes first order subnational regions in African countries for
the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses,
two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. Both regressions include year
and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared
country-specific time trends. The constituent term of the probability is depicted in the
appendix. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Click here to go back to section 5-6.1.
Interpretation: The table shows the results when simultaneously including WB aid and
Chinese aid in the regression equation. The coefficient for the WB aid differ in size, but
not in sign and significance, compared to Table 5-4. The coefficients for Chinese aid
are largely unchanged. Table 5-B50 shows that the difference for the WB this is mainly










Table 5-B49 – OLS results: (WB Aid - Same Years as Chinese Aid)
Panel A: WB Aid (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.1505 0.0559 0.0811 -0.0606 -0.0976 0.0657 0.0717 -0.0795 -0.1004
(0.1197) (0.0949) (0.0910) (0.0864) (0.0859) (0.0865) (0.0886) (0.0884) (0.0944)
N 8736 8736 8736 8736 8700 8700 8254 8700 8254
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -0.1753∗∗ -0.0233 -0.0026 -0.1090∗ -0.0663 -0.0654 -0.0682 -0.0347 -0.0441
(0.0865) (0.0705) (0.0642) (0.0572) (0.0644) (0.0726) (0.0725) (0.0883) (0.0917)
N 9464 9464 9464 9464 8700 8700 8254 8700 8254
Country FE No Yes Yes – – – – – –
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes – –
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country ×Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD¡5). The sample includes first order subnational
regions in African countries for the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the
country-year and regional level. Conflicts are considered for the WB from 2002 to 2013 due to the lag structure. Time Trends include linear and
squared country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Interpretation: The table shows the results when restricting our estimations for WB aid to the years with available information for Chinese aid,
which reduces the sample by 5 years. The coefficient for the WB aid are different compared to Table 5-3 and lose statistical significance.
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Table 5-B50 – ADM1 IV (WB Aid - Same Years as Chinese Aid)
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV Second Stage: World Bank
ln(WorldBank Aid t-1) -0.6227 -2.3417
(1.0568) (1.6897)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.005
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 22.619 6.960
IV First stage: World Bank
IDAPosition t-1×Cum. Prob t-2 57.2759∗∗∗ 63.9080∗∗∗
(12.0429) (24.2241)
N 7975 7975
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: China
ln(ChineseAid t-2) -0.2582 -0.1886
(0.4282) (0.5256)
N 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 36.578 31.190
IV First stage: China
ChineseCommodity t-3×Cum. Prob t-3 -14.0193∗∗∗ -12.6964∗∗∗
(2.3180) (2.2734)
N 7975 7975
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict incidence indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0
if BRD¡5). The sample includes first order subnational regions in African countries for
the 1995-2012 (WB) and the 2000-2012 period (China). Standard errors in parentheses,
two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. Both regressions include year
and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared
country-specific time trends. The constituent term of the probability is depicted in the
appendix. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Interpretation: The table shows the results when restricting our estimations for WB
aid to the years with available information for Chinese aid, which reduces the sample
by 5 years. The coefficient for the WB aid are similar to those when including Chinese
aid jointly, indicating that using both aid variables in separate equations in our main
approaches does not introduce a large bias.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis analyzes different determinants of social unrest and violence of armed
groups. More specifically, it asks whether climate shocks leverage grievances of
economically disadvantaged groups. It also poses the question how competition
between groups representing one ethnic group affects violence levels. Finally, it
addresses the question if development aid promotes peace or fuel conflict.
The results show that ethnic inequality matters. Droughts are especially likely
to trigger social unrest in regions with high ethnic between-group inequality but
not so much for non-ethnic inequality measures. A validation study shows that
individuals’ perception of economic differences between their ethnicity and other
groups correlates with our measure of spatial inequality between groups. Focusing on
one specific ethnic group in Pakistan shows that armed violence is not conducted by
one representative group, but group competition among the same ethnicity increases
armed violence. Finally, there is no evidence that development aid of the World Bank
and China contributes to civil war. However, Chinese aid seems to increase state
repression and higher acceptance of autocratic rule.
Moreover, the thesis has two methodological contributions. First, we develop
a novel inequality measure that can be decomposed into inequality between and
within groups. We apply the measure to ethnic regions, but the index is flexible to
accommodate any kind of groups and spatial dimensions. Second, the thesis develops
a method to combine two well-known datasets of armed violence. The procedure
eliminates double-counting of events and allows to approximate for government
counter-insurgency measures.
The thesis points out that ethnic grievances are a crucial factor for social
unrest and armed violence that is likely to worsen with climate change trends.
A natural way to reduce the risk of social unrest induced by climate change
is to shield the economy from these shocks. Climate change adaptation is a
strategy that governments, bilateral, and multilateral donors promote along with
climate change mitigation measures. Climate change mitigation and adaptation
are necessary measures for countries, but completely eliminating the exposure from
natural hazards is infeasible and, in most cases, economically inefficient.
Subsequently, addressing grievances are important as well. However, this thesis
did not set out how to address these grievances. Also, social unrest and armed
violence may occur because citizens see the social contract broken, as they cannot
see that the government is providing them any benefits. In contrast, state repression
may undoubtedly be able to smother social unrest but may not address underlying
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tensions. Without the possibility to vent anger, these tensions could build up over
time and potentially lead to (armed) violence. Moreover, economic inequality is
merely one facet that constitutes ethnic grievances. For example, an entire literature
exists on the cause and consequences of ethnic exclusion from political participation.
Democratization is a process that many western donors like to see but could
backfire in individual settings. Chua (2003) argues that, in an attempt to win
voters, politicians may stir ethnic hatred against rich and market-dominant ethnic
minorities when market liberalization and democratization occur simultaneously.
Examples include ethnic violence against Indians in Southeast Africa or Chinese in
the Philippines and Indonesia. In contrast, a community-driven approach in the
design of development projects may reduce protests by building up accountability
and improved delivery of public services (Barron et al., 2011). Therefore, democratic
norms and values are a way to address grievances, including ethnic grievances.
However, there are no one-size-fits-all solutions to address ethnic inequality and
grievances. Fruitful future research may identify what dimension of the social
contract is broken that stirs up social unrest and how to shape policies to empower
ethnic regions that governments are willing to undertake to promote stability.
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